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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the growth performance of Sub-Saharan African 
countries and the factors that appear to be most significant in the growth 
process. Regression analysis is the main research method employed. Data 
limitations restrict the sample to thirty-two countries, over the period 1960- 
86, and the empirical study consists of fifteen factors.
There are three main groups of equations : the growth rate, the investment 
ratio, and the incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). The main conclusions 
were that the most significant influences on economic growth are the 
investment ratio, export and import growth, and political instability.
The main influences on the investment (saving) ratio were found to be per 
capita income levels, government consumption, and political instability. The 
most significant effect on the ICOR appeared to be the degree of market 
distortions, as proxied by the ratio of the black market to the official 
exchange rates.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1.1 Introduction
In their pursuit of economic growth and development, less developed 
countries have had to cope with many problems - some within and some 
beyond their own control. Those problems have affected different 
developing countries differently. In particular, the Sub-Saharan African 
countries appear to have fared worse than other less developed countries. 
Table 1.1 illustrates this, with SSA as a region experiencing the slowest 
growth rates of GNP per capita; the lowest life expectancy at birth; and the 
worst record of the growth rates of domestic investment.
Table 1.1
Selected Development Indicators Across Regions
GNP Per Capita 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate (%) 
1965-89
Life Expect- Average Annual
ancy at birth Growth Rate of
1989 (years) GDP(%)
’65-’80 '80-'89
Average 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate of 
GDI (%) 
1980-89
SSA 0.3 51 4.2 2.1 -3.9
East Asia 5.2 68 7.3 7.9 9.9
Latin America 
& Caribbean 1.9 67 6.1 1.6 -2.3
South Asia 1.8 58 3.7 5.1 4.1
OECD 2.5 76 3.8 3.0 4.3
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1991
In this thesis, an attempt is made at defining and quantifying those factors 
which appear to have most affected the growth process in the Sub-Saharan 
African countries.
Chapter two briefly surveys the various theories of growth and the different 
approaches to the problem of economic under-development. Chapter three 
examines SSA's social, economic and political problems in detail, providing 
a descriptive analysis of the continent’s predicaments. The fourth chapter 
explains the econometric approach and methodology adopted in the 
analysis, detailing the data sources and identifying the main factors which 
will be included in the equations of the following chapters.
Chapter five is devoted entirely to the examination of the effects of political 
instability on economic growth. This also includes a regression equation to 
explore 'causality' between economic growth and political instability.
The main regression models comprise the majority of chapter six, with an 
accompanying descriptive analysis of the results. This chapter forms the 
main empirical econometric analysis of the thesis, with a growth equation, a 
savings-rate equation, and an incremental capital-output ratio equation’ 
being explored. Finally, chapter seven contains a summary of the main 
results of the previous chapters, particularly of the empirical work, and an 
overall assessment of the development problems of Sub-Saharan Africa is 
presented.
The remainder of this chapter gives an overview of Africa's past growth 
performance, and some comparisons are made with other developing 
countries in order to assess the continent's relative performance.
1.2 Growth performance in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1945
With the exceptions of Liberia and Ethiopia, all the other Sub-Saharan 
African countries (SSAC’s) were colonised in 1945. The two largest 
occupying powers were Britain and France, with other European countries 
(mainly Portugal and Belgium) holding smaller territories. Thus the history
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of those African countries was very closely associated with the policies that 
the colonising powers adopted towards their colonies. In general, there was 
more interest in the welfare of the African colonies after the Second World 
War, since the people of the colonies fought alongside their occupiers and 
the colonisers wanted to stave off potential upsurges of nationalism and 
independence power struggles (Davidson, 1988, and Killick, 1992).
During the period 1945-1960, the economic growth of most African countries 
was determined, to a very large extent, by the degree the colonising powers 
were exploiting those countries' resources and administering their colonies 
(Brett, 1973). This was nearly always geared towards the security of the 
White population that had settled in Africa, and the security of supplies of the 
major trading commodities of each country/region. The returns from this 
trade mostly went to the companies and individual traders who were 
engaged in trade, but some of it went towards the administration and 
development of the colonies. Railways and ports were set up, new crops 
and new technologies were introduced and educational facilities were 
established by charities and the various churches. All these factors, together 
with rising world demand for the primary products of Africa, ensured a fair 
growth rate of the African economies despite being subjected to occupation 
and exploitation (see Table 1.2 below).
The late 1950s and early 1960s saw drastic changes in most African 
countries, as it was a period of decolonisation and independence for most of 
them. Apart from twelve countries1, South Africa and Namibia, the whole of 
Sub-Saharan Africa was independent by 1966. This, among other things, 
meant that the economic progress of those countries was now the sole 
responsibility of their respective governments. However, links with the 
colonising powers were not cut-off, and considerable economic and political 
support still came from those countries to their ex-colonies, as evident by the 
aid levels given, the number of expatriate workers remaining in the African 
countries, and trading links, such as France, for example, being the main 
trading partner for most of the Franc Zone countries and, to a lesser extent, 
Britain for the ex-British colonies (Africa South of the Sahara, 1988).
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Table 1.2
Average annual growth rates of GDP and of GDI/GDP (Gross Domestic 
Investment ratio) for a selection of SSA countries, 1950-60.
GDP(%) GDI/GDP(%)
Botswana 2.9 8.4
Central African Rep. 2.6 19.6
Congo 1.1 52.9
Gabon 11.5 50.1
Ghana 4.1 19.7
Kenya 4.0 22.1
Mali 3.2 13.4
Mauritius 0.1 17.3
Mozambique 3.1 8.7
Nigeria 4.1 11.7
Sudan 5.5 7.0
Swaziland 8.4 12.9
Tanzania 6.0 14.4
Zaire 3.4 20.3
Zambia 5.6 25.8
Source : World Bank, World Tables, Third edition, 1984
The 1960s saw continuing economic growth in Africa, sometimes at very 
high rates (see Table 1.5). World demand for the exports of those countries 
was still high, and, according to the World Bank (1981), the net barter terms 
of trade grew at an average rate of 2.9% annually between 1961 and 1970 
for SSA as a whole. Per capita income and output were growing, education, 
health and infrastructure spending was rising (see chapter three). 
Furthermore, the rest of the world was experiencing boom conditions with 
continually rising demand (Brett, 1984), and there was increased aid and 
loans (especially bilateral) to those African countries that needed them. This 
situation continued until the early 1970s.
The 1970s presented a completely different setting, particularly after the 
1973/74 oil price rise and subsequent world recession. Output growth 
deteriorated and even became negative in some African countries, as 
Tables 1.4 and 1.6 show.
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Table 1.3 gives some indication of the changes in the SSA economies. 
When examining the performance of those countries, it is often more fruitful 
to exclude the oil-exporters, particularly Nigeria and to study the 
performance of the latter separately. Nigeria is of particular significance due 
to its exceptionally large population, as well as its sizeable oil exports.
According to World Bank data, the volume growth rate of thirty main 
agricultural exports fell from 1.9 to -1.9% per annum between the periods 
1961-71 and 1971-79 (World Bank, 1981). At the same time, the world bank 
maintains that imports of food and agricultural produce were rising markedly. 
Reserves were being drastically run down and a balance of payments crisis 
was in the making. Towards the end of the decade, this crisis was well 
entrenched. Debt levels were rising despite the falling ability of the 
borrowing countries to service or repay their loans. Falling import volumes 
(due to the lack of funds to purchase them) began to hamper any significant 
growth in exports and potential exports, as the machinery required to 
produce those exports were unaffordable on the scale that was necessary.
As Table 1.4 illustrates, the growth of food production was significantly lower 
than the population growth rates, which appeared to be increasing 
continuously. Food imports were rising reinforcing external food 
dependency. According to the World Bank (1981), incomes per head were 
being eroded to levels below poverty standards and access to basic needs 
was limited. Falling world demand for African products reduced further the 
market share of those countries, having also significantly reduced their 
export revenues. The agricultural sector was particularly severely hit by the 
recession as total agricultural output fell to levels below those of the 1950s. 
This fall was detrimental as agricultural output was, in many ways, the single 
most important determinant of overall economic growth in many Sub- 
Saharan African countries where agriculture forms the largest sector. The 
World Bank (1989) also states that over the past three decades, agricultural 
production in SSA has risen by only 2% a year, while agricultural exports 
have declined, and food imports increased at around 7% a year.
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Table 1.3
Comparable Economic Indicators
GNP per Capita,Average Average Annual Average Annual
Annual Growth Rates(%) Growth Rate in Growth Rate of
1960-70 1970-79 Volume of Exports GDP(%)
1970-79 1960-70 1970-79
All SSA 1.3 0.8 I o 00 3.9 2.9
Low income 
SSA 1.6 -0.3 -1.9 3.7 1.7
SSA excluding 
Nigeria 1.3 0.7 -0.8 4.1 1.6
Nigeria 0.1 4.2 -0.3 3.1 7.5
All low-income
developing
countries 1.8 1 .6 -0.8 4.5 4.7
All Ind­
ustrialised 4.1 2.5 5.9 5.1 3.2
SSA oil 
exporters 4.4* 0.5** -0.1 3.4 4.6
Source : World Bank, "Accelerated Development in Sub Saharan Africa", 1981
1965-73
1973-80
The second oil price rise and world recession of 1978/79 also hit the African 
countries severely. It served to further deepen the effects of the former 
world recession and to further hamper any development efforts. While other 
less developed countries might have coped relatively well, the African 
countries were not well equiped (econom ically, po litica lly  or 
administratively) to deal with this second shock. Growth rates continued to 
deteriorate, output and export revenues continued to fall until the early 
1980s, when some improvements started to occur (see chapter three).
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Table 1.4
Food and Agricultural indicators in SSA over various periods
61/63 to 69/71 69/71 to 77/79
Rate of growth of 
ave. annual volume 
of production of 
total cereals
2.3 1.3
1965-73 1973-80 1980-87
Growth of production 
of total cereals (%) : 
total SSA 
excluding Nigeria
2.0
2.3
0.9
2.0
2.3
1.7
Average annual 
population growth : 
total SSA 
excluding Nigeria
2.6
2.6
2.8
2.9
3.1
3.1
1965 1980
% share of food 
in merchandise 
imports : 
total SSA 
excluding Nigeria
14
15
16
15
Source : World Bank, 1981 and 1989
However, one of the heaviest loads that remain crippling the African 
economies is the debt burden. Many SSAC's are heavily in debt, and any 
increase in export revenues or in funds from other sources are being sucked 
in to pay the debt service as well as the debts themselves. More recently, 
however, many SSA countries have obtained some debt and debt-service 
relief and rescheduling programmes. Some argue that those measures
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have been 'too little and too late'. This issue is further elaborated upon in 
chapters three and seven.
1.3 Comparisons of Economic Growth Performance
It is interesting to note how the growth rates of other Less-Developed 
Countries (LDC's) compare with those of the SSAC's. Table 1.5 below 
gives some indication of this.
Table 1.5
Average Annual Growth Rates (%) of GDP at Factor Cost
1950-60 1960-70 1970-81 1980-86 Differenc
1970S-6I
Other Developina Countries
Algeria 6.5 4.3 6.9 3.4 +2.6
Argentina 2.7 4.3 1.9 -0.6 -2.4
Brazil n/a 8.2 8.4 3.8 +0.2
Chile 4.0 4.4 2.1 1.8 -2.3
Egypt n/a 4.3 8.1 6.8 +3.8
India 3.8 3.4 3.7 5.5 +0.3
Indonesia n/a 3.9 7.8 4.4 +3.9
Rep. of Korea 5.1 8.6 9.0 6.7 +0.4
Malaysia n/a n/a 7.8 5.0 n/a
Morocco 2.0 4.4 5.2 3.2 -0.8
Pakistan n/a 6.7 4.9 7.3 -1.8
Philippines 6.5 5.1 6.2 0.5 +1.1
Singapore n/a 8.8 8.6 6.1 -0.2
Thailand n/a 8.4 7.2 5.3 -1.2
Portugal n/a 6.2 4.4 2.1 -1.8
Greece n/a 6.9 4.4 1.4 -2.5
Cyprus n/a 6.7 4.6 5.5 -1.2
High Income Countries
Australia n/a 5.6 3.3 2.6 -2.3
Canada 4.6 5.6 3.8 1.8 -1.8
France 4.5 5.5 3.3 2.5 -2.2
Germany 8.7 4.4 2.6 1.6 -1.8
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(Table 1.5 cont.)
Ireland 1.5 4.2 4.0 1.5 -0.2
Italy 5.7 5.5 2.9 0.7 -2.6
Japan 6.4 10.4 4.5 2.0 -5.9
Spain n/a 6.3 3.4 3.8 -2.9
Sweden 3.4 4.4 1.8 1.0 -2.8
UK 2.4 2.9 1.7 1.1 -1.2
USA 3.2 4.3 2.9 1.2 -1.4
Angola n/a 4.8 -7.3 n/a -12.1
Benin n/a 2.6 3.3 3.6 +0.7
Botswana n/a 5.7 12.6 11.9 +6.9
Burundi n/a 5.2 3.2 n/a -2.0
Cameroon 1.7 3.7 6.3 8.2 +2.6
Cape Verde n/a n/a 1.6 n/a n/a
C A R n/a 1.9 1.6 1.1 -0.3
Congo 1.1 3.5 5.5 5.1 +2.0
Ethiopia n/a 4.4 2.2 0.8 -2.0
Gambia n/a 6.2 4.5 n/a -1.7
Ghana 4.1 2.2 -0.3 0.7 -2.5
Cote D'Ivoire n/a 8.0 6.2 -0.3 -1.8
Kenya n/a 5.8 5.8 3.4 0.0
Liberia n/a 6.5 1.3 -1.3 -5.2
Malawi n/a 4.9 6.2 2.4 + 1.3
Mali 3.2 3.3 4.6 0.4 +1.3
Mauritania n/a 6.7 1.7 1.0 -5.0
Mozambique n/a 4.6 -2.1 -9.0 -6.6
Niger n/a 2.9 3.1 -2.6 +0.2
Nigeria n/a 3.1 4.5 -3.2 +1.4
S. Tome & P. n/a n/a -2.5 n/a n/a
Senegal n/a 2.5 2.0 3.2 -0.5
S.Leone n/a 3.6 1.9 0.4 -1.7
Sudan n/a -0.6 6.6 0.3 +7.2
Swaziland n/a 8.6 4.5 n/a -4.1
Tanzania n/a 5.4 4.0 0.9 -1.4
Togo n/a 8.5 3.1 -1.1 -5.4
Uganda n/a 4.8 -1.6 0.7 -6.4
Zaire n/a n/a -0.2 1.0 n/a
Zambia n/a n/a 0.4 -0.1 n/a
Zimbabwe n/a n/a 1.6 2.6 n/a
Source: World Bank World Tables , third edition.
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To begin with, data for the period 1950-60 for most of the SSAC's is not 
available from World Bank sources (hence the changes calculated in the last 
column of the table are between the 1970s and the 1960s only). It is also 
very difficult to obtain from other sources (such as the IMF and the Economic 
Commission for Africa). However, nearly all countries have growth figures 
available for the 1960s onwards.
Apparent from the table is that many SSAC's appear to have fared relatively 
well in terms of the growth rates of GDP, when compared to the growth 
figures of the so-called the ’Semi-Industrialised' or Newly Industrialised 
Countries' (the NIC's - the Philippines, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Brazil, Uruguay, Turkey, Yugoslavia), and even to those of the 
industrialised countries. Others, like Angola, Mozambique, Mauritania and 
Uganda have shown a much worse performance than the rest, mainly due to 
the fact that those countries have experienced wars and political instability to 
different degrees throughout the period under study.
The amounts by which the economic growth rates have fallen in the SSA 
countries are in many cases similar to the declines in the growth rates of the 
industrialised countries-. Perhaps a more relevant comparison can be made 
between the performance of the SSA countries and the NIC's, as well as 
with other developing countries. However, it is not especially helpful to draw 
any comparisons between those groups, given the very different structures 
of their economies (even though there is clearly more similarity between the 
SSA countries and other developing countries than with the developed 
countries). This also brings us on to the complicated issue of the meaning of 
development, and whether the growth figures of average incomes per capita 
and of aggregate output are a sufficient measure, or a good indication of the 
state of 'development' of a country, or whether other indicators, such as 
education levels and health indicators, would give a better overall picture of 
a country’s development level (Killick, 1980).
Looking at the 1960-70 and 1970-81 World Bank growth figures for 
developing countries other than the SSAC's, it is apparent that they have 
fared well and coped relatively better with the economic shocks of the 
1970s, with most of them experiencing relatively small falls in growth rates,
10
and some, rather surprisingly, experiencing small rises in their growth 
figures (such as the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, India and Brazil). 
This may be due to a disproportionately high rise in the prices of their main 
export products, being high enough to counteract the costs of the increase in 
international oil prices. However, this is not a sufficiently strong reason 
accounting for the relatively good performance of those countries in the face 
of the world recessions of the 1970s.
Table 1.6 indicates that Africa did not suffer significantly more than other 
LDC's due to the changes in international commodity prices over the period 
1972 to 1981. It also appears that SSA’s terms of trade did not deteriorate 
as much as those of the other included groups, except the 15 heavily- 
indebted countries. Yet, what is apparent is that SSA's export and import 
volumes fell significantly more than those of the included Asian NICs and the 
heavily-indebted countries.
Table 1.6
Trade indicators for different developing-country groupings, 1972-81. 
(Percent, average annual changes).
Non-fuel
commodity
prices
Export
volumes
Import
volumes
Terms of 
trade
SSA1 9.2 0.3 0.9 -0.8
4 Asian NIC’s^ 10.2 15.3 10.8 -2.9
Small low-income
economies3 8.7 -0.2 0.7 -1.4
15 heavily-indebted
countries4 9.1 2.4 7.6 4.9
Source : IMF,"World Economic Outlook", May 1990.
1 Excluding Nigeria and South Africa
2 Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan
3 Excluding India and China. This group comprises those countries whose GDP per person
did not exceed the equivalent of U.S.$425 in1986. 31 out of those 45 countries are in
SSA.
4 Those countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Columbia, Cote D'Ivoire, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
11
Furthermore, Tabie 1.7 shows that the terms of trade for the type of export 
did not favour the NICs or other exporters of manufactures, over the 
exporters of agricultural and primary commodities, as the average terms of 
trade for manufactures over the period 1972-81 appears to have 
deteriorated more than that for any other category. Thus, it is clear that 
factors other than terms of trade movements have contributed to making the 
economies of the NICs more resilient than those of the SSACs in the face of 
powerful economic shocks. Some of those factors are reviewed in the 
following discussion.
Table 1.7
Average Annual Changes (%) in the terms of trade (ToT) by predominant 
export, 1972-82
Category AToT
Fuel 17.8
Non-Fuel exports -0.9
Manufactures -2.1
Primary Products -0.1
Agricultural products 0.2
Minerals -0.6
Diversified
Export Base 1.0
Source : IMF, World Economic Outlook.1990
The degree to which individual economies were affected by the 1970s oil 
price rises depended on a number of factors, including dependence on 
imported petroleum, ability to obtain international capital, non-oil terms of 
trade, the composition of their international trade, the structural 
characteristics of their economies, the degree of diversification of their export 
base, and, perhaps most importantly, their policy response to the 
disturbances.
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According to the world bank (1981), prior to 1973 (and for many years after 
it), the SSAC’s followed development policies which, it has been argued, 
were narrow in their long-term perspective. The largest sources of revenue 
were mainly those attained from the country’s main export products. For 
most of the SSAC's, these were usually one or two agricultural products 
which were the main foreign exchange earners. Major changes in the 
demand for those products or in their international prices were not 
anticipated or taken into account in policy formulation. Such changes were 
most probably similarly ignored by other countries world-wide, but many of 
those had sufficient diversification and flexibility in their economic structures 
to be able to somewhat cushion the 1973/74 and 1978/79 shocks to their 
systems. This is perhaps what other developing countries, such as 
Singapore, Korea, Brazil, Taiwan and Turkey managed to do better than the 
SSA countries (Chenery, 1986).
It appears that the main conclusion here is that some non-oil developing 
countries adjusted better than others to the shocks of the 1970s because of 
several factors. According to Chenery (1986) and the World Bank (1981), 
two important factors were their more diversified economic structure and 
more highly trained and flexible labour force. For other LDC's, the 
disturbances exposed underlying structural weaknesses which made them 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks. One of the most essential 
features of the NICs' approach to the first oil-price shock was the apparent 
maintenance of high levels of imports of essential intermediate and capital 
goods. This was aided by increasing the levels of their external borrowing 
and maintaining as high rates of growth of export earnings as possible (after 
1975).
This was perhaps easier for the NIC's because of their apparent underlying 
structural strength, and their generally higher 'creditworthiness* with 
international financial institutions . They had also accelerated the 
diversification of their productive structure and adopted policies aimed at 
integrating their economies more closely with the world economy, and, 
particularly after 1973, policies were formulated taking into account the slow­
down in world trade and the higher petroleum prices within their broader
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development objectives, in an attempt to minimise the disruption to the 
growth of their economies.
Furthermore, the Semi-industrialised Countries had specialised more in 
manufactured exports; a sector which can be subjected to adjustment 
relatively easier than the agricultural sector, which provided many of SSA's 
exports. The latter exhibits more structural rigidity and difficulties in 
adjustment than the former (World Bank, 1989). The problems with SSA's 
agricultural sector are examined in greater detail in the third chapter of this 
thesis.
It is argued (World Bank, 1981 and 1989), that to be effective, measures to 
strengthen a country's external position by addressing short-term 
disequilibrium must be accompanied by restructuring of a longer term 
nature, with increasing shifts in resource use to production of tradable 
goods. That the NIC's were in general able to adjust in this way to a greater 
extent than other non-oil developing countries was related to their already 
more advanced economic structure, flexibility, higher levels of human 
capital, and their generally higher creditworthiness and greater access to 
external capital (OECD, 1988). Another important factor is the fact that these1 
countries experienced relative political stability throughout this period of 
international economic upheaval. This stable environment provided the 
basis for investment and growth. The role of political stability in the growth 
process is explored further in chapter five.
It is, therefore, unfair to attribute the dismal economic performance of the 
1970s in Sub-Saharan Africa completely to the misguided actions of the 
governments of those countries, since it can be said that the high rates of 
growth achieved by the NIC's in manufacturing production and exports is 
also due to a variety of historic circumstances, locational, geographic, 
climatic as well as physical and natural attributes which those countries 
have enjoyed. In addition, the African countries achieved independence 
later than the NIC's, who therefore had all the advantages of an earlier start, 
including earlier investment in human capital and education, the benefits of 
which appear after a time-lag of perhaps five to ten years.
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Yet, it is argued that internal factors and government mismanagement have 
played a very significant role in Africa's economic plight (e.g. World 
Bank,1981 and 1989, and Steel and Evans, 1984). For example, it could be 
said that among others, interest rate, incomes and exchange rate policies 
were used with increasing effectiveness by a number of NIC's as a means of 
managing aggregate demand. For instance, the maintenance of positive 
real interest rates have made financial intermediation by the banks and 
other institutions possible and successful in attracting private savings, thus 
contributing to a more efficient allocation of these savings among the 
alternative investment opportunities available. Furthermore, by allowing the 
exchange rate to depreciate slowly, while at the same time curbing domestic 
monetary expansion gradually rather than abruptly, some countries 
improved their balance of payments and simultaneously avoided a serious 
and prolonged adverse impact on economic growth and employment.
In addition, coordinated interest rate and exchange rate policies have made 
it possible for a number of countries with domestic rates of inflation above 
those of world inflation to maintain positive interest rates, and thus provide 
incentives for domestic savers, thereby discouraging capital flight and often 
attracting savings and investment from abroad. Overly expansive domestic 
fiscal and monetary policies were also avoided, and much needed cuts in 
areas of domestic expenditure were executed to suit the economic 
environment that was created in the 1970s, in a further attempt to avoid 
ever-escalating deficits and balance of payments crises (World Bank, 1981).
Yet, as mentioned above, it might be questioned as to how relevant or useful 
is the experience of the semi-industrialised countries, or indeed, of other 
less developed countries when studying the Sub-Saharan African growth 
record.
It is clear that acceptable rates of growth in GDP and GDP per head have 
been observed in countries with markedly differing overall strategies to 
growth and development. For example, some countries have adopted 
outward oriented paths to development, favouring trade and export-led 
development attitudes (such as Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan). Others, like 
Yugoslavia, appear to have achieved good growth results under a socialist
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worker-management regime. A third path to development that has been 
adopted by many LDC's and is more inward looking is that of import- 
substituting industrialisation. This was followed with varying degrees of 
success by Mexico and Brazil (Chenery et al, 1986), whose economies grew 
rapidly, but a high social cost was involved, such as increasing income 
inequality and environmental degradation.
The process is more one of matching policies to conditions - observing 
carefully the circumstances (both domestically and internationally) which 
face a country so that a change in conditions of, say, demand or supply is 
adequately and speedily dealt with. However, keeping a long-term 
perspective is also important, in addition to policy flexibility and pragmatism. 
Furthermore, the consequences of particular policies are not the same in all 
countries. Indeed, similar policy instruments may produce vastly different 
results in different countries, depending, among other things, on the 
interaction of the social and political forces prevailing.
Therefore, given the differences between the SSA and the NIC economies, it 
is apparent that no great benefit can be obtained from directly comparing the 
two together. Yet, this is not to say that studying the experiences and history 
of other developing countries is of no relevance to the African experience. 
To the contrary, comparisons are useful, even if only to examine and learn 
from the differences.
1.4 Summary
In analysing the economic problems of SSA, different analysts adopt 
different approaches. Apart from the traditional classical/neo-classical 
approach, the 'structuralists' approach, and the stages theories, recent 
debate has tended to concentrate on the influences of the internal 
(endogenous) vs. the external (exogenous) factors that appear to determine 
growth. Many recent World Bank reports are examples of this (e.g. World 
Bank 1989 and 1990). Wheeler (1984) and Killick (1992) have also 
followed that approach.
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The approach adopted here consists of a mixture of the neo-classical 
factors, structural, and internal/external factors. It was thought best to 
concentrate on the Sub-Saharan African countries only, as within the 
continent, there appears to be sufficient diversity of experience and 
economic performance, with some countries showing great success, such as 
Botswana, while others exhibiting significant failure in managing their 
economies. There is also a commonality in the key characteristics of those 
economies to warrant such a specific approach across SSA. Examples of 
those characteristics are the comparatively recent experiences of 
independence, political fragility, generally small economic size, trade 
openness, the nature of agriculture, and human capital levels.
Therefore, this thesis is a descriptive and empirical cross-sectional 
examination of the African growth experience, and the factors that are 
thought to influence the continent's growth rates. However, before dealing 
specifically with the problems of SSA, we will review the main growth 
theories that have been expounded since the 1950s in the following chapter.
NOTES
1 Those twelve countries are Mauritius, Swaziland, Equatorial Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Angola, Seychelles, Djibouti and Zimbabwe.
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CHAPTER TWO 
ECONOMIC GROWTH THEORY
2.1 Introduction
This chapter is a review of the main theories and models that have been put 
foreword to explain the economic growth process. The purpose of this 
review is to identify the factors that economic theory argues are significant in 
affecting the growth of aggregate output. These factors form the basis of the 
empirical work of later chapters.
A number of growth models have been developed, especially since the post­
war years (after 1945), to explain an economy's long-run trend or potential 
growth path. The models that will be examined here are the (neo-classical) 
one-sector growth models, two-sector models, the structural theories and 
'multi-sector' models, endogenous growth models, and foreign trade issues. 
Some strategic aspects of growth will also be briefly reviewed, such as the 
'big push' theories, balanced vs. unbalanced growth, and the 'engine of 
growth' debate.
Finally, drawing on the theoretical discussion, we will summarise the key 
factors influencing African economic growth. These will be tested in the 
empirical work of chapter six.
Firstly, however, we will review the 'stylised facts' of African economic 
growth.
2.2 The 'Stylised Facts' of African growth
Kaldor introduced the concept of the stylised facts of growth in 1958 to 
describe the
'long term regularities in the relationships that seem to appear in most 
industrial countries, between growth rates of output and capital and 
labour inputs, and between factor prices and relative income shares'.
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The African 'stylised facts', or empirical observations, that growth models 
need to explain are naturally different to those of the industrial countries. 
According to Branson (1979), in the industrial countries, the growth rates of 
capital appear to be fairly constant and greater than the growth rates of the 
labour force. This implies that the capital-labour ratio would be increasing 
through time. The growth rate of the capital stock also appears to be nearly 
equal to the growth rate of output, thus making the capital-output ratio fairly 
constant. Also, the growth rates of potential output (the product of average 
labour productivity and the total labour force) are greater than those of the 
labour input, both growing at a fairly steady rate through time, resulting in a 
positive growth rate of output per worker.
Finally, regarding the profit rate and relative income shares, it was observed 
that in the long term, the profit rate is fairly constant. Given that the capital- 
output ratio is also fairly constant, this indicates a relatively constant 
distribution of output between wages and profits in the long run. More on the 
theories relating to those observations is presented in the following sections.
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the empirical observations, or stylised 
facts, are summarised in Table 2.1 below.
Table 2.1
SSA's 'stylised facts'. Average annual growth rates (%)
1960-70 1970-80 1980-85
Labour force 2.0 2.1 2.3
Gross domestic investment 5.7 3.2 -8.2
GDP 3.9 2.9 0.5
Source : World Bank "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", 1981, and "Sub- 
Saharan Africa - from Crisis to Sustainable Growth", 1989.
The growth rate of the labour force appears to be fairly steady - around the 
2% level. However, the growth rate of output appears to fluctuate markedly 
over time, resulting in a correspondingly significant fluctuation in output per 
labour force unit.
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If we take the growth rate of GDI (Gross Domestic Investment) as a proxy for 
the growth rate of the capital stock, then from Table 2.1 above, it is clear that 
this has experienced severe fluctuations from the period 1960-70 to 1980- 
87. During the 1980s, this ratio became negative and less than the growth 
rate of the labour force. This indicates that unlike the case in the industrial 
countries, the SSA countries have experienced a period when the growth 
rate of the capital stock is slower than that of the labour force, implying that 
the growth of the capital-labour ratio was not always positive.
Another 'stylised fact' of African growth is that the growth rate of capital is not 
similar to the growth rate of output. Therefore, the capital-output ratio could 
not be constant over time.
Finally, given the data deficiency problems for SSA, it would be difficult to 
reach a conclusion regarding the profit rate and relative income shares. 
However, if we take the figures for the average annual growth rate of 
earnings per employee to indicate the share of labour from output, then the 
figure for SSA as a whole is -1.5% for the period 1970-80, and -4.8% for 
1980-87 (UNDP, 1991). This indicates that wages were falling in the 
specified periods, implying a falling share of output of the labour input. This 
does not imply that the share of profits was rising (data availability was, 
again, very problematic). However, combined with the previous three facts, 
it may be deduced that the relative income shares were not constant in SSA.
The 'stylising' of some of the facts of SSA's growth experience along the 
lines of Kaldor, reveals that, for one thing, the continent's growth experience 
is somewhat different from that of the industrial countries. Africa's growth 
has not exhibited the stable features of the former. Thus, the empirical 
analysis will need to introduce factors to attempt to explain why this is so. 
These include government-induced distortions, political instability, and 
climatic factors, all of which are discussed in greater detail in the following 
chapter.
Growth models would, therefore, need to provide some explanation of the 
African experience specifically. Yet, as they stand, the traditional models of 
growth (as reviewed in the following section) appear somewhat deficient in 
explaining the lack of growth of developing countries, particularly SSA
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(Todaro,1989, and Branson, 1979). This may be because, initially, they 
were formulated to explain the historical growth experiences of the industrial 
countries given their own set of conditions and special circumstances. 
However, they provide the basic foundations of the growth process. For 
SSA, the additional special problems of growth are described in section 2.8 
below.
We will now review the various growth paradigms, starting with the neo­
classical one-sector model.
2.3 One-Sector Growth Models
Growth models formulate functions of output growth (usually defined as 
growth of real GDP) as depending on inputs into the production process, 
which are Capital (K), Labour (L), and, in more detailed models, other factors 
such as land and technical progress are included.
A combination of three assumptions typically form the basis of growth 
models:
(i) Labour supply is exogenously determined and it grows at some given 
rate: gi_. Thus the labour force at time t is given by
Lt = L 0e9Lt (1)
where L0 is the initial labour force.
This formulation has sometimes been made in terms of 'effective' labour 
units, E , as follows:
Et= Ltex t = L0 e(9L+>-)t (2)
where
X = rate at which each labour unit is becoming more 
productive in time, due to skill improvement 
= rate of increase of average labour productivity.
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(ii) A production function is incorporated, in which labour and capita! 
inputs transform at any given time, t , into output Qt :
Qt = F(Kt,Lt) (3)
Further assumptions of this function are that the marginal products of capital 
and labour are positive and decreasing as the relevant input increases. The 
function is also assumed to be homogeneous of the first degree in K and L, 
implying constant returns to scale.
(iii) The last assumption in this single-sector growth model is a Saving (S) 
and Investment ( I ) relationship, which determines how much of 
current output will be saved and how much will be invested to add to 
the existing capital stock.
These models assume full employment with planned saving equal to 
planned investment. Thus the following static equation will hold:
S = I (4)
where,
S = income not spent on consumption (both public and 
private)
I = total public and private investment = dK/dt
It follows that
dK/dt = St = It (the process of capital formation).
In the simplest versions of the neo-classical model, it is assumed that a 
constant fraction of income is saved 's' and invested, raising K by sQt from 
one period to the following period :
It = St = sQt = dK/dt
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The three basic functions above form a simple explanation of the growth 
process. Equations (1) and (2) determine the labour input at time t. 
Combined with the capital stock inherited at the beginning of period t, this 
produces a flow of output, Q t , through the production function. The saving 
function then determines what fraction of output is invested in period t. This 
investment adds to the inherited capital stock to give a larger stock which is 
passed on to the next period. That stock then combines with the larger 
labour force in t+1 to produce an increased level of output Qt+1 .
Formalised growth models of this type will be discussed next, starting with 
the Harrod-Domar (H/D) model.
2.3.1 The Harrod-Domar Model
This is a simple model of the determination of the rate of economic growth. It 
emphasises saving behaviour, even though this may not be very stable in a 
developing country. It is often used to calculate the investment requirements 
necessary to achieve a target rate of growth of per capita income in a 
developing country.
The assumptions made in the basic model are:
(i) A closed economy.
(ii) Only two factors of production, capital (K) and labour (L).
(iii) Fixed coefficients of production.
(iv) No technical progress.
(v) A single producing sector in the economy (used for 
consumption and for investment).
(vi) A constant net savings rate (s).
If
I = amount of investment capital, 
g = rate of growth , and 
K = capital stock available,
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then it can be said that
I = gK 
or, I = g.v.Y
where v = K/Y,
and so K = vY
'v1 is thus the capital/output ratio,
By assumption
I =S
where S = Savings, and
I = Investment level
Also, S = sY (savings are a constant ratio [s] of output)
Thus,
g.v.Y = sY
or,
gv = s
Rewriting this in terms of the growth rate gives 
g =s/v
which is the basic growth equation of the H/D model. This 'g' is called the 
"warranted growth rate". It is the rate of growth at which desired I is equal to 
desired S, i.e. it is the rate of growth that would maintain full employment of 
the capital stock.
Given an exogenous rate of growth of the labour force, gi_, and a fixed- 
coefficient production function of the type Q\  = F(K,L), output Qt, must grow 
at the same rate as effective labour input, so that:
Q° = g|_+ x
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where, ° denotes the rate of growth of that variable, and
^ = rate of growth of average labour productivity. 
gL+ ^ is known as the 'natural rate' of growth of labour 
in the H/D model.
Thus,
gL+ ^ = n.
The condition
Q° = L° = E° = q l + *
must be satisfied if full employment of the labour force is to be maintained .
For both K and L to be fully employed as an economy grows, we have the 
H/D condition :
gi_+ = s/v.
However, since g[_+ ^ , s ,and v were all independently fixed by 
assumption to begin with, the possibility of gL+ ^ to equal (s/v) is minimal.
If (gi_+ M  is greater than (s/v), there will be increasing unemployment of 
labour and violation of the initial equilibrium assumption.
Also, if (gL+ ^ ) is smaller than (s/v) , excess capital will develop and the 
economy will also be out of equilibrium.
Thus the H/D condition does not guarantee full equilibrium, unless (gi_+ ^ ) 
is equal to (s/v) , which can only happen by chance. The initial assumptions 
are therefore, too rigid, rendering the model unstable. It is an "over- 
determined" model due to the assumptions of fixed production coefficients, 
fixed savings ratio, and a fixed effective labour force growth, which leave no 
freedom for movement towards equilibrium in the model.
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However, this rigidity can be relaxed by
(i) changing the production function to allow substitution between K and 
L, permitting the equilibrium capital-output ratio (v) to be determined 
by the growth process itself, or
(ii) making the savings ratio itself a function of the profit rate or the 
distribution of income between K and L, allowing 's' to also be 
determined by the growth process, or
(iii) a combination of the above two alternatives.
The basic neo-classical growth model, formulated by Solow employs the first
option.
2.3.2 The Neo-Classical-Solow Growth model and extensions
This model is based on the following assumptions:
(i) The growth of the labour force is exogenously given as g|_,
(ii) The production function is Q = F(K,L). Its main properties
being that the function exhibits constant returns to scale, it is
homogeneous of the first degree, K and L are substitutable and 
diminishing marginal productivities exist, and,
(iii) Investment (I) and Savings (S) are a fixed proportion of output.
It = St = sQt
Re-writing the production function in a per capita form :
q = F(K/L ,1) = f(k/l) = f(k).
L
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Output per man is a function of capital per man alone. As the growth 
process proceeds, substitutionality between K and L gives a way of varying 
the capital-output ratio.
q = Q[L = Q = 1 (the inverse of v).
k K/L K v
It can be shown that the above production function, f(k), taken together with 
the assumptions made concerning the exogenous growth rate of the labour 
force and the Investment-Saving function, yield a dynamic system that tends 
towards equilibrium values of 'k' (the capital-labour ratio), 'q' (the output per 
man), and 'v1 (the capital-output ratio). Furthermore, this equilibrium can be 
shown to be stable1.
Thus this model explains the convergence of an economy towards a steady 
growth path where Q° = K°, and V  (the capital output ratio) is constant, but 
it is not consistent with the empirical long term observation of growth models 
that both Q° and K° are greater than L°. This discrepancy can be eliminated 
by adding a technical progress factor to the growth of the labour force, giving 
an effective labour force growing faster than L. Furthermore, by allowing V  
to vary, this model explains how the economy will tend towards a growth 
path along which the H/D condition for balanced full employment growth is 
met.
The role of the savings rate 's' in this model can be seen by analysing the 
model if 's' increases (or decreases). If 's' increases, then the investment 
level will rise above the level needed to keep the capital stock growing as 
fast as the labour force at ko* (the initial capital stock equilibrium), it follows
that the capital-labour ratio, K/L , begins to rise towards the new equilibrium 
k-j* where, again, growth of that larger capital stock at the rate gL will
absorb si Q of investment. There will therefore be a departure from one 
equilibrium k* to another. That is to say, there will be a movement from one 
equilibrium growth path to another - the equilibrium growth path will shift 
upwards, bringing a transitory period of output growth at a faster growth rate 
than gL as output per man rises from qo* to q1*. The economy will finally 
settle at a new growth path with the same slope, i.e. the same growth rate , 
as the earlier one, equal to the growth rate of the labour force, but one with
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the higher level output, due to the increase in the savings rate. This process 
is illustrated in the diagram below (Fig. 2.1). Similarly, the opposite occurs 
when a decrease in the savings rate takes place.
The neo-classical model also has implications for the profit rate, p , the real 
wage rate, w , and the distribution of output to relative factor income shares 
with competitive pricing assumptions.
To begin with, in a competitive economy with constant returns, the profit rate 
is the return on capital, which is equal to the marginal product of capital 
(MPK).
Thus,
p = MPK = dQ/dK = Lf'(K/L). (1/L)
P =f(k) ;
Given that the per capita production function is 
q = Q/L = F(K/L , 1) = f(K/L) = f(k),
and therefore, the total production function is 
Q = Lf(K/L) = Lf(k)
Therefore, the profit rate, p , is the slope of the per capita production function.
As to the real wage rate, in a competitive economy, the return to labour is the 
marginal product of labour (MPL).
Thus,
w = MPL = dQ/dL = Lf'(K/L) (-K/L2) + f (K/L)
or,
w = f (k) - k f  (k)
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Figure 2.1
Equilibrium growth paths before and after an increase in the saving rate.
Q/L = q (gL/so).k
(gL/sl).k
f(k)
ko* k1*
InQ
Qtl
QtO (slope=gL)
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That is to say,
wages/man = (output/man) - (capital/man) (profits/capital)
= (output/man) - (profits/man)
which is true if w + p = Q, (i.e. we have constant returns to scale - Euler's 
rule^).
A further issue remains to be discussed relating to the neo-classical model,
and that is the introduction of technical progress. This can be introduced in
the form of a rate of increase in labour productivity, exogenously determined.
Redefining 'L* in the model as 'E' - the effective labour force, to include the 
number of workers and technical progress :
gL = rate of growth of the labour force
X = rate of growth of the effective labour units per man.
Therefore,
E \ = Lte^t = Loe 9l* e^t a Loe(9L+^)t
Again, having the production function in the form 
Qt =F (K t ,Et )
or in per capita terms,
q = Q/E = Q/LeW = f(K /Le^) = f (k)
Where
k = K/E.
Thus the growth rate of 'k' is given by
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or k° = sQ/K - ( 9 l + X )  = sq/k - ( g L +x)  
= sf  (k)/k - ( g l + x)
o
Again at equilibrium, k = 0 ,
Therefore at k* ,
sf(k*)/k* = 9 |_+ X
or,
f(k*) = [(9 L + X)  . k*] / s
At equilibrium, k* and q* can be obtained. Along the equilibrium path 
K° = E° = 9 |_ + X (if K/E is constant at k *)
and
Q° = E °=  9 l +  X = K° (if Q/E is constant at k*).
*  i  o o o
Thus with E = Le^1 , the fact that Q = K which is greater than L is
explained, with ' X1 as the rate of growth of labour productivity - X is that rate
o o o
by which Q and K exceed L .
In a similar manner to the previously derived real wage rate and profit rate 
(the relative income shares), it can be shown that with technical progress the 
real wage rate is given by
w = ew [ f(k) - kf(k) ] 
and the profit rate by
p = dQ/dK = f'(K/LeM ) = f(k) 3 .
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Furthermore, the relative income shares ( pK/wL) are constant in the 
technical progress model.
The issue of technical progress is very central in the neo-classical 
explanation of the economic growth process. Essentially, this comes in 
three forms : neutral, labour saving and capital saving technological 
progress.
When an increase in output is achieved through equal increases of capital 
and labour, it is said to be 'neutral1. Labour (capital) saving technical 
progress occurs when an increase in output is achieved through the 
increase of capital (labour) alone, or the increase of capital (labour) by more 
than that in labour (capital).
Capital-saving technology is rare, indicating that, perhaps, new technology 
comes from labour-saving developed industrial countries, where a primary 
concern is the reduction of labour costs. It is often argued that given the 
abundant (unemployed and under-employed) labour in the developing 
countries, SSA included, there is an escalating need for more neutral, if not 
capital-saving, technologies. This argument is based not only on the ’ 
abundant and relatively cheap labour in the developing countries, but also 
on the basis of high purchase, running and maintenance costs of the (mostly 
imported) capital.
Furthermore, the 'wrong' or inappropriate type of technology often reaches 
developing countries, thus adding to the difficulties of production. The 
choice of the production technique has always been a contentious point in 
the development process; would the less-developed countries be better-off 
using more labour-intensive techniques, given the major unemployment 
problems they suffer, or should they simply 'copy' the mostly capital- 
intensive techniques that the more advanced countries adopt. Many 
techniques are adopted with a heavy bias in the labour-saving direction, in 
many cases in SSA (see chapter three), the choice of technique is not 
determined by cost-minimising enterprises responding to prices which 
reflect scarcities, as is implied by the neo-classical models. Techniques 
have often been chosen by non-profit-maximising state-owned enterprises,
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or in the context of distortions which raise labour prices and reduce capital 
costs.
Thus developed-country techniques are often inappropriate for the 
developing countries, exacerbating unemployment, perpetuating the 
dualistic structure of their economies, increasing income inequality, and 
perhaps worsening the foreign exchange position and increasing their 
dependence on the developed countries.
However, the choice of production techniques is not that simple. One factor 
that has to be borne in mind is that for a large number of goods there may 
not be a spectrum of techniques to choose from, (that is, the production 
function may not be smooth and certain techniques may not be profitable to 
operate). Another factor is that the market prices of the factors of production 
may not reflect their relative abundance or scarcity. Such common market 
imperfections often necessitate using economic rather than market prices in 
feasibility studies of projects. Furthermore, although labour in the 
developing countries may be abundant and its money price may be lower 
than that in the developed countries, it is not necessarily 'cheaper' or less 
costly to employ because its productivity may be lower.
A final factor which may prejudice the choice of technique is that in certain 
cases, capital intensity may be explained by a skill constraint. In many 
cases, labour intensive techniques require a great deal of skilled labour 
compared to capital-intensive technology, which requires a preponderance 
of semi-skilled labour to undertake routine tasks. In less developed 
countries short of skilled manpower, capital may substitute for skills and 
constitute a rational response on the part of decision-makers. However, it 
has often been the case that the downfall of many projects was the lack of 
appropriate and timely maintenance of the invested capital and machines, 
which, once misfunctioned, may render the whole project redundant thus 
turning it into an under-productive or even wasteful investment.
The role of capital in the development process depends on how capital is 
defined and whether it is inductive of technological progress. If capital is 
defined as 'any asset which generates an additional future stream of 
measurable income to society', many goods and services commonly
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regarded as consumption goods ought, strictly, to be included in the 
country's capital stock. Expenditure on education, clothes and durable 
consumer goods would fall into that category.
Thus to increase the country's per capita income and to build up its 
productive potential, there is a need to expand the capacity for producing 
goods - not just physical capital but investment in 'human' capital and 
'incentive' consumer goods. Another form of investment is that in 'social' 
capital which does not necessarily produce goods directly, but still expands 
the capacity to produce by facilitating the smoother operation of directly 
productive activities. Examples of such investments are those in 
communications, housing and transport facilities.
Finally, capital accumulation is also seen as an escape from the 'vicious 
circle of poverty'. Low productivity leading to lower per capita income, 
results in a low level of savings per head and low levels of capital stock per 
head, which again, results in lower productivity. Capital accumulation can 
be used to break this circle.
If we also consider technological progress applied to human (as well as 
physical) capital, then the value of education in the growth process would 
become clear. It may even be said that investment in human capital is as 
important as that in physical capital, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa 
where the values of indicators of investment in people (such as literacy rates 
and school enrolment ratios) are among the lowest in the developing world. 
(World Bank, World Development Reports, 1978-91, and Todaro, 1989). It is 
argued that the effects of education primarily translate into increased labour 
productivity, especially through relieving the shortage of skilled and semi­
skilled workers, and through increased awareness of the social and political 
aspects of development problems (such as population growth pressure and 
the need for populism and democracy in government).
In the main growth model of chapter six, these theories are examined 
empirically for SSA, and the effects of investment in both physical and 
human capital (the latter proxied by the literacy rates) on the economic 
growth rate are explored.
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Returning to the growth theories, further extensions of the basic neo­
classical model, with the emphasis on varying the savings assumption - that 
S = sQ, have been formulated. The three main propositions or model 
variations are :
1. The classical saving function, s=s(p); s'>0 .where r is the profit rate
measuring future returns to investment (which equals savings in a full 
employment equilibrium). As r increases, 's' increases.
2. The Kaldor saving function,
S = swW + spP ; where 1 > sp > sw >0 , 
and,
P = Profits
sp = proportion of profits which is saved
W = Wages,
Sw = proportion of wages which is saved.
3. The Ando-Modigliani (consumption) function
C = ao W + a-j K ; Where 1 > ag > a-] > 0 .
Consumption (C) is presumed to depend on labour income (w) and 
consumer net worth which, in this model, is the consumer's capital 
stock, (K).
Each of these assumptions, combined with the previous two assumptions of 
the basic neo-classical model concerning the labour force and the 
production function, can be shown to produce a stable equilibrium k* and 
q*. The conclusion that is relevant to our analysis is that all these models 
emphasise the importance of savings in the growth process, primarily in 
shifting the trend growth path up or down, while maintaining the same 
growth rate as before the change in the saving rate occurred.
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From the previous discussion of growth models, it has transpired that the
rate  of growth of output, consumption and investment in the long run 
equilibrium is determined by the growth rate of the labour force, gj_, plus the
exogenous growth of labour productivity, X . Whereas the level of growth,
given by the equilibrium values of 'k*1 and 'q*1, is determined jointly by the
natural growth rate, n = gL + X , and by the saving behaviour. If the savings
ratio rises, then 'k*' and 'q*' will rise and the economy will shift on to a higher
equilibrium growth path. Thus if 's' could be controlled by the governing
authorities, a choice would have to be made as to which of the many
equilibrium growth paths, each corresponding to a different 's' , would be
best.
Aggregate growth depends not only on factor accumulation and its sectoral 
allocation, but also on total factor productivity (TFP) growth.
Two issues concerning total factor productivity growth are especially 
relevant for development policy : the first concerns the range of TFP growth 
rates that can reasonably be expected, and the second relates to the causes 
or sources of TFP growth. One hypothesis suggested by Chenery is that a 
positive relationship exits between between productivity change and the rate 
of growth of output.
Chenery (1979 and 1984) maintains that:
"identifying the source of increased productivity is the major 
conundrum for any attempt to explain growth".
These include technological change or scale economies, factor reallocation 
from lower to higher productivity sectors, and choice of trade strategy.
Dennison (1967) also stresses the role of technical progress in explaining 
the 'residual' factor in economic growth (that which could not be accounted 
for by the growth of the factor inputs alone). The extent to which this affects 
output growth depends, as discussed above, on whether this technical 
progress is input-augmenting, input-embodied, or totally disembodied or 
neutral.
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To the Less Developed countries of today, growth models and theories do 
not seem to be able to provide the guidance they did three decades or more 
ago for the developing countries of that time. The conditions facing today's 
developing countries are different and somewhat more complex than before.
An example of the inconsistency between growth theory and practice is the 
neo-classical model with technical progress. That seems suitable for 
explaining the growth of developed industrial economies, but not for 
developing economies which could show increasing returns to scale, thus 
producing a different production function which may exhibit multiple 
equilibria. Also, the rate of growth of the population may depend on the 
level of per capita income, thus making the growth of the labour force a 
function of output and capital per man levels, and again, multiple equilibria 
would be possible.
If an economy exhibits increasing returns to scale, due to, perhaps, the need 
to provide social overhead capital - roads, dams, etc. - the production 
function could have the following shape (Fig.2.2 below) :
At low 'k' levels, output per man could grow with increasing returns to the 
capital-labour ratio, 'k'. As 'k' rises, eventually, output per man would reach 
a point of diminishing returns where f"(k) < 0. Thus the production function 
could have two intersections with the (gi_/s) line, intersecting from below at
low *k* levels (k**) and from above at higher 'k' levels (k*). Therefore, there 
are two possible equilibrium 'k' levels, but only one is stable (k*). Only if the 
savings ratio 's' could be raised temporarily would we get rid of the low 
unstable equilibrium point, and gradually move towards the stable 
equilibrium at 'k*'.
This multiple equilibria possibility provides a theoretical underpinning for the 
‘Big push1 theorem and the 'returns to scale' argument, both of which are 
discussed in section 2.7.1 below.
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Figure 2.2
Increasing returns to scale production function.
Before proceeding to the many sector, structuralist approach to the problems 
of economic growth, a summary of the different kinds of growth, as 
expounded by Branson (1979), is perhaps constructive in providing a 
framework for categorising the influences on economic growth which are 
employed in the empirical work of the following chapters.
Four different kinds of growth are identified :
1 . Short-term growth.
This is essentially static in nature, whereby growth can only be increased by 
increasing the stocks of capital, labour, and technological progress. This
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would involve increasing either or both the resources from a state of under­
utilised capacity to a more fully-utilised capacity, where the economy could 
reach its potential output level (as described by the production function).
2 . Medium-term growth.
This type of growth follows from short-term growth. Once the resources 
(capital, labour, and technical progress) are fully employed, the economy 
could grow along the production function towards its long-run equilibrium, by 
moving towards the long-run equilibrium growth path.
3. Long-term growth.
This would only eventuate if 'capital deepening' and 'capital-widening' 
occur, where capital-deepening involves the increase of the amount of 
capital per effective worker, and capital-widening involves maintaining the 
same ratio per 'effective' worker but providing new workers with capital. 
This is illustrated in figure 2.3 below.
4. The 'optimal' growth path.
This involves the movement from one to a higher long-term growth path. 
This can only be achieved by changing (increasing) the saving ratio (s), 
thereby determining which long-term path the economy should be on.
's' therefore, becomes the control or 'policy' variable with which the level of 
the long-term path would be determined. These movements between long­
term paths are realised when full-employment of the resources is 
maintained.
This is illustrated in figure 2.3 by the move from *D‘ to 'E' and beyond, on the 
higher equilibrium path (Q/L)**.
Thus the important questions would be : how long will it take to move from 
one equilibrium path to another (from tg to t-j), or/and how steep is the
growth path from *D' to 'E' indicating the degree to which the growth rate of 
output responds to a change in the saving ratio. This 'steepness' depends
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on what could be described as the 'saving-rate elasticity of output growth1. 
That is, the sensitivity of the growth rate of full-employment output to 
changes in the
growth rate of the capital stock, which is,
If this elasticity was greater than one (elastic), then that would imply that a 
given increase in the saving ratio (investment ratio) would produce an 
initially greater increase in the growth rate of output, thus resulting in a 
steeper 'D' to ‘E1 path (with full employment of the resources maintained).
Figure 2.3
The different kinds of economic growth
= percentage change in output growth 
percentage change in capital stock growth
Given that
Sj = sQj = lj
s = lt/Qt = Kt°/Qt
Q/L
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Short-term growth,
under-employed resources becoming utilised 
medium-term growth
economy on a long-term equilibrium growth 
path.
The higher equilibrium growth path resulting from a 
higher saving rate (its slope is equal to that of the 
original path; (Q/L)*.
This elasticity or responsiveness of the growth rate of output to changes in 
the capital stock, depends on the source of technical progress in the 
economy. This relates to the previous discussion of technical progress. The 
success of policies using the saving (investment) ratio to influence growth 
depend significantly on whether technical progress is neutral (disembodied), 
labour augmenting (involving quality or skill upgrading of the existing labour 
force), or capital augmenting (more productive use of existing capital) 
(Solow,1957, and Nelson, 1964).
For example, if it was the case that an economy's technical progress is 
mostly labour augmenting, then a policy such as a government-subsidised 
employee training scheme would produce a higher growth pay-off than if it 
was the case that technical progress was neutral or capital-augmenting.
Most of these theories were formulated to explain or describe the growth 
experiences of the industrial countries. In particular, the experience of SSA 
appears to be due to not only the factors discussed in the above models 
(saving, investment and technical progress), but to other factors not included 
in those models, such as political instability and external factors (both of 
which will be discussed in the following chapters).
It may therefore be concluded that according to one-sector growth models, 
optimal use of resources and factor inputs, saving and investment levels, 
population growth, and technical progress are considered to be the key
A to BC path :
Up to point C:
Beyond C & : 
before D
(Q/L)**:
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factors affecting economic growth. However, in the case of SSA, increased 
saving and investment are a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
realisation of economic growth. This will become clearer when the factors 
thought to be responsible for the continent's poor growth record are 
considered in greater detail in the following chapters.
2.4 Two-sector models
The relationship between the modern (industrial) sector and the traditional 
(agricultural) sector is the basis of those models. The basic two-sector 
model as expounded by Lewis (1954) is based on the assumptions o f:
1. an overpopulated agricultural (subsistence) sector, where the 
marginal product of labour is very low or even zero (hence there 
exists surplus labour in this sector).
2. An industrial sector in which the marginal product of labour is higher 
than that in the agricultural sector, thus permitting the gradual transfer 
or re-aliocation of labour from the lower to the higher productivity 
sector.
3. Capitalists re-invest their profits.
4. Wages in the modern sector are constant and higher than wages in 
the traditional sector, by a proportion high enough to induce the 
migration of labour from one sector to the other. At this wage, labour 
supply from the rural sector to the modern sector is assumed to be 
perfectly elastic.
Investment and expansion of the modern sector output and employment is 
dependent upon this sector's profits, which are assumed to be re-invested 
by the capitalists. The speed of the sector's expansion is determined by the 
rate of this industrial investment and capital accumulation.
Figure 3. below illustrate the workings of the Lewis two-sector model.
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Fig. 3.
The Lewis two-sector model
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Given a production function of the type Qa  = f (K ,La ) in the agricultural 
sector, where capital is fixed and labour is the variable input, then any 
increase in 'L' would result in having the total agricultural output change in 
the way depicted in Figure 3.1 (a) (Assuming no change in technology). The 
associated changes in the marginal and average products of labour are 
shown in Figure 3.1(b).
At maximum total product [OT in 3.1(a)], the marginal product of labour is 
zero and the average product of labour is equal to OA [3.1 (b)]. This is due to 
the model assumptions of zero marginal product of labour, and that the rural 
wage rate is determined by the average, not the marginal, product of labour. 
(This is also assumed to be the case in the modern sector were w = AP|_ not 
MP|_).
As for the modern sector, again, output is assumed to be a function of the 
variable factor input, L, given fixed capital inputs and an unchanging 
technology :
QM = f (K >lM)
The model assumes that the profits of the first period in this sector are re­
invested. Therefore, capital is assumed to increase, say, from K-j to K2 .
Furthermore, given the assumptions of a perfectly elastic supply of labour 
into this sector, and the traditional downward sloping demand curve of 
labour (where the demand for labour is a negative function of the wage rate), 
then with a K-j amount of capital, OL-j units of labour will be employed, at the 
OW real wage rate, producing OTP-j units of industrial output [Fig. 3.2(a) and 
3.2(b)].
Due to profit re-investment in the following period, capital would increase, 
say, from K-j, to K2 , to K3 . Accordingly, total product would increase from 
TP (K-j), to TP(K2), to TP(K3).
Figure 3.2(b) shows the MP(_ curve, which is the actual demand curve for 
labour, given the assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets. From 
the diagram, it is apparent that wages in the modern sector (OW) are higher
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than those in the traditional sector (OA). Hence, labour is assumed to 
migrate from the agricultural to the modern sector, in pursuit of this higher 
modern-sector wage rate, without pushing this rate higher than OW as it is 
assumed that labour supply from the agricultural sector is unlimited and 
perfectly elastic.
Given the assumption that employment in this sector would be where the 
marginal product of labour is equal to the real wage, the initial amount of 
labour employed with K-j capital input is equal to OL-|, and this produces 
OTP-j industrial output - also equivalent to the area OD-) FL-j. Out of this 
output, OWFI_i would be paid as wages, leaving WD-j F as total profits
accruing to the capitalist. This, if re-invested, would raise the capital stock 
from K-| to K2 , shifting the total product curve from TPK-\ to TPK2 , thus 
raising the demand and marginal product of labour to D2 K2 . The new
equilibrium would therefore be established at G, with total output rising to 
OD2 GL2 , of which OWGL2 would be allocated to wage payments, and 
W D 2 G would accrue as profits. Again, these would be re-invested 
increasing the capital stock to K3 , and so on.
This process demonstrates how modern sector output and employment 
would expand, until all surplus rural labour is absorbed. If further rural 
labour migration were to occur beyond the point where all the surplus was 
absorbed, it would be at the cost of reduced food and agricultural output, 
(still assuming no technical progress). In this situation, the labour supply 
curve to the modern sector will no longer be perfectly elastic, but will 
become an upward positively sloping function of the wage rate.
This basic version of the Lewis model was extended and modified by Fei 
and Ranis (1964) and others. However, despite the model's apparent 
validity and proximity to the historical experience of the Western developed 
economies, some of its assumptions do not seem applicable to today's 
developing countries.
To begin with, there is the assumption of complete re-investment of profits by 
the capitalists creating modern sector employment at a rate proportional to 
that of capital accumulation. However, even assuming away the possibility
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of capital flight, it is likely that those capitalists would re-invest their profits in 
a more labour-saving manner, as the real cost of labour could be relatively 
high if the productivity of labour is relatively low, rendering a capital- 
intensive process more lucrative.
Furthermore, the assumption of surplus rural labour but fully-employed 
urban labour has been questioned, and evidence points to the reverse 
situation in many of today's less developed countries (Todaro, 1989).
Finally, there is the tendency for modern sector wages to rise rapidly, 
rendering the assumption of a competitive modern sector labour market 
somewhat unreal. This is due to institutional factors, and forces such as 
union power, multinational corporation hiring practices, and civil service 
wage scales.
Overall, the Lewis model and its extensions are very valuable in the analysis 
of the development process, with emphasis on the rate of capital 
accumulation in the modern sector, surplus rural labour, and relative factor 
shares in each sector, as the key factors affecting economic growth. 
However, as mentioned above, some of its assumptions clearly need 
reviewing and adjustment in order for the model to become applicable to 
today's developing countries.
2.5 Many Sectors and the Structuralist approach to Growth
In the development process, some economists, such as Fisher (1933 and 
1939) and Clarke (1940), have made the distinction between primary, 
secondary and tertiary production as a basis of a theory of development. 
Countries are assumed to start as primary producers, then, as the basic 
necessities of life are met, resources shift into manufacturing or secondary 
activities, and finally due to rising income, more leisure and an increasingly 
saturated market for manufacturing, resources move into services or tertiary 
activities, producing commodities with a high income elasticity of demand. 
This corresponds to a move from being a less developed country to a mature 
developed economy with a high proportion of resources in the services 
sector.
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Having reviewed one and two-sector growth models, we now turn to the 
many-sector models, whereby extending consideration to more than one 
sector introduces factors and problems that arise when an economy's 
resources cannot shift effortlessly between sectors. This approach is an 
extension of the Lewis-type mode!. It focuses on the transformation of the 
structure of production, moving from a traditional-sector-based economy to a 
more industrial and modern-sector-based one, as per capita incomes rise. 
However, unlike the Lewis model, increased saving and investment are 
considered necessary but not sufficient conditions for economic growth.
In addition to the accumulation of both physical and human capital,
"a set of interrelated changes in the economic structure of a country 
are required for the transition from a traditional to a modern economic 
system" (Chenery, 1979).
These include changes in the composition of demand, international trade, 
socio-economic factors (e.g. urbanisation), and changes in resource use.
Thus the structural change economists emphasise that the growth and 
development of an economy depends on both domestic and external, or 
international factors.
In the neo-classical tradition, output would grow due to the long-term effects 
of capital formation, labour force expansion and technological change, all of 
which are assumed to take place under conditions of competitive 
equilibrium. Shifts in demand and the movement of resources from one 
sector to another, are considered relatively unimportant because labour and 
capital produce equal marginal returns in all uses.
In the other broader view, as described by Chenery (1984), economic 
growth is regarded as one aspect of the transformation of the structure of 
production that is required to meet changing demands and to make more 
productive use of technology. Given imperfect foresight and limited factor 
mobility, structural changes are most likely to occur under conditions of 
disequilibrium. This is particularly true in factor markets. Thus a shift of 
factors (L and K) from less productive to more productive sectors can
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accelerate growth. These alternative views to the growth process are 
summarised in Table 2.2 below (adapted from Chenery et. al, 1984).
The structural approach has therefore, tended to concentrate on differences 
among sectors of the economy that may exhibit the equilibrating adjustments 
in resource allocation implied by neo-classical theory. Disequilibrium is 
more often manifested by the differences in returns to labour and capital in 
different uses, than by the shortages and surpluses that indicate the 
complete failure of markets to clear. In contrast, Neo-classical theory 
assumes that equilibrium is maintained over time, which limits the sources of 
growth to factors on the supply side.
Thus competitive equilibrium assumptions underlie Neo-classical theory. 
Growth of capital and labour inputs, as well as of productivity appear to be of 
comparable importance for all economies as sources of growth, but they 
vary significantly with the structure of an economy and the effectiveness of 
the policies to manipulate it.
The empirical work of the structuralist economists provides the main grounds 
upon which the theories are based. Chenery et al. (1984), attempt to identify 
the main differences in the sources of growth between developing and 
developed economies by focussing on the role of factor inputs compared 
with that of productivity growth. Thirty-nine economies were studied 
(including developed, developing and centrally planned economies), and 
three variables were calculated for each country (for available periods) : the 
growth of value-added, the growth of total factor productivity, and the 
combined contribution of the factor inputs (capital and labour).
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Table 2.2
Summary of the neo-classical and structural approaches to economic 
growth.
Neo-classical Approach Structural Approach
Assumptions
-Factor returns equal the marginal 
returns in all uses 
-No economies of scale 
-Perfect foresight and continuous 
equilibrium in all markets
-Income related 
changes in internal 
demand
- constrained external 
markets and lags in 
adjustment 
-Transformation of 
productive structure 
producing disequilib­
rium in factor markets
Empirical Implications
-Relatively high elasticities of 
substitution in demand and trade 
-Limited need for sector disaggregation
Sources of Growth
-Capital accumulation
-Increases in labour quantity and quality
-Increases in intermediate inputs
-Total factor productivity growth within sectors
-Low price elasticities 
and lags in adjustment 
-Segmented factor 
markets
-lags in adopting new 
technologies
-Neo-classical sources 
plus:
-Reallocation of 
resources to higher 
productivity sectors 
-Economies of scale 
and learning by doing 
-Reduction in internal 
and external bottle­
necks (the potentials 
for this are likely to be 
greater in developing 
rather than developed 
economies).
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Their findings concluded that the developed countries were categorised by 
little growth of labour inputs, moderate growth of capital and output, and a 
relatively large contribution of total factor productivity to aggregate growth. 
By contrast, the developing countries had high rates of growth of labour 
inputs, a higher total factor growth, and a relatively small contribution of total 
factor productivity to aggregate growth. Finally, the centrally planned 
economies were, in most respects, closer to the performance of the "Semi­
industrialised countries" of the Far East than to the developed economies. 
They appeared to rely more heavily on expanding factor inputs than on 
increasing productivity.
Following that, a regression analysis was carried out of the differences in the 
growth processes of the three groups. An average growth equation was 
estimated for each group to study the relation of productivity growth to other 
elements in the equation. Allowance was made for the possibility that 
productivity growth may be affected by the rate of growth of factor inputs, by 
output growth or by unspecified differences among the country groups. It is 
also noted that productivity advances are at least partly embodied in 
additions to the stock of physical or human capital.
The results of this regression revealed that most developed countries fit 
within a small cluster defined by the relatively low factor growth, with total 
factor productivity accounting for between 50-70% of overall growth. Japan 
was the main exception, having double the average growth rate of a 
developed country, but also having a higher proportion being the result of 
higher factor inputs. The regression further showed the relative inefficiency 
of the growth process of the typical developing economies.
The main factors tested were:
1. The growth of the capital stock.
2. The growth of the labour force.
3. Improvements in the quality of labour (or a rise in education levels).
4. Reallocation of labour and capital.
5. Growth of exports.
6. Capital inflow.
7. Level of development.
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The main conclusions to emerge from the regressions were:
i. The growth of capital was still the most important single factor, but its
relative contribution is reduced from over 50% of average growth in the neo­
classical model to 30-40% in the structural formulations.
ii. The growth of the labour force is similarly reduced in importance; in 
some developing countries it appeared to be no longer statistically 
significant. These findings are consistent with the evidence that many 
developing countries are characterised by surplus labour.
iii. The reallocation of capital and labour from agriculture to more
productive sectors accounted for nearly 20% of average growth.
iv. The growth of exports made a significant contribution to growth for all 
developing countries in the period 1964-1973, however, it did not appear to 
be significant before 1960. If both factor reallocation and export expansion 
are included in the same regression, the latter appears to be more important.
v. The capital inflow (excess of exports over imports) showed a
significant effect on growth in two of the studies, in addition to its effects on 
investment and exports. This finding gave some support to the two-gap 
hypothesis that imports may constitute a limitation to growth.
The structural factors in the cross-country regressions appeared to be more 
significant for the developing countries than for the developed ones, 
whereas growth of the labour force had a more significant effect in the 
developed countries. Investment appeared to be the only important source 
of growth for both groups, although the relative importance of technological 
improvements is subject to speculation.
Chenery et al. emphasise the process of structural transformation. For the 
economy of a developing country, this may be defined as the set of changes 
in the composition of demand, trade, production and factor use that takes 
place as per capita income increases. To understand country differences in 
sources and rates of growth, the transformation as a whole must be 
analysed. More specifically, changes in demand and trade may affect the
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sources of growth as much as the changes in factor supplies which are often 
stressed.
2.5.1 The Structural Transformation
The growth process of a developing country is sometimes explained in terms 
of being part of the overall transformation of its economic structure. This 
interdependence works in both directions : income growth causes changes 
in the composition of domestic demand and production, and conversely, 
rising investment rates and the reallocation of labour tend to increase 
aggregate growth. The transformation is by no means uniform across 
countries. It is affected by resource endowments and the initial structure of 
the economy, as well as by the choice of development policies. Indeed, in 
extreme cases, large structural changes may be associated with little or no 
growth.
The structure of the economy can be defined by its supplies of productive 
factors - labour, capital, and natural resources - and their employment in 
different uses or sectors. The term 'structural transformation1 encompasses 
the changes in the economic structure that lead to, and are caused by, a rise 
in the national product, together with the proximate causes of these 
changes. A narrow definition of proximate changes would include the 
composition of demand and changes in comparative advantage. A broader 
definition would incorporate some aspects of productivity growth and the 
effects of government policies on resource allocation.
In the early stages of the structural transformation, the rate of productivity 
growth is quite modest and accounts for a small amount of total output 
growth. The initial acceleration of growth comes largely as a result of faster 
input growth - primarily, capital accumulation. However, the growth of the 
capital stock later stabilises or declines. Since output growth continues to 
accelerate for a considerable period, the growth rate of factor productivity 
must increase and must also account for an increasing proportion of growth. 
This is basically the argument that leads Kuznets (1971) to expect the rate of 
factor productivity growth in most countries to be higher in the twentieth 
century than it was in the nineteenth. Indeed, for most of the countries which
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have long-term records, productivity growth did accelerate over time. Thus 
in the industrialising stage of an economy, productivity growth in 
manufacturing exceeds that in the services sector, whereas in the developed 
stage the situation is reversed.
Chenery et al. model the structural transformation in two parts, the first being 
an explanation of the rate of growth, and the second an explanation of 
changes in economic structure (both being inter-related). Their basic 
measure of the economic structure is the share of GNP originating in each 
sector of the economy. The most notable feature about the structural 
transformation is the increase in the share of manufacturing in GNP and the 
corresponding fall in the share of agriculture. The reallocation of labour from 
rural to urban areas, along with many aspects of industrialisation, stems from 
this basic change in the productive structure. The causes of the rise in the 
share of manufacturing in GDP differ considerably from those of the 
reduction in primary output. The decline in the share of primary outputs can 
be attributed to falls in domestic demand and shifts in net trade. Whereas 
the proximate causes of the rise in manufacturing are more the result of the 
increase in intermediate demand and use of industrial products, shifts in 
domestic demand, and the transformation of comparative advantage as 
factor proportions change. The relative importance of these factors varies 
according to each country's initial structure, natural resource endowment, 
and development policies.
Various hypotheses have been suggested to explain this process where the 
share of primary production falls, relative to that of manufactures, as income 
rises. These can be grouped as:
1. Demand explanations, based on a generalisation of Engel's law 4 .
2. Trade explanations, based on shifts in comparative advantage as 
capital and skills are accumulated, and
3. Technological explanations, which include the substitution of
processed for natural material, and the effects of differential rates of 
productivity growth.
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When modelling structural transformation two traditions of multi-sectoral 
analysis are used : either input-output analysis (as pioneered by Leontief), 
or the applied general equilibrium approach (pioneered by Johansen). The 
latter explicitly incorporates price effects, thus making the model more data 
demanding but potentially more useful for policy analysis, whereas the 
former is particularly useful as a planning and forecasting technique.
In their studies of the industrialisation process and the structural 
transformation that developing countries experience, Chenery & Syrquin 
propose two basic hypotheses (which they proceed to support empirically 
using their sample of 39 countries). The first hypothesis is that the long-run 
transformation of economic structure is found to be similar for ail types of 
countries, and the second posits that differences in initial structure and 
development strategy have affected the timing of the industrialisation 
process and the sequencing of specific activities, more than they have 
affected the overall pattern.
In conclusion, the main premise of the structuralist approach is that there are 
identifiable structural changes in the process of the development of an 
economy, the main features of which are common in all countries. Yet, it is 
recognised that the pace and exact pattern of development are not the same 
among countries, but depend upon each country's particular set of 
circumstances. A country's initial resource endowment, size, government 
policies, external capital and technology availability, and the international 
trade environment all play a significant role in the development and growth 
process, and determine the timing and form of the structural transformation.
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, most countries remain highly dependent 
on the traditional (mining or agricultural) sector, with very weak industrial 
and/or service sectors. Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mauritius are perhaps the 
most notable exceptions, having a relatively more developed industrial 
base. The reasons behind the underdeveloped state of African economies 
are discussed in greater detail in chapter three, but are primarily due to 
factors included in the above conclusions. Table 2.3 below demonstrates 
the overall sluggishness of the structural transformation process in the 
continent over the period 1965-87, particularly for low-income SSA, 
excluding Nigeria.
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Also notable is the reversal in the shares of agriculture and industry between 
1987 and 1980, whereby the share of agriculture appears to have increased 
in 1987 (from 1980), and that of industry to have decreased. The share of 
the service sector exhibits little change over the period considered.
Table 2.3
The structure of production in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Distribution of Gross Domestic Product. (%)
Agriculture Industry Services
1965'80 '87 '65 80 '87 65 '80 *87
Total SSA 43 30 34 18 33 28 39 37 39
SSA excluding 
Nigeria 40 34 35 20 25 24 41 41 43
Low-income SSA 
excluding Nigeria 42 40 42 19 20 19 39 40 42
Source:WorldBank,1989
2.6 Endogenous Growth
The mid- late-1980s saw the emergence of a significant amount of literature 
on the subject of new or endogenous growth. These theories were 
developed and pioneered by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988), to interpret 
the economic growth process of developed and less developed economies, 
and to understand the disparities between countries at various stages of 
development. Their main preoccupation was with how to maintain 
sustainable growth and why it occurs, rather than with how to start it.
Endogenous growth theories suggest that differences in economic 
performance between countries are a function of a number of factors not 
explicitly expounded in traditional neo-classical and other growth theories. 
Specifically, factors such as investment in human capital and technology are 
thought to play an important role in the development of an economy, equal 
in importance to that played by the "traditional" factors - the size and
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distribution of factor inputs and their productivity. Thus new growth theories 
attempt to endogenise the sources of growth which are left out by the neo­
classical growth models (investment in human capital and technology). 
These theories also attempted to get away from the traditional Solow-type 
conclusions that the majority of long-term growth in per capita incomes 
arose from exogenous technical progress.
One of the concerns of new growth theories is the failure of different 
economies to converge in the long term - both in terms of per capita income 
levels and the limited mobility of capital (and labour) between countries. 
Barro describes this as :
"In neo-classical growth models with diminishing returns, such as Solow (1956), Cass 
(1965) and Koopmans (1965), a country's per capita growth rate tends to be inversely 
related to its starting level of income per person. Therefore, in the absence of shocks, 
poor and rich countries would tend to converge in terms of levels of per capita 
income. However, this convergence hypothesis seems to be inconsistent with the 
cross-country evidence, which indicates that per capita growth rates are uncorrelated 
with the starting level of per capita product." (Barro, R., 1989).
Thus, proponents of endogenous growth models present them as 
alternatives to the neo-classical models, as the latter appear to fail 
empirically in explaining cross-country differences. In neo-classical models, 
the rate of return on investment and the rate of growth of per capita product 
are expected to be decreasing functions of the levels of the per capita capital 
stock and, over time, wage rates and the capital-labour ratios are expected 
to converge across countries.
However, others, such as Mankiw, D. Romer and Weil (1990), argue that an 
augmented Solow model which includes accumulation of human as well as 
physical capital provides a good description of cross-country data. In their 
model, which covers 98 countries over the period 1960-85, they conclude 
that
"...the Solow model is consistent with the international evidence if one 
acknowledges the importance of human as well as physical capital. The augmented 
Solow model says that differences in saving, education, and population growth 
should explain cross-country differences in income per capita. Our examination of 
the data indicates that these three variables explain most of the international 
variation." (Mankiw et al, 1990).
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They further conclude that
"...Differences in tax policies, education policies, tastes for children, and political
stability will end up among the ultimate determinants of cross-country differences."
To some extent, this latter conclusion seems to fit with our observed growth 
problems within SSA (see chapter three), but as cross-country comparisons 
cannot be performed in this study due to the enormity of the subject, the 
theory has not been tested here.
A primary premise of new growth theory is the assumption of a non-convex 
aggregate production function. Individual production functions may be 
convex, but at the aggregate level of the economy, convexity fails to exist 
throughout the whoie function, because of market failures and, more 
specifically, because of the existence of externalities in investments in 
human capital and technology, deriving from the public good nature of 
technology and, to a lesser extent, education and health. These externalities 
are mostly positive and thus lead to an increase in the overall productivity of 
an economy, causing increasing returns to scale to exist at the aggregate 
macroeconomic level, when the individual at the microeconomic level faces 
a constant returns to scale production function.
Incorporating human capital in a production function creates the possibility 
of capital accumulation without an accompanying fall in the marginal 
productivity of capital, thus reducing, or ultimately eliminating, the reason for 
capital flows from more-developed to less-developed economies (Barros, A 
R , 1992). Furthermore, finance for some capital investments, such as those 
in human capital, are difficult to finance from international capital markets as 
they do not have a direct tangible return. There is therefore, a credit 
constraint which eventually results in, or necessitates, government 
intervention in the form of the procurement and provision of these funds and 
services.
King and Rebelo (1989), attempt to use the neo-classical model's 
transitional dynamics (the motion from a given initial capital stock to the 
steady state growth path-associated with growth in productivity and 
population) to explain cross-country differences in rates of economic growth,
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but they find that diminishing returns to capital (physical capital) induce 
major counter-factual implications. They conclude that
"it is difficult to use the neo-classical model to explain sustained differences in growth
rates".
Baumol (1986) analysed productivity growth and convergence, and 
concluded that for the industrialised countries, there appeared to be a 
tendency for productivity levels and per capita income levels to converge. 
Using Maddison's 1870-1979 data, he found a very high correlation 
coefficient, where the higher the country's productivity level at the beginning, 
the more slowly that level grew in latter periods. Furthermore, he arrives at 
the conclusion that there is more than one "convergence club", with the 
centrally planned economies and the other groups of countries somewhat 
inferior in performance to that of the industrialised market economies, 
exhibiting a weaker trend towards convergence. He refrains from explaining 
why the poorer developing countries of today have not benefited much from 
the public good properties of the innovations and investments of other 
nations, but infers that part of the explanation may lie in the product mix (for 
which technological innovations apply) and education.
However, De Long (1988) concludes that Baumol's results are not 
particularly solid, as they are founded on a biased sample, selected ex post 
of countries that are now successfully developed. Baumol's sample was 
primarily of countries that afterwards became successful, thus making 
convergence appear to have taken place. He also maintains that Baumol's 
results tell us nothing about the strength of the forces making for 
convergence among nations selected in his sample. The sample suffers 
from selection bias. Why some countries develop and others not may have 
something to do with the fact that countries such as Australia, New Zealand 
and some of the Latin American countries were built on European capital, 
labour and skills, at least as much as on natural resources. These countries 
did not lack the institutional and organisational frameworks and capabilities 
that are necessary to foster sustainable growth and long-term development. 
Also, the mode of government is relevant. De Long concludes that "Perhaps 
only industrial nations with democratic political systems converge. "
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However, being a democracy is also partly determined by growth and 
economic development over the preceding period. De Long concludes that 
convergence may indeed happen, as technology is a public good, but that 
the capability to assimilate industrial technology appears to be surprisingly 
hard to acquire, and it may be "distressingly easy to lose". Indeed, the forces 
making for convergence are no stronger than the forces making for 
divergence. Technology transfer is by no means inevitable.
Endogenous growth theories have implications regarding, for example, the 
role of government in an economy, trade policies, intellectual property rights, 
and income distribution and growth.
To begin with the roie of government, the existence of market failures and 
externalities, in traditional neo-classical theory as well as in new growth 
theory, forms the basis for government intervention, primarily in the form of 
taxation and subsidies. So long as these interventions are not excessive 
and do not substitute for private investments, then government intervention 
in a country which is still at the early stages of development should be 
welfare enhancing. However, there is great controversy regarding the 
optimum level of government intervention, but in an economy where it is very 
difficult to mobilise savings and hence, investment, the government must 
provide the substitute funds for the necessary social/human capital 
investments.
Thus, endogenous growth theories tend to suggest that investments in 
research and development and education are fields which could be 
subjected to government intervention to enhance economic growth and 
development. They further imply that public education promotes social 
equity more than private education, and social equity is often considered 
one of the main targets of economic development, particularly at the initial 
stages of development, where the disparity between incomes can become 
very severe if the provision of essential services, such as education and 
health, are left to the market system.
However, such conclusions must be qualified by focusing on the efficiency of 
the government and the capability of the public sector's institutions to 
manage such investments efficiently. For example, it is clear that in Korea,
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Taiwan and Singapore, government institutions are far better equiped than 
the governments in SSA to handle public investments efficiently. 
Furthermore, after a certain point, increasing government intervention in the 
economy becomes counter-productive. However, that point has not been 
reached in SSA. Indeed, a major problem so far has been the striking 
inefficiency of many government investments in the continent. Whether that 
is directly related to the level of education of the policy makers is as yet 
undetermined, and the process of proof will be fraught with difficulties in 
discerning the impact of education and training in their own right, and other 
factors such as innate personal characteristics which might account for 
better policy-making capabilities.
As to the implications of endogenous growth theories for trade policies, the 
theory often assumes that the reduction of trade barriers improves 
communication across countries and thus avoids replication of research 
efforts. Technological cooperation programmes and the exchange of 
qualified personnel could have a similar effect to the reduction of trade 
barriers, if there were no barriers to such transfers and if it did not involve a 
prohibitively high cost. Furthermore, the removal of trade restrictions should 
lead to the concentration of resources in sectors in which the country has a 
comparative advantage.
Yet in new growth models, there is contention regarding the positive effects 
of specialisation according to the laws of comparative advantage. The 
assumptions made concerning the country's innovation capacity, its stock of 
human capital and whether the flow of information is perfect or not. New 
growth theories conclude that, indeed, protection should be reduced by the 
developed economies for the promotion of economic growth, but that less 
developed economies need to protect (or subsidise) those sectors which 
can generate more spillover to other sectors throughout the economy to 
enhance economic growth. Furthermore, the theories conclude that the 
improvement in technological (international) flows is beneficial for the 
development of all countries.
Intellectual property rights is a more important issue in relation to the Asian 
countries, where imitation and "patent -breaking" practices are common. The 
question here is whether such protection is welfare enhancing (for the whole
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world), as it increases incentives for research and development. Such 
protectionism is clearly to the benefit of the more advanced economies 
where the original innovation may emanate from, and the cost of a more 
legal approach to imitation could be prohibitive to the less developed 
economies. Indeed, new growth theory concludes that an increase in the 
protection of intellectual property rights may have an adverse effect on the 
world economy. Imitation in LDC's, combined with lower real wages in those 
countries, transfers the production of these new products to the developing 
countries. Resources are thus freed in developed countries and could be 
moved into producing other goods. This mechanism, it is argued, will speed­
up innovations and should have a beneficial long-term impact on the world 
economy.
Finally, on the issue of income distribution and growth, new growth theory is 
in contention with neo-classical theories, in introducing the idea that the 
higher the propensity to save, the higher will economic growth be. Neo­
classical growth models assume that savings do not affect the equilibrium 
growth rate, but only the level. This subject remains controversial, and 
evidence can be found to support either theory.
Given the propositions of the theories of endogenous growth, can the 
developing countries adopt deliberate interventionist policies to expand 
human resources in order to speed-up their economic growth, and will such 
policies be effective. The clearest evidence regarding this issue emanates 
from the experience of the East Asian countries - and more specifically, from 
the newly industrialising economies of the Far East.
In general, there appears to be sufficient evidence to support the conclusion 
that there is a positive association between investments in human resources 
and economic growth, albeit with some exceptions, such as the Philippines 
(Behrman, 1990).
It is argued that
"...policies that increase the availability of knowledge beyond that which would occur 
with private production of knowledge are likely to lead to greater efficiency an greater 
national income at world prices for a given production possibility frontier." (Behrman, 
1990).
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Behrman then cites evidence that the newly industrialising countries had 
adopted an active interventionist stance to development, where the 
respective governments planned and directed the growth effort. The specific 
experiences of South Korea and Taiwan suggests that
"...Their successful industrial expansion was greatly facilitated by their educational 
systems....[however] Whether or not their [elaborate manpower] planning effort was a 
success is a matter of dispute, since manypeopie were trained for careers that they 
did not pursue. The fact that they were trained and that the training was transferable 
to many different activities, however, is widely accepted." (Krause, 1989).
Therefore, the experience of these countries may not be applicable to that of 
other countries, particularly the African economies, because of the different 
historical, locational, and social circumstances. Investment in human capital 
is not, on its own, sufficient to foster economic growth. The general policy 
and economic environment has to be suitable to ensure a high rate of return 
to such investment. Indeed, it should be accompanied by an equal and 
sustained effort to invest in physical capital, in order for the investment in 
human capital to be sufficiently productive.
The extent to which investment in human capital has affected the growth rate 
of real GDP in the Sub-Saharan African countries will be tested in chapter 
five, using literacy rates as an indicator of education. Despite the problems 
associated with the choice of variable, this was the only variable for which 
there was a most comprehensive data set for the countries in the sample 
and for the years under study. The results of the cross-section regressions 
are presented in chapter six, and those of the panel regressions in Appendix 
IV.
2.7 Foreign Trade Issues
Section 2.8.3 expands upon the idea of trade as an 'engine of growth1. In 
this section, we will concentrate on the main aspects of the trade policy 
debate.
Traditionally, there have been three major strategies which countries have 
attempted to follow in their pursuit of growth. These are import substitution 
(IS - an inward oriented trade strategy), export promotion (EP - an outward
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oriented strategy), and a balanced approach to growth using a 'sensible' mix 
of the first two strategies. Sometimes, increased foreign borrowing is used 
in conjunction with either policy. This is regarded as a complementary 
policy to any of the above mentioned three main routes to growth.
The main aim of the IS approach is to reduce imports by producing domestic 
substitutes for them. The main policy instruments for this would be tariffs, 
quotas and import rationing methods. Protectionism would be aimed at 
reducing the importation of certain commodities in order to attempt to set up 
local industries to produce those commodities. Typically, this involves 
cooperation with foreign companies. The economic rationale behind this 
strategy is usually based upon the 'infant industry' argument, or balance of 
payments improvements (as fewer commodities are imported), or a 
combination of both. Ultimately, it is hoped that the protected infant industry 
would become strong enough, not only to satisfy the demands of the 
domestic market, but also to begin exporting.
A different trade hypothesis is that opening up to to international competition 
will induce increases in domestic efficiency. There is an implicit challenge- 
response mechanism induced by competition; domestic industries are 
forced to adopt new technologies, to reduce X-inefficiency ["the notion that 
individual firms are more likely to operate inside their production possibility 
frontiers than on them because producers do not exert sufficient effort at all 
time to maximise output ", (Herrick and Kindleberger, 1984) - this is 
essentially inefficiency resulting from managerial ineptitude and slack], and 
to generally reduce costs wherever possible. Thus export expansion and 
import liberalisation are always seen as beneficial.
Another possible link between trade and productivity is through the foreign 
exchange constraint. It is usually the case that developing countries cannot 
easily substitute domestically produced goods for the imported intermediate 
and capital goods. In a sense, these imported inputs embody technologies 
that are unavailable to domestic producers and can only be obtained 
through imports. Policies that limit the availability of such imports, or make 
them more expensive, will lead to poor productivity performance. Thus, for 
example, one of the reasons an export-led development strategy will be 
beneficial is because exports are an important source of foreign exchange;
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they permit industries to buy inputs that can be produced domestically only 
at a much greater cost - if at all.
Import substitution strategies for growth may be appealing to governments of 
the developing world, because of their apparent simplicity and high pay-offs 
in the form of reduced imports, a greater industrial base and industrial export 
potential, (therefore, in practice, the distinction between IS and EP strategies 
appears less pronounced than theory suggests). This is especially the case 
when developing countries face difficult external factors, such as declining 
demand and price for their primary exports, growing balance of payments 
difficulties and the belief that the reason behind other countries' successes 
is the ‘magic of industrialisation'.
However, it has been argued (Little et. a l , 1970, and Schnitz, 1984) that a 
significant number of LDC's have been largely unsuccessful at 
industrialising through import substitution alone. One of the factors behind 
this has been the fact the benefits in the domestic market of import 
restrictions have tended to accrue to the foreign companies involved in the 
import-substituting industries. Furthermore, there has been a tendency for 
the foreign exchange rates to be over-valued in those developing countries 
pursuing an IS strategy, in order to facilitate the import of the capital and 
intermediate goods required for the infant industry. This is despite the fact 
that the industries concerned often never 'grow' to the planned size, and 
remain uncompetitive, hiding behind the protection policies imposed by the 
government.
Export promoting strategies aim at the penetration of world markets by the 
country's domestic exports (be they primary products or manufactures), and 
also the liberation of imports. One of the most important policy instruments 
in this case is the real exchange rate. That could be set (or left freely to 
settle) at levels which make the exports of that country attractive. In addition, 
domestic policies would be formulated so as to encourage exports and to 
stress the primary role of trade in the economy. The consequences of such 
policies, or the lack of them, are considered in chapter three.
Proponents of export-promotion, or outward-oriented policies base their 
arguments mainly on the efficiency and growth benefits of free trade, the
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advantages to be gained from access to larger markets, the distortionary 
effects of protectionism and, more to the point empirically, the exceptional 
successes of the East Asian countries, especially Singapore, Korea, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong (Little e ta l . , 1970).
However, the hazards of an outward-oriented trade policy include being 
subject to large fluctuations in world demand for the country's exports. This 
'trade dependency' is particularly detrimental for small countries whose 
exports are not large enough to form a significant force in determining the 
price of the exported commodity (most of the SSA countries fit into this 
category).
The expansion of exports can be in the primary commodities sector 
(agriculture and mining) or in the manufactures sector (industry). Difficulties 
in the promotion of exports of the primary commodities include the 
development of competing synthetic material (instead of, say, cotton, rubber 
and sisal), the tendency for the prices of primary products to decline relative 
to other traded goods (resulting form low income elasticities of demand for 
primaries relative to those for manufacturers), and the inherent rigidities in 
the rural production systems of most less developed countries. These 
rigidities include soil quality and climate on the natural side, and social and 
economic structural rigidities, such as those resulting from institutions like 
the marketing boards, particularly prevalent in SSA.
Also, the expansion of manufactured exports often faces the growing 
protectionism from the developed countries against the processed exports of 
LDCs in general (Taylor, 1982). Other problems associated with imports are 
concerning imported technology. These are discussed in section 2.3.
Citing the newly industrialised countries as an example of the successes of 
pursuing a free trade and market forces approach can be somewhat 
misleading, as evidence suggests that in most countries (particularly in 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan), governments played a large and significant 
role in directing and carefully planning the production and composition of 
exports (Bradford, 1986).
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Finally, some countries may opt for a 'balanced' trade strategy, combining 
elements of both IS and EP. Such a policy would reduce the inefficiencies 
and price distortions associated with the protectionism involved in a 
comprehensive IS strategy, without concentrating totally on encouraging the 
rapid growth of exports associated with the EP strategy. This may be 
achieved by combining successful IS with devaluation of the real exchange 
rate, which encourages exports and avoids the anti-export bias inherent in 
the IS strategy. Elimination of this bias encourages export growth, which 
permits substantially more rapid growth in imports.
In all policies however, the ability of the particular country to raise foreign 
capital (its credit-worthiness) in the international financial markets remains of 
great importance in the course of its development, acting as an extra source 
of finance if and when it is needed.
One direct impact of alternative development policies is reflected in the 
incentives to domestic producers to sell products in domestic rather than 
foreign markets. The policies that influence these incentives include 
instruments such as tariffs and subsidies, as well as the real exchange rate. 
One important implication of the choice of development strategy stemming 
from sectoral interdependence concerns the relative price of capital goods 
and its effect on capital accumulation and growth. Capital accumulation in 
an economy occurs as investors in each sector purchase capita! goods.
The relative price of capital goods will determine the real investment 
resulting from a given investment expenditure. This capital goods price is, in 
turn, strongly influenced by trade policy since a large portion of the 
machinery purchased domestically is imported. Thus any policy that raises 
the domestic price of imported machinery will raise the price of capital 
goods, since substitution possibilities are limited. In an EP strategy, the 
relative price of capital goods should decline over most of the period, given 
that that is an essential factor in fostering a successful development of 
exports.
Therefore, the selection of a particular trade strategy requires a careful 
assessment of the forces involved and the timing of implementation. 
Flexibility and careful monitoring of the international trade environment are
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also necessary, in order to be able to adopt suitable policies in the face of 
changing conditions, such as a contraction in world trade, for example, or a 
change in world demand for the output of a particular sector.
2.8 Strategic Growth Issues
In this section, four issues of growth associated with the choice of strategy 
will be discussed. These are the 'big push' theory, balanced and 
unbalanced growth, the 'engine of growth' theories, and income distribution. 
We will begin with the theories of the 'big push'.
2.8.1 The big push theory
Some economists (e.g. Rosenstein-Rodan, 1986) argue that a 'big push' is 
needed, mainly in the form of large investment expenditure, to get an 
economy started in its growth process. The economic rationale for the 'big 
push' forms part of the doctrine of balanced growth.
In the ‘big push' theory, a large investment programme, promoting rapid' 
industrialisation and building up economic infrastructure, is considered 
necessary (but not sufficient) as a first step towards sustained economic 
growth. This theory is primarily based on certain indivisibilities of inputs, and 
processes of output, which give rise to increasing returns to scale, and 
external economies. Another cited reasoning for the big push is the 
imperfect state of the markets, particularly for investment, which could give 
distorted signals sending the economy away from its 'optimal' growth path. 
This, combined with the indivisibility argument, would be one of the reasons 
calling for state intervention in the investment market, by setting up 
industries such as power, transport and communications (social overhead 
capital).
The third argument calling for a big push is demographic. It is argued that 
such an investment may be one of the main routes to escape the 'Malthusian 
population trap'. This would be done by giving income a 'big push' so that it 
would jump to such a level that exceeds the growth rate of the population. In 
this way, the Malthusian positive checks (Famine and natural disaster)
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would be avoided. However, some argue that this is neither feasible nor 
particularly necessary for developing countries (Ellis, 1986). There is a 
contention that firstly, regarding the demographic aspect, it is argued that 
despite the interdependence between population growth, per capita income 
and income growth, the model conclusions appear to be unduly pessimistic 
and restrictive. Furthermore, historical experience (Hagen, 1959) suggests 
that, such a 'big push1 was not necessary to raise per capita income to the 
level beyond which its further growth will not be dependent on income- 
depressing versus income-raising forces (e.g due to the role of technical 
progress).
The theory also appears to imply that once this large (typically 
governmental) investment is made, the developing economy could 'take-off' 
into its development process. Not enough emphasis appears to be placed 
on other, perhaps equally important, forces such as the productivity of such 
investment, the level of human capital and education and the general 
stability of an economy. This reverts to the overall role of investment in the 
growth process, and not simply of a "state engineered investment burst".
In the empirical work of chapter six, the effect of a 'big push' is proxied by the 
use of Gross Domestic Investment levels, relative to GDP, as a factor 
affecting growth. Despite not being an exact measure of a governmental 
investment intervention, the use of government consumption levels as 
another factor, gives an indication of the roles of investment and the 
government in the growth process.
2 .8.2 Balanced Versus Unbalanced Growth
The term 'balanced growth' could be used to refer to two ideas. The first 
concerns the scale of investment necessary to overcome indivisibilities on 
both the supply and demand sides of the development process (as 
proposed by Rosenstein-Rodan). On the supply side, indivisibilities refer to 
the iumpiness of capital. One implication is that only investment in a large 
number of activities simultaneously can take advantage of various external 
economies of scale. This forms the basis of the big push theories discussed 
in section 2.7.1 above.
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This is bound up with the assumed existence of external economies of scale 
- the nature of the production function in one activity may be altered by the 
existence of other activities, or the impact of a large investment program on 
the profit functions of participatory firms. Thus the private return of an activity 
is lower than the social return. Proponents for a balanced growth strategy 
argue that increasing investment in an overall program can eliminate this 
divergence. However, the cost of factor inputs may rise, thus offsetting the 
benefits of those external economies. Nevertheless, it is usually the case 
that certain investments must be of a minimum size to be economically 
viable.
On the demand side, indivisibilities refer to limitations imposed by the size 
of the market on profitability and hence, feasibility of economic activities.
The second interpretation of balanced growth refers to the path of economic 
development, and the pattern of investment necessary to keep the different 
sectors of the economy in balance so that the lack of development in one 
sector does not impede development in others. Absence of shortages and 
bottle-necks is implied here. Thus balanced growth has a horizontal and a 
vertical aspect to it.
Among the foremost proponents of this second version of the balanced 
growth doctrine emphasising the path of the development process and the 
pattern of investment are Nurske and Lewis (1955). In Particular, they 
emphasise achieving a balance between the agricultural and the industrial 
sectors of a less developed country, due to the interdependence between 
those sectors and the mutual assistance and stimulus that each can give the 
other.
A significant argument upon which Nurske's conclusions are based is the 
restricting part played by market size in the growth process. Given the 
fluctuations of world demand for developing-country exports (mainly, of 
primary commodities), expansion and growth through trade are not always 
possible. Therefore, he argues, alternative growth strategies should be 
found.
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Increased productivity and increased domestic purchasing power is seen 
possible through "a balanced pattern of investment in a number of different 
industries, so that people working more productively, with more capital and 
improved techniques become each others' customers". This, it is argued, 
would result in an upward shift of domestic demand schedules, thus 
providing an incentive for further (mainly private) investments and growth.
A major criticism of the balanced growth doctrine is that it fails to come to 
grips with the fundamental obstacle to development in developing countries 
- namely, a shortage of resources of all kinds, especially, capital 
(Todaro,1989). Critics of a balanced growth approach do not deny the 
importance of a large scale investment program and the expansion of 
complementary activities. Their argument is simply that in the absence of 
sufficient resources, especially capital, entrepreneurs, and decision makers, 
the striving for balanced growth may not provide a sufficient stimulus to the 
mobilisation of resources, or the inducement to invest, and will certainly not 
economise on decision-taking if planning is required.
One of the foremost exponents of the doctrine of unbalanced growth is 
Hirschman (1958). In his view, the real scarcity in developing countries is 
not resources themselves but the means and abilities to bring them all into 
play. He maintains that preference should be given to that sequence of 
projects which maximises "induced" decision making.
Thus Hirschman's version of unbalanced growth appears to stress the 
importance of decision taking. Hirschman also points to two inducement 
mechanisms at work within a sector : the backward linkage effects and the 
forward linkage effects. The former concern the derived demand for inputs, 
and the latter pertains to non-final demand output utilisation.
To be most effective, what both balanced and unbalanced growth strategies 
seem to pre-suppose is planning - be that at private or state level (Streeten, 
1986). It is the association with planning that has tended to polarise opinion 
on the two strategies. Unbalanced growth does not necessarily preclude 
planning. Both Nurske and Hirschman emphasise that this coordination or 
planning can be provided from the private investing sector, not only by the 
state. This planning debate is too vast to be considered here, but it has
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been (and in many cases, it continues to be), a common feature of the 
development efforts of most developing countries (Todaro, 1971, Tinbergen, 
1967, and Blitzer et. a l , 1982).
An interesting reconciliatory view, notably by Mathur (1966), is to treat 
unbalanced growth as a means of achieving the ultimate objective of 
balanced growth. In this way, elements of both strategies could be 
combined to produce a possibly less extreme and more comprehensive 
policy for development.
It may not be easy to evaluate the balanced Vs. unbalanced growth debate. 
For one thing, it is difficult to test the theories empirically. In chapter six, one 
of the variables used in the regression analysis is a proxy for the size of the 
government sector. This is used as an indication of the effect of government 
intervention on economic growth.
2.8.3 The Stages Of Economic Development and the 'Engine of Growth1
The stages of economic growth is a theory most commonly associated with 
W. W. Rostow (1960). The essence of Rostow's theory is that it is possible 
to identify stages of economic development and to classify societies 
according to those stages. He distinguishes five such stages : traditional, 
transitional, take-off, maturity, and high mass consumption. Traditional 
societies are characterised by a ceiling on productivity imposed by the 
limitations of science, and having the majority of the work force engaged in 
the agricultural sector.
The main economic requirement in the transition phase is that the level of 
investment should be raised to at least 10% of national income to ensure 
self-sustaining growth. The preconditions to take-off are met in the 
transitional stage, and the take-off stage is a short stage of development 
during which growth becomes self-sustaining. Also important here is the 
establishment of what Rostow calls "leading growth sectors", such as grain 
in the United States, the Soviet Union and Canada, timber in Sweden, and 
to a lesser extent, textiles in Britain.
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The Maturity stage is that when society has effectively applied the range of 
modern technology to the bulk of its productive sectors. In this stage, there 
would be a significant growth in the urban population and other changes in 
the industrial structure would occur (such as the increase in the proportion of 
white-collar workers).
High mass consumption is the final and most developed stage (which none 
of the developing countries are likely to reach in the foreseeable future). In 
this stage, the leading sectors shift towards the production of consumer 
goods and services.
Furthermore, a close association appears to exist between the growth of 
industry and the growth of output as a whole, giving more support to the 
proposition that "manufacturing is the engine of growth". In a study by 
Thirlwall (1983) of 81 countries over the period 1970-1977, a regression 
equation is calculated relating average growth of GDP (gQDP) t0 average 
growth of manufacturing industry ( g |). The resulting equation is :
9GDP -  1.414 + 0.569 g| r2 = 0.610
(0.051)
(Other studies produce similar results, see for example, Journal of Post- 
Keynesian Economics, Spring, 1983, symposium on Kaldor's growth laws). 
The regression coefficient is significantly less than one, implying that the 
manufacturing rate of growth is typically faster than the overall growth rate of 
GDP.
This link between manufacturing growth and the growth of GDP is based on 
two main arguments. The first is that the faster the industrial growth rate, the 
faster is the transfer of labour from the lower productivity traditional sector to 
the higher productivity industrial sector, thus increasing the returns from the 
previously unemployed (surplus) labour. The second argument is that 
increasing returns are thought to exist in the manufacturing sector, due to 
factors such as economies of scale and technical progress.
However, the stages theories, as expounded by Rostow, are not without 
shortcomings. A common criticism of those theories is that the stages are
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very blurred - no distinct phases are definable, and plenty of overlap in the 
definitions exist, especially between 'transition' and 'take-off', 
(Kuznets,1965, and Cairncross, 1961). Moreover, the theories prove 
empirically untestable (Fishlow,1965). Even the suggestion that the rise in 
investment to 10% of national income is virtually non-existent historically 
(Morgan, 1975). The stages theories appear not to have taken into account 
the complications introduced into the growth process by the external 
international environment, from which severe disturbances could arise. Too 
little attention is given to the fact that the historical records of today's 
industrial countries do not necessarily form a suitable learning basis for 
today's less developed countries, who face immensely different and 
complex inter-relationships with their external environment. Finally, the 
theory appears to give too much attention to physical capital and not enough 
to the human capital element, institutional factors and the transfer of 
technological progress.
Yet, while stages of growth theories may be lacking in analytical power, 
Thirlwall (1986) summarises their purpose as to
"distinguish the situations in which an economy may finditself, not 
that the stages distinguished should necessarily have parallels in 
history, or be rigidly distinct".
2.8.4. Growth and Income Distribution
Higher economic growth is not always associated with greater equality in the 
distribution of income. Indeed, the link is controversial and subjective, with 
some arguing that faster growth precedes and produces higher income 
equality ('Grow first, redistribute later' and not vice-versa), (Galenson and 
Leibenstein, 1955), while others stress the weakness of the perceived 
automatic link between the two variables, arguing that faster economic 
growth would not always lead to greater equity in income distribution 
(Todaro, 1989).
The traditional argument for prioritising growth over the income-equality 
objective is based upon the concepts of factor shares, savings and 
investment. It is assumed that increased inequality means increased
73
income for the rich, higher saving, classes. This (primarily neo-classical) 
argument stipulates that capitalists, or the rich classes in an economy would 
save and invest a large proportion of their surplus capital or profit, thus 
creating greater employment and faster output growth, which, in time, should 
'trickle-down' to the masses in the form of higher incomes and living 
standards. This process, it is argued, would be assisted by taxation and 
subsidy programmes. The poor are assumed to spend all (or the majority) of 
their income on consumption goods (Galenson and Leibenstein, 1955).
Looking at today's less developed countries, this argument could be faulted 
on a number of premises. Firstly, empirical evidence suggests that the rich 
elites of developing countries do not appear as 'devoted' to domestic re­
investment of profits as theorised (Lessard and Williamson, 1987). Instead, 
they appear to prefer spending their surplus capital on imported luxury 
goods, real estate and 'safe havens' abroad constituting capital flight. 
Clearly, such behaviour could only be an added drain on a country's 
resources, rather than an addition to its productive resources.
Another counter-argument (Dasgupta and Ray, 1987) is based upon the 
effects of low income levels and living standards on the output and 
productivity of the poor masses, with lower growth resulting from the lower 
productivity which could be brought about by poor health, nutrition and 
education. Furthermore, the low incomes of the poor would depress 
demand for domestic output, such as food and clothing (given that they 
cannot afford expensive imports as the rich can). This reduction in demand 
for domestic output would then reduce employment, investment and 
ultimately, growth.
Large income disparities within a society could also lead to a politically 
unstable situation, especially by the more educated sections of the 
population, whose aspirations to higher living standards may not be fulfilled. 
This political instability could act as a strong suppressant of growth. (The 
association between economic growth and political instability is examined in 
chapter five).
Perhaps one other factor is that, even assuming the traditional argument for 
'grow first, re-distribute later1 holds, today's less developed countries seem
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to have an inefficient tax-collecting system, in which the assets of the rich are 
minimally 're-distributed1, as many methods of tax evasion are employed.
Table 2.4
Economic growth rates and inequality
Percentage share of Household income
Country Year lowest 20%
Growth
highest 20% highest 10% of GDP
Botswana 1985-86 2.5 59.0 42.8 13.0
Cote D'Ivoire 1986-87 5.0 52.7 36.3 2.2
Ghana 1987-88 6.5 44.6 29.1 1.4
Source : World Bank, World Development Reports, 1986-91
The effects of per capita income on the savings ratio are explored 
empirically for Africa in Chapter six. In the case of SSA, data on inequality is 
scarce, but from table 2.4 above , and for the countries for which data was 
available, it appears that it is not necessarily the case that higher economic 
growth is associated with greater equality in the distribution of income (e.g. 
Botswana). It further illustrates that higher inequality is not necessarily 
associated with high growth rates (Cote D'Ivoire and Ghana).
2.9 Summary
This chapter has reviewed the main theories of economic growth, starting 
with one-sector models and gradually covering all the major issues that 
have traditionally been associated with growth. The empirical work in 
chapter six, in which the explanatory variables of growth will be tested, is an 
attempt to assess the influence of different factors on the growth of 
aggregate output in SSA.
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From the above review of the traditional theories of growth, certain factors 
emerge dominant in the growth process. The most influential factors appear 
to be the capital, saving and investment levels. In the empirical work, the 
factors affecting the saving rate will be explored, and the effect of the saving 
(and investment) levels on the growth rate of GDP will be tested.
Another related problem that will also be tested is that of the productivity of 
capital in SSA. The factors thought to affect the Incremental capital-output 
ratio (ICOR) will be included in a separate regression model of the ICOR (or 
V  in the Harrod- Domar model).
Human capital investments have also emerged as a factor affecting growth. 
This factor is difficult to be precisely captured, but literacy rates are used as a 
proxy in the empirical analysis for the effect of this factor on economic 
growth.
From the foreign trade debate, the impact of exports and imports emerges of 
great importance. This is tested by the use of the ratios of export and import 
volumes to GDP, export and import growth rates, and the change in the 
terms of trade. These appear of particular importance to SSA, given the 
important role that trade plays in those countries.
Many of the theories reviewed above stressed the effect of population 
growth on economic growth. Two types of equations will be used to analyse 
this effect. One will include population growth as an explanatory factor of the 
growth of GDP, and the other will test the effect of population growth on the 
savings ratio. It is important to test the role of population growth in the 
growth process of SSA, since those countries have experienced relatively 
high growth rates of population throughout the period under study.
Other factors that will be tested as explanatory variables in the African 
growth experience are the size of the public (or government) sector, political 
instability, foreign aid and the debt levels. These factors appear to have had 
great influence on the development of the African economies (see chapter 
three), and will therefore be included in the empirical analysis.
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Finally, given the general stress on the role of the free operation of the 
market system by many theories, particularly that of the neo-classicals, a 
variable will be included in the analysis as a proxy for this factor. This will be 
the ratio of the black market to the official exchange rates in the SSA 
countries considered. This is of particular importance in Africa, as the 
informal sector appears to be relatively large in many countries (see 
chapters three and six).
This completes the coverage of the theoretical background to economic 
growth. Given the theoretical expectations regarding the factors affecting the 
growth rate of aggregate output, the following chapters will discuss each 
factor as it manifests itself in Sub-Saharan Africa. The discussion will first be 
descriptive, then it will be followed by a detailed econometric analysis, 
assessing each factor's role and putting the theoretical propositions to the 
test using an OLS regression model.
NOTES
(1) kt = Kt/Lt
In kt = In Kt - InLt 
Differentiating,
k°t = (dk/dt)/k = (dK/dt)/K - (d!_/dt)/L 
= Kt° - Lt°
Furthermore, the change in the capital stock = investment, that is,
dK/dt = I = sQ
Since
L° = gL, (exogenously given),
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it follows that
kt° = sQ/K - gL / dividing by L
k° = sq/k-gL 
= sf(k)/k - gL
= the rate of growth of k in terms of k itself.
The equilibrium K/L ratio is that value of k which makes kA = 0 .
If it reaches that value it will remain there, since kA will then be equal
to zero.
Thus,
let k° = 0 to find k* : 
sf(k)/k - gL = 0 
or
sf(k*)/k* = gL , which defines k*.
Or
q* = f(k*) = (gL/s). k*
This is a stable equilibrium to which the economy will move and stay, if it 
begins at a different K/L ratio.
If k < k* , f(k) > [ (gL/s).k ] 
or sf(k)/k > gL .
From the equation
ko = sq/k-gL 
= sf(k)/k-gL.
In this case, ko > 0, and so k is increasing if k < ko.
If k > k* and sf(k)/k < gj_ , ko < 0 and k is decreasing.
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Fig.2.5
Neo-classical growth equilibrium
(gL/s)k
q
k*
(2) Euler's theorem states that for a production function with constant 
returns to scale,
Q = (dQ/dL).L + (dQ/dK).K
Where,
dQ/dL = MPPl and dQ/dK = MPPk
Thus, for the special case of constant returns to scale, the marginal 
productivity theory satisfies the 'adding up' condition :
[Share of Labour] + [share of capital] = 1
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(3) Income shares with technical progress :
Re-write production function as
Q = Ef(K/E) = LeXtf(K/E) =Letf f(k)
differentiating, to get the marginal product of capital, MPK, under 
competitive conditions, the profit rate would be
p = dQ/dK = LeXtf(K/Letf ).(1/Letf) = f'(K/LeXt) = f(k) 
profit rate = slope of production function = constant in equilibrium.
The wage rate is given by
w = dQ/dL = LeXtf'(K/LeXt).(-K/eXtL2)+eXtf(k)
= eXt [ f(k) - kf'(k) ]
= the real wage rate.
In equilibrium, at k = k*, w grows at rate X , which is the rate of 
growth of the average labour productivity Qo - Lo.
The capital share of income is given by pK, and the labour share 
by wL.
If the ratio (pK/wL) is constant, then the income shares would be 
constant:
K/E = K/LeA.t = k* = constant in equilibrium.
That is
K/L = k*eA,t and (K/L)o = X .
Therefore,
K share/L share =   -k*e^
eXt [( f(k*)- k* f'(k*)]
= ffk*) .k*
f(k*) - k* f  (k*)
= constant at equilibrium ratio K/E, k*.
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(4) Engel's Law being that with increases in income, the structure of 
demand moves strongly in favour of manufactures and against 
primary products, or in other words, the share of food in consumption 
expenditure declines as income rises, while the share of all other 
components rises.
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CHAPTER THREE
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND GROWTH PERFORMANCE IN 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
3.1 Introduction
Prior to the wave of independence movements in Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
economies of those countries were conditioned by their relationship with the 
colonising powers (with the exceptions of Liberia and Ethiopia), who were 
using their colonies as a source of the raw materials and primary 
commodities they required (see chapter one).
Agriculture, which had been mainly concerned with food production for local 
consumption, became geared towards the production of cash and export 
crops by a variety of methods and incentives (Brett, 1973). There was little 
industry or manufacturing. Whatever was made was was mainly for the 
satisfaction of the demands of the the local settler communities. Industry 
was generally not viable, except where it formed part of the colonial pattern 
of trade, assisting the export process of primary commodities in exchange for 
European manufactures.
The manufacture of simple consumer goods such as beverages, shoes, 
textiles, tobacco and some timber products was sometimes possible. In 
countries were there was a relatively large settler community, such as Kenya 
and Zimbabwe, local manufacturing prospered relatively more than in other 
African countries, again, in order to satisfy the settlers' needs. However, 
most of the trade and industrial activity was owned and undertaken by non- 
African nationals, particularly Asians. Africans were generally excluded by 
the lack of access to education and capital - sometimes even by the law 
(Rweyemamu, 1980 and Hazlewood, 1979).
In this chapter, there is first an examination of Sub-Saharan Africa's growth 
record in the post-independence period. This is followed by an assessment 
of the general trends and the orientation of economic policy. The rest of the 
chapter is devoted to an examination of the internal and external factors that,
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it has been argued, have been responsible for the deterioration of the 
African economies.
3.2 Sub-Saharan Africa's Growth Record
In the first chapter, Table 1.2 compares the growth rates of the Sub-Saharan 
African and other countries giving some indication of the difference in growth 
rates between the African countries South of the Sahara and other countries 
of the developing and the developed worlds. Although the 1960s indicated 
comparatively good growth rates for the majority of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries, the 1970s showed a marked deterioration and a few countries 
experienced negative growth rates. However, some countries, namely 
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Kenya, and Nigeria, did 
maintain a good record, with growth rates either rising or remaining more-or- 
less constant (on average, for the decade 1970-79). Those countries are the 
ones often cited as Sub-Saharan Africa's more successful economies due a 
variety of reasons, such as being oil exporters, or generally better at 
economic management than others.
Table 3.1 below presents the growth rates for forty-five Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) countries for the periods 1960-69, 1970-79, and 1980-86.
From the table, it can be seen that for 22 countries out of 45 (seven countries 
unknown), there was a deterioration in average growth rates from the 1960s 
to the 1970s, but an improvement for the rest. This was not surprising due to 
the generally deteriorating economic climate world-wide and the shocks of 
the 1970s.
The deterioration in economic growth rates continued into the 1980s. At a 
time when other developing countries were experiencing better economic 
performances (see chapter one), the majority of the SSA countries appeared 
to be performing worse than in the 1970s. This deterioration is reflected in 
Table 3.2, which compares the annual growth rates of per capita incomes of 
different regions over the past three decades.
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Table 3.1
Growth rates of GDP for SSA countries (%)
Country 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86
Angola 4.80 -9.61 * 4 .
Benin 2.80 3.16 3.60
Botswana 4.49 12.53 11.90
Burkina Faso 2.79 3.70 2.50
Burundi 3.55 2.73 • • •
Cameroon 3.90 4.89 8.20
Cape Verde 0.75
C.A.R. T 4 6 2.28 1.10
Chad 0.83 -0.22 • • *
Comoros • ■ * -3.81 * » *
Congo 4.65 ' 4.05 5.10
Cote D'Ivoire 7.05 6.26 -0.30
Djibouti 0.67
Eq. Guinea -19.43
Ethiopia 3^58 1.83 0.80
Gabon 6.93 7.38 1.50
Gambia 7.29 5.95 »«»
Ghana 1.75 -3.15 0.70
Guinea 3.16 3.50 0.90
Guinea Bissau 3.36 . . •
Kenya 6.17 6.04 3.40
Lesotho 6.44 7.40 0.90
Liberia 5.18 1.72 -1,30
Madagascar 2.51 0.32 -0.10
Malawi 5.50 6.04 2.40
Mali 3.75 3.25 0.40
Mauritania 8.16 12.64 1.00
Mauritius 2.01 7.67 4.40
Mozambique 4.60 -0.29 -9.00
Niger 2.78 1.89 -2.60
Nigeria 1.65 5.66 -3.20
Rwanda 1.64 7.64 1.80
Sao Tome & P. -7.97 ■ • .
Senegal 1.10 2.95 3.20
Seychelles 7.87
Sierra Leone 3.82 1.72 0.40
Somalia 1.09 3.33 4.90
Sudan 1.72 7.20 0.30
Swaziland 8.84 4.53 4 1 »
Tanzania 5.86 4.49 0.90
Togo 8.84 3.52 -1.10
Uganda 5.84 -0.99 0.70
Zaire 3.36 -0.21 1.00
Zambia 5.13 1.01 -0.10
Zimbabwe 4.30 1.60 2.60
Average* 3.90 2.90 2.10
Source : OLS regressions of GDP over time. GDP data was obtained from the World Bank,
World Tables, all editions.
Where this was not possible, the growth of GDP figures were obtained from : 
World Bank , "World Development Reports", 1978-1991.
World Bank, 1981, and 1991.
... Unavailable
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Table 3.2
GNP per capita, Average annual growth rates, %
1960-70 1970-79 1980-88
SSA 1.3 0.8 -2.2
Industrial
countries 4.1 2.5 * 3.0
South Asia 1.5 1.5 3.0
Latin America 
& Caribbean 2.7 3.5 -0.4
East Asia & 
Pacific 4.9 5.6 6 .2*
Source : World Bank, World Development Reports, 1978-91, 
* Figure for 1980-89
The African economies were, therefore, on a continuing downward trend, 
even when the rest of the world was recovering. Naturally, there were some 
years of relative recovery, such as the mid-1980s, when, for example, GDP 
grew at -2.8% in 1984 for SSA as a whole, but recovered to 5.1% in 1985 
and was 3.1% in 1986. However, this recovery was neither sustained nor 
sustainable for most of the countries. This raises the question of what have 
been the main factors responsible for the deterioration in SSA's growth 
rates.
Before embarking on a discussion of the 'exogenous' and 'endogenous' 
problems of the SSA countries, we will discuss the progress of general 
policy orientation in the continent.
3.3 Evolution of Economic Policy in Africa
In the past, the general view (particularly of the African governments 
themselves) was that given the African countries' circumstances at 
independence; being mostly small open economies with a scarcity of a 
highly trained and educated labour force - thus lacking the various technical,
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organisational and managerial skills, and with a very large dominant 
agricultural sector, it was widely believed that the market system alone was 
not particularly well suited and could not solve their economic problems. A 
certain amount of government intervention was necessary to give their 
economies the required 'push1 towards development (Steel and Evans, 
1984).
It was also believed that for many African countries, import substitution was 
the correct strategy to start with . The strongest evidence for this case came 
from what was perceived as an extremely high degree of import 
dependence of that region - amounting to more than a third of GDP during 
the period 1954-62. However, it was also acknowledged that the feasibility 
of import substitution could not be justified solely through such evidence on 
the level of overall import dependence, it is also necessary to investigate 
the viability of individual industries.
Some of the conditions necessary for import substitution to be successful are 
the existence of a domestic market large enough to consume more than the 
minimum output necessary for the viability of at least one plant, the 
possession of simple necessary technical capabilities, the acceptability o f' 
protection for that type of product (e.g. cotton and textiles), and adequacy of 
the industrial infrastructure. As development proceeds, possibilities for 
import substitution will diminish (having been primarily in basic consumer 
industries such as food processing, shoes and textiles), and the next course 
of action could be export expansion. This would be necessary as a means 
of increasing the amount of foreign exchange earned and of diversifying the 
structure of export earnings.
This approach can link domestic production of inputs and competitiveness in 
world markets. It also has the advantage of de-linking the (possibly small) 
demand of the domestic markets from the production of potentially high 
foreign exchange-earning goods. However, the possibilities for export 
expansion in SSA may not be so wide. Processing of primary products 
would be one possibility to begin with, but foreign protection and breaking 
into oligopolistic international markets would limit that possibility, as they 
could for other possible venues of export expansion.
An alternative is the production of simple manufactures for world markets. 
The pace of industrialisation in some African countries was relatively good
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(such as in Kenya, Zambia and Ghana), at least before 1975. However, it 
lagged behind that of other developing regions (Steel and Evans, 1984). 
From 1960 to 1975, Africa's share of world manufacturing value added rose 
only from 0.7% to 0.8%, whereas the Asian countries combined grew from 
2.2% to 3.0%, and Latin American countries from 4.1% to 4.8% (see Table
3.3. below). Therefore, the arguments for import substitution are based upon 
the terms of trade deterioration, the perceived benefits of the shift of 
production from agriculture to industry (Chenery and the structural 
transformation), the sectoral linkages and instability in the output and prices 
of primary products.
Table 3.3
Share of developing country regions in World manufacturing value added 
and exports (percentage)
Year Africa Latin America Asia*
Share in Value Added
1960 0.7 4.1 2.2
1970 0.7 4.2 2.4
1975 0.8 4.8 3.0
Share in Exports
1970-71 1.1 1.5 3.4
1975-76 0.6 1.6 5.4
Source : W.F. Steel & J.W.Evans, "industrialisation in Sub-Saharan Africa -
Strategies and performance", 1984 
This includes South, East and other Asia
According to Steel and Evans (1984), most of the SSA countries have not 
taken advantage of the growing world markets for manufacturing exports 
from the developing countries during the 1970s. Their share of total 
manufacturing exports fell from 1.1% in 1970-71 to 0.6% in 1975-76, 
whereas that of other developing regions, especially the Asian countries, 
grew. This suggests a lack of competitiveness of African manufactures in 
world markets. At the same time, SSA has lagged behind other developing 
countries both in raw material exports and in processed commodities based 
on them.
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However, there are several reasons for Africa failing to expand 
manufactured exports. These include wars and civil strife, lack of 
appropriate levels of skill, management, and organisation, foreign exchange 
constraints, and the effects of domestic policies.
Industrialisation strategies and policies in SSA have often introduced new 
distortions into the markets, and have failed to achieve the objectives of 
sustained industrial growth, low-cost production and productive 
employment. They did not appear to be based on comparative advantage. 
Declining growth in the 1970s was associated with the inability to move 
beyond the initial stages of import substitution and with continued high 
overall dependence on imports. This resulted largely from policies that 
tended to orient industrial production primarily towards domestic consumer 
demand rather than export markets, and ventures that required imported 
materials and capital rather than domestically produced inputs.
Industrial growth is, to a large extent, dependent on the generation of 
surplus resources (material inputs, investment funds, and foreign exchange) 
by other sectors, particularly agriculture, and on the continued growth of 
markets once import substitution demand is largely satisfied (World 
Bank, 1989). Sustained industrial growth in SSA requires a favourable 
economic environment consisting of steadily growing agricultural production 
and incomes to provide both inputs and an expanding market, human 
resources (especially intermediate technical, supervisory and managerial 
skills), reliable infrastructural facilities and greater inter-regional trade flows, 
especially in key intermediate and key goods industries, so that costs of 
production are sufficiently reduced and quality raised enough to be able to 
penetrate the international markets (as the experience of the East Asian 
countries suggests).
All those problems and others plague the Sub-Saharan African countries, 
and despite the individuality of each of those countries, it is possible to 
isolate certain common problems that are thought to have retarded their 
growth rates. Those problems apply to most, if not all, of these countries to 
different degrees. They will be discussed beiow and will be categorised as 
either internal (endogenous) or external (exogenous).
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3.4 Internal Problems
In this section, problems which are thought to be the result of misguided 
policies and general economic mismanagement, or of factors endogenous 
to the SSA countries will be examined to determine the extent of their effect 
on the growth of output. These are perceived to be within the control of 
African governments, and so their alleviation is presumed to be within their 
powers and responsibilities.
3.4.1 Population growth
One of the most often discussed problems that face the African (and other 
developing) countries is that of rapid population growth. In the period 1960- 
70, population in SSA grew at an average rate of 2.5% per annum. In the 
decade 1970-79, this figure was 2.7% per annum, and for 1980-86 it was 
3.1%. Within those periods, the corresponding figures for average output 
growth of total cereals per annum were 2.3% for 1960-69,1.3 % for 1970-79, 
and 2.3% for 1980-86 (World Bank, 1981 and 1989). Therefore, population 
has been growing at a faster rate than domestic food production. This has 
resulted in increasing food imports which have not only been very costly, but 
have also had negative price and demand effects in the domestic markets 
facing the domestic food producers (as well as the potential producers).
This problem has been accentuated by the worsening budgetary positions of 
the treasuries of African countries. With their growing debt and debt-service 
problems, and the general mismanagement of resources, governments have 
tended to neglect the problems resulting from the rapid population growth 
and the increasing population pressure on land, especially given the fact 
that fertile cultivable land is in short supply in most African countries. 
However, since the late 1970s and the early 1980s, there has been a 
growing concern and awareness by those governments, and some steps 
have been taken to ease the problem. More emphasis is being placed on 
the importance of using birth control methods and better and more careful 
family planning is being advocated. A concurrent problem is that despite 
improvements in education and health care throughout the continent, on 
average, life expectancy is still the lowest and infant mortality the highest in 
the world.
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Growing populations also mean that greater spending is needed on services 
such as health, education and housing. As a World Bank Report puts it, 
"people are both the ends and the means of development" (1989), thus 
governments need to take the existing and projected rates of growth of the 
population into account in policy formulation. Despite an improvement in the 
access to health care and education in most African countries since 
independence, there has been a recent set-back in this field due to 
governmental fiscal difficulties (Table 3.18 below).
Essentially, there are three main issues when considering the growth of 
population and economic growth. The first concerns the way in which 
population growth affects economic development, the second, how 
development affects the rate of population growth, and the last, how 
development could occur without improving living standards (see below). 
The issue of how population growth affects the growth of aggregate output is 
tested econometrically in chapter six.
As to the way in which development and economic growth affects the rate of 
population growth, it has been observed that there is a negative association 
between economic growth and population growth (World Bank, 1989). This, 
it is argued, is due to the fact that higher levels of development are 
associated with increased levels of education and changing perceptions 
regarding family size and birth control, both of which combine to produce a 
lower rate of population growth.
Higher rates of population growth are often associated with falling per capita 
income levels, if the growth of aggregate output was lower the that of the 
population. In SSA, even though there appears to have been significant 
human development gains since independence, with falling infant mortality 
rates rising life expectancy levels, and higher adult literacy rates, economic 
growth has been slow in the 1980s, while population growth has been rising 
by about 3.2% a year. As a result, per capita incomes have been falling at 
an average of 2 .2% a year (UNDP, 1991). Thus development in the region 
appears to have taken place without a corresponding increase in per capita 
incomes and living standards.
According to the World Bank (1981 and 1989), SSA has suffered and still 
suffers from a serious lack of a skilled and trained workforce which could 
cope with the challenges of growth and development. Managerial and
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technical expertise appears to be imported in most countries, or made 
available from the expatriate population. There is a clear and direct link 
between investing in people and economic growth (this is investigated 
econometrically in chapter six). One must be accompanied by the other. 
Indeed, the number of people with access to various levels of education and 
healthcare may be a better indicator of a country's level of development than 
any other yardstick, such as the growth rate of GDP.
Table 3.4 below compares education indicators (primary, secondary, and 
tertiary school enrollment rates) in various regions. It is clear that the SSA 
rates are the lowest throughout. It is argued (e.g. World Bank, 1989) that 
increased investment in education is needed, as it can accelerate growth in 
many ways. For example, educated farmers in SSA have been found to 
achieve higher productivity levels than those who have not acquired any 
formal schooling. It was also found that increased female access to 
education improves the survival chances of infants and young children.
Table 3.4
Percentage of age group enroled in education at different levels (Totals)
Primary Secondary Tertiary
1965 1988 1965 1988 1965 1988
SSA 41 67 4 18 0 2
East Asia 88 128 23 46 1 5
South Asia 68 90 24 37 4
Latin America 
& Caribbean 98 107 19 48 4 17
Oil Exporters 50 87 11 40 1 12
OECD 104 103 63 95 21 41
Source : World Bank, World Development Report, 1991.
On the whole, it is argued that increased education should improve living 
standards. However, it was also found that if the levels of education 
increased without the anticipated corresponding increase in living 
standards, then this could fuel political instability and dissatisfaction by those
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who had expected to improve their lives as they increased their education 
(chapter six).
At this point, it is worth noting that population growth need not always be that 
major problem it is often perceived to be in the literature, since, in theory, if a 
country has excess resources that are capable of feeding and providing for a 
larger population, then a growing population might well have a positive 
effect on economic growth (as long as the population growth rate does not 
exceed the rate of resource utilisation).
In other words, if the marginal benefits from an increased population (in the 
form of a larger labour force, larger market, and greater demand) exceed the 
marginal costs of an increased population (in the form of greater 
consumption of natural resources and government services - education, 
health, infrastructure, etc.), then population growth should be beneficial.
However, in practice, Sub-Saharan Africa has not put its resources to the 
most efficient use, and therefore the population growth has tended not to 
enhance economic growth. Naturally, it is expected that there would be a 
negative association between population growth and the growth of per 
capita income, and as mentioned above, greater pressures would be 
created on the provision of services such as health, education, and housing, 
all of which would be more thinly spread unless expenditure on them is 
increased.
Another consequence of the rapid population growth and the lack of good 
public amenities, particularly in the rural areas has been the continuing 
urban concentration and the rapid growth of cities in the African countries 
(Table 3.6 below). Despite the fact that most African societies are still 
primarily agricultural, migration from rural to urban areas has been 
increasing. From the table, it appears that one in every 3.7 people resided 
in urban areas in 1985, compared with about one in 4.5 in 1980 and one in 
7 in 1965.
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Table 3.5
Health, Education and Nutrition indicators in SSA (Totals)
1965 1980 1984 1986
Population per 33,390 
Physician
- 23,610 -
Population per 
nursing person 5,420 - 2,100 -
Daily Calorie
Supply per capita 2,092 2,152 - 2097
% of age group 
enroled in primary 
education 41 79 73
% of age group 
enroled in secondary 
education 4 16 20
% of age group 
enroled in tertiary 
education 0 1 - 2
Source : World Bank, World Development Reports, 1978-91 
- not available
This increase was due to a variety of social, political and economic reasons, 
but perhaps it was mainly due to the belief of the rural populace that urban 
areas provide more and better facilities - mainly, more employment. 
Although it is not usually long before the migrants realise that city living has 
considerable drawbacks, they never-the-less appear to prefer urban living to 
their rural origins. This is because the living conditions in the rural areas are 
often even worse.
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Table 3.6
Urbanisation indicators, SSA, Totals
1965 1980 1985
Urban population as 
a percentage of 
total population 14 22 27
1965-73 1973-80 1980-87
Average annual 
growth rate of 
urban population 5.5 5.7 6.9
1960 1980
Percentage of the 
Urban population 
in the largest 
city 28 36
Number of cities 
over 500,00 
persons 3 28
Source : World Bank, 1989.
However, social living conditions are by no means the only factor affecting 
rural dwellers' decisions concerning the source of their livelihood. Another, 
and perhaps more important factor, is the availability of farm aids such as 
fertilisers, pesticides, simple technologies (e.g. oxen or tractors), agricultural 
advisers, and last but not least, financial aid and guarantees if the market 
prices paid to those farmers for their produce are particularly low. 
Furthermore, despite the social problems in the cities, urbanisation is 
associated with the structural changes argued by Chenery (1984) to be an 
important factor in the growth process. All of these are usually a 
consequence of government policy towards the agricultural sector. This is 
the subject of the next section.
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in summary, the effects of rapid population growth on economic growth are 
expected to be either negative or positive, depending on the relative sizes of 
the previously mentioned opposing forces. This is empirically tested in 
chapter six, where the effects of the growth of populations on both the growth 
rates of GDP and the savings ratio are explored.
3.4.2 Agricultural Policies
This brings us on to another particularly problematic area that exists in many 
African economies; state policies regarding agriculture. After independence, 
some African countries chose to incorporate the agricultural sector (the 
major agricultural activities) within the state sector. Many governments fixed 
the prices of agricultural goods and products, as well as the prices of inputs 
into this sector. Accordingly, incentives to farmers were greatly affected.
This was carried out by some countries with the ultimate aim of socialising 
the whole of the agricultural sector and running it under socialist principles 
(e.g. Tanzania), white others have experimented with it for the simple 
purpose of improving productivity given the limited resources that farmers 
have access to individually. The results of those experiments are mixed. 
Some countries have had a certain degree of success, while others 
succeeded initially, but then failed due to a host of different reasons (de 
Wilde, 1984). This failure, whether due to misguided policies , external 
factors, or a combination of both, has proved very costly to the Sub-Saharan 
African countries in terms of lost output and income, since agriculture 
accounts for between 30-60% of national output, and between 60-90% of 
employment in most countries (World Bank, 1981 and 1989).
This particular bias in government policies was manifested in the agricultural 
investment and pricing policies adopted by the authorities. The latter will be 
discussed in detail below, but the former, investment, has been well below 
what is required for this leading sector, and often, mismanagement and 
inefficiency would render what funds were invested unproductive, especially 
given the excessive emphasis on large-scale government operated 
schemes (de Wilde, 1984, and World Bank, 1981 & 1989).
Agricultural pricing policies will be discussed below in conjunction with 
exchange rate policies. Other factors affecting agricultural production and
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farmers' incentives include the effectiveness of agricultural research and 
extension, the availability of land and labour, and the impact of weather and 
climatic conditions.
The first factor holds the key to finding means for increasing agricultural and 
livestock output that can be demonstrated to be both profitable and feasible 
from the standpoint of producers. Both research and extension can have 
important impact on yields which, in turn, affect the price level at which a 
product is profitable to the farmer. Some efforts have been undertaken by 
the authorities to increase and improve existing agricultural research and 
extension services, but the improvements have not been anywhere on the 
scale that is needed. According to the World Bank (1981) , yields in Africa 
are substantially lower than in other continents. Little money has gone into 
research and extension, which is reflected in the continuing problems that 
face agriculture in the continent. Expenditure in the mid-1970s was 
estimated at 1.4% of the value of agricultural output in SSA, about half the 
proportion of industrialised countries.
More recently, some countries have taken steps to improve their research 
and extension services. In Kenya, for example, Maize yields increased by 
up to 59% by some farmers as a result of the improvement in national 
extension services. Similarly, positive results could also be found in Cote 
D'Ivoire, Senegal, Nigeria, and Togo (World Bank, 1989).
Research into food crops appears as necessary, if not more so, as that into 
export/cash crops. More specifically, there appears to be a greater need for 
more investment in and maintenance of irrigated cultivation, as well as to 
drought resistant crops, given the great vulnerability to climate, disease and 
world market fluctuations which this sector is subject to (World Bank, 1989). 
In food-deficit countries, there is a greater need to give food crops priority 
attention through policies providing the producers with similarly favourable 
conditions which have supported the success of certain export crops. Those 
policies which have acted as a disincentive to farmers are discussed in more 
detail below, under the heading 'agricultural pricing and exchange rate 
policies'.
As to the agricultural extension services, whereby extension workers spread 
new technologies and transfer the results of research into the fields, often as 
instructed by the agricultural ministries or parastatals, these have produced
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very limited results due to an inappropriate Incentive structure, an inability to 
deliver what the farmer needs (due to organisational weaknesses and poor 
infrastructure and transport facilities), and the unattractive 'package' that is 
often offered to farmers who are generally very hesitant to accept new crops 
or new technologies if they cannot actually see the consequences of 
introducing them (World Bank, 1981 & 1989).
Security of food supply and of income are still extremely important 
considerations in many parts of Africa, particularly for subsistance farmers. 
One particular source of insecurity is the price that they are likely (not 
guaranteed) to receive for their 'new and improved' product, and the prices 
they will face in the markets when they go to spend their newly acquired 
income. This aspect is particularly important when governments try to 
convince the farmers to switch from the production of food crops to the 
production of export crops, or vice-versa.
As to the second factor, labour has been, and continues to be, an important 
constraint to increases in production. The situation gets worse as rural- 
urban migration increases, whereby the potentially most productive 
members on the farm (males aged from 16 to 30-35) depart, leaving a 
workforce consisting mainly of women and young children to run the farms. 
Also, suitable agricultural land is becoming increasingly scarce in many 
countries, with the increasing pressure of population growth pushing 
cultivation into less productive areas.
One other problem with agricultural policies in SSA is the over-emphasis on 
large mechanised farms and on large, centrally organised, irrigation 
schemes (de Wilde, 1984). Mechanised agriculture requires (the very 
scarce) skilled management, specialised maintenance and capital, all of 
which render it import intensive. This directs government expertise, 
personnel and funds away from addressing the central problems of peasant 
agriculture. These include the lack of basic amenities and simple 
technologies, easier access to markets, and extended credit facilities to 
small-holders. To significantly increase the output of the agricultural sector 
in the SSA countries, many analysts, including the World Bank, have 
emphasised the need for better opportunities and greater attention to be 
given to the small-holders who form the nucleus of this sector, and who 
should therefore, be the main target of the authorities in their attempts to 
increase the sector's output and efficiency.
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Agricultural Pricing Policies and Exchange Rate Policies
Pricing and exchange rate policies affect the industrial and export sectors as 
well as the agricultural sector. The former is discussed in section 3.4.3 
below. These policies are very often the ones emphasised by analysts as 
some of the most important of SSA's problems (e.g. Whetham & Currie, 
1967, de Wilde, 1984, Rose, 1985, and Kiilick, 1992).
The agricultural pricing policies are carried out by the state via its 
institutions or agricultural marketing boards. These set the pricing and 
marketing policies according to the government's instructions. A particular 
feature of most SSA countries with respect to their pricing policies of 
(domestic) agricultural produce is the low price that they pay to producers for 
their output. This low producer price has been the source of many economic 
and incentive problems. Since the price that producers receive is low, they 
(the farmers) are discouraged from producing food for the domestic market. 
Not only are producers receiving artificially low prices for their output, but 
they also face relatively high prices for their inputs. Furthermore, they often 
have the added disadvantage of not being able to put their prices up in line 
with domestic inflation. Indeed, several African countries find that producers 
of traditional export crops cannot be paid enough to cover the costs of 
production. In some countries, such as Kenya, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania 
and Zambia, producers frequently receive less then half the real value of 
their crops (World Bank, 1981).
Potentially more damaging than the low producer prices farmers receive, are 
the food import policies that many African governments have pursued. 
Pressures from the urban population and other factors have led many 
governments to continually increase food imports, particularly of wheat and 
rice (substitutes to the local cereal staples). These have become available 
to the (urban) consumers at relatively cheaper prices than the domestic 
produce due to the generally overvalued exchange rates and government 
subsidies. Governments feel the need to keep food prices low for the urban 
population - potentially the most politically and economically disruptive to 
stability (Bates, 1981). Food aid appears to have also made matters worse 
for the local producers adding more competition and substituting for their 
products.
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It has been argued that the African countries are increasing their 
dependence on food imports and neglecting the development of their own 
vital agricultural base, at a time when they must ensure high domestic food 
supplies, given their problems of obtaining sufficient foreign exchange to 
pay for the goods which they have very little ability of producing (such as 
machinery and essential capital goods) (World Bank, 1989). it will therefore 
relieve some of their foreign exchange difficulties, if they can conserve in 
spending on food imports which they can produce relatively easily, it is 
argued, if agricultural prices reflected world prices.
Farmers also have little incentive to produce their capacity of cash or export 
crops, due to the fact that they have no direct access to the foreign markets, 
instead, for most of the period under discussion, they have had to sell their 
produce to the marketing boards at the boards' set price, not the actual 
market price. Furthermore, the situation is compounded by the fact that 
export crops are often heavily taxed in SSA countries. For example, 
agricultural export taxes provided more than 5% of the government's tax 
revenues in Zambia in 1984. This figure was just over 10% in Cote D'Ivoire 
(1980), and more than 20% in Ethiopia (1980) and Ghana (1985) (World 
Bank, 1988). However, the government does subsidise some of the inputs 
and services provided to the farmers, but in most cases, this does not 
compensate for the low final price they receive for their product.
Trade and exchange rate policies help set the pattern of incentives for 
economic growth. These are composed of policies on the official exchange 
rate, import duties, export taxes, subsidies, food prices, quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exchange controls. As discussed above, in many 
of the SSA countries these have been set in such a way that has hampered 
the development of the agricultural sector. Another consequence of those 
policies has been the resort to extensive black market activities and 
smuggling throughout most of the continent (de Wilde, 1984, and 
Hazlewood, 1979). The gap between the official and the unofficial 
exchange rates are sometimes as wide as 100% and evidence of 
overvaluation is widespread. Table 3.7 below illustrates the gap between 
the official and unofficial exchange rates for a number of African countries 
which clearly shows the scale of the problem.
In the empirical analysis of chapter six, the effects of the size of the 
government sector and its exchange rate policies are tested using the ratio
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of government consumption to GDP, and the ratio of the black market to 
official exchange rates, over the period 1960-86. The latter is used as a 
proxy for distortions in the operation of the price mechanism, and are 
therefore, a good indication of the effects of government intervention.
Table 3.7
Ratios of the black market (BM) to the official (E) exchange rates for selected 
SSA countries. Averages for each decade (%).
BM/E
1970-79 1980-86
Burundi 128 124
Ethiopia 138 173
Gambia 210 154
Ghana 180 178
Kenya 120 120
Lesotho 130 150
Mauritania 152 196
Nigeria 156 113
Sudan 160 129
Tanzania 199 314
Zaire 2 ^  ^ 108
Zimbabwe 160 158
Source : calculated by using the BM rate from 'Pick's Currency Yearbooks', 1965-1987, 
and the official rates from the IMF - IFS yearbooks.
3.4.3. The effect of Pricing. Trade and Foreign Exchange Policies on 
Exports and Industrial Development
High import duties, while protecting import-substituting industries, make it 
very costly for domestic producers to produce for the export markets. Instead 
of using cheaper imported inputs (available before the imposition of import 
duties), they have to use the locally produced substitutes into their 
manufactures. In many cases these duties can be refunded to exporters in 
principle, but in practice, bureaucratic inefficiency prevents this taking place. 
This makes it more profitable for them to produce for the local markets 
because their prices would be too high to compete with other, cheaper, 
Asian products in world markets, since they themselves face higher costs of 
production at home. These higher costs are later transmitted to consumers 
in the domestic markets, a large part of whom are the farmers who will
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further experience a fall in real income. Exporters are therefore at a 
disadvantage from the start, even before reaching the stage of considering 
the difficulties of competing with other producers in world markets.
Thus, deliberately or not, government policy in favour of import substitution 
and protected domestic markets have tended to discourage production for 
exports by providing more favourable conditions to producers for local 
markets. Import substitution does not necessarily have to take place at the 
expense of exports. A thriving export sector could ultimately be the main 
source of growth for SSA. The imposition of export taxes further worsens the 
situation. Thus there appears to be an inherent bias against exports in 
government policies in most of SSA.
These factors affect imports and import growth as well as exports. This is 
because of the clear and strong link between imports and exports, with 
exports generating the foreign exchange necessary for intermediate and 
capital goods imports which would increase production and improve 
productivity, thus increasing exports and obtaining even more foreign 
exchange, and so on.
Another consequence of the typical trade and exchange rate system in SSA 
is that it encourages high-cost, capital-intensive and import-intensive 
industry, as well as discouraging the development of domestic industries 
that consume local raw materials and labour. Protection often favours 
packaging or assembly-type industries which consume scarce foreign 
exchange, do not provide many economic benefits to the economy, and 
often operate well below capacity.
One further point should be mentioned concerning the trade and exchange 
rate policies of most African countries; since import controls are used to 
reduce to a minimum (or sometimes even eliminate) the imports of the goods 
deemed 'unnecessary' or 'luxurious' by the authorities, then presumably, 
only the 'necessities' are left unrestricted. Supposing however, there was a 
foreign reserves crisis, or that there was a need to cut down further on 
foreign exchange spending (which often happens in African countries), then 
under such circumstances, the only option left to the authorities would be to 
restrict the import of those necessities and to impose even tighter controls on 
currency movements. Thus the result of imposing so many restrictions at the 
beginning is that the authorities, within the context of the domestic policy
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regime they have chosen, have left themselves no room for emergency 
measures if and when a crisis arises.
On the whole, pricing, trade and foreign exchange policies were often 
determined more in reaction to events than as an integrated industrialisation 
and trade strategy. For example, price controls were often instituted in 
response to rising price inflation and shortages of goods due to lack of 
foreign exchange, or to soften the impact of a devaluation. However, it is not 
always possible for the government to act in an economically rational 
manner when faced with continuous external shocks (such as droughts and 
oil-price rises) on the one hand, and potentially disruptive domestic interests 
(particularly of urban workers, the military, and civil service) on the other. 
Still, reform to pricing, trade and exchange rate policies is seen to be crucial 
in SSA, especially given the negative effects of the current policies on the 
two most important sectors: agriculture and industry (World Bank, 1989).
From the previous discussion, it appears that the negative influences of 
government policies on export and import expansion, both from the 
agricultural and industrial sectors, have retarded the growth of exports and 
imports. In chapter six, in addition to the impact of the black market 
exchange rates, the impact of the growth of exports and imports on growth is 
empirically tested, in order to assess the importance of both in the growth 
process.
Before proceeding to the problems of the public sector, it is necessary to 
discuss the special circumstances of the Franc Zone countries in SSA, as 
they do not appear to share the same circumstances and problems as the 
rest of SSA.
Francophone Africa
It is argued that Francophone Africa has been more successful than other 
African countries (e.g. Hodd, 1991). This is primarily due to the fact that 
those countries still have political and economic links with France. This is 
mainly manifested in the fact that those countries belong to the CFA 
(Communaute Francaise Africaine) zone, ali having a fixed exchange rate in 
terms of the CFA to the French Franc (FF), and the CFA Franc is fully 
convertible (at a rate of CFAfr50:FF1). Table 3.8 below shows the average
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values of the CFA In terms of the U.S. dollar and the French Franc over the 
period 1960-86.
Table 3.8
Average Values of CFA currency
1960-70 1971-80 1981-86
CFA/US$ 253.1 234.1 369.0
French Franc/US$ 5.1 4.7 7.4
CFA/FF 49.6 49.8 49.9
Source: World Bank - World Tables, various editions.
The real exchange rates are tied to those of France, and devaluation as a 
cure for over-valuation is therefore prevented except under special 
circumstances. This poses a problem for the SSA CFA countries, given the 
diversity in economic structure and the different problems that face each 
country, compared to France.
Nevertheless, the rules of the Franc Zone impose limits on budget deficits 
and this has resulted in somewhat greater price stability (Rose, 1985). Yet, it 
also allows for greater use of short-term and medium-term external credits. 
Also, the banking system in the CFA countries has deteriorated in recent 
years. One of the main reasons for this is that governments, unable to print 
money, have forced the commercial banks to finance expenditures that 
would normally have been met by government subsidies. Governments 
have also interfered with the allocation of credit in several ways, for 
example, by forcing banks to extend credit to public enterprises that were not 
creditworthy.
Exchange controls against France are not permitted, and the African central 
banks have strict limits on fiduciary issues. They are basically French-run in 
terms of policy, and French personnel as well as French treasury funds are 
provided to cover approved state and external balance deficits. Also, as 
mentioned above, changes in currency parities against the French Franc or 
against each other are only permitted under exceptional circumstances.
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However, Table 3.9 indicates that, on the whole, the Francophone countries 
as a group have not performed better economically than other SSA 
countries, particularly since 1980, except where inflation is concerned. 
Other countries have done comparably well, or even better. Much depends 
on which indicators of economic performance are chosen. Some of those 
countries which have done comparably well were Botswana, Mauritius, 
Gambia and Kenya. However, what remains clear is that the majority of 
Francophone African states have usually avoided overt recurrent budget 
deficits, open detailed quantitative import controls and, less markedly, 
sustained high rates of inflation. The reason for this is, of course, their above 
mentioned monetary and exchange rate systems, and the associated 
restrictions imposed by France (Rose, 1985).
In the empirical analysis of chapter six, a regression equation is performed 
testing the growth performance of the non-CFA zone countries separately, 
due to the above-mentioned special circumstances of the Francophone 
countries.
3.4.4 The size of the Public Sector
After independence, it was widely believed that the public sector should play 
a major role in the development process, providing the much needed 
financial resources and expertise to contribute to economic growth 
(Wickens, 1986). Accordingly, many governments started their 
nationalisation programmes of what they considered to be industries and 
sectors vital to the well being of the national economy. Development plans 
were formulated and more emphasis was laid on public investment and 
participation.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the public sector greatly extended its 
economic role in Africa, as it did elsewhere. Table 3.10 illustrates this 
growth as indicated by the ratio of government consumption to GDP. This 
growth has come from the expansion of government per se, as well as by the 
extension of the state into commercial or productive activities including 
mining, transport, manufacturing and marketing activities which were 
primarily in private hands before independence (World Bank, 1981 and 
1989).
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One particular field where the government has extended its authority is in 
the operation of parastatal marketing organisations, which are responsible 
for the marketing of farm produce and the supply of production requisites. 
Their operation could be faulted on a number of issues. For instance, 
standards of accountability have been seriously inadequate, their costs and 
margins have frequently been excessive and are often inflated by over- 
staffing, they regularly face high over-head costs and rising losses in 
marketing, storage, and transport. Furthermore, the financial situation of 
many parastatals has deteriorated, causing shortages in funds needed for 
the purchase of farm products and, in many cases, serious delays in the 
payment to farmers for their deliveries. Also, those that have monopoly in 
supplying inputs have often failed to ensure the timely delivery of necessary 
inputs (Bates, 1981, and World Bank, 1981 and 1989).
The problem of high levels of government expenditure was also 
compounded by donors and/or lenders who were willing to finance projects 
without assessing their viability and impact on budgets, or their value as 
public investment programmes.
105
Table 3.9
Economic indicators for a selection of CFA and other counties in SSA
Average annual growth Average annual
rate of GDP (%) growth rate of GNP
per capita
'65-73 73-80 80-87 '65-73 '73-80 80-87
CFA Zone countries
Benin 1.9 2.3 2.8 0.0 -0.3 -0.6
Central A. R. 2.6 2.1 2.0 1.5 -0.5 -0.7
Cote D'Ivoire 8.6 4.7 2.2 4.5 1.2 -3.0
Congo 7.0 4.7 5.5 4.2 1.1 1.7
Gabon 7.4 3.6 0.6 4.9 -1.2 -3.5
Togo 5.5 4.1 0.5 2.0 1.5 -3.9
Niger -1.2 5.6 -1.9 -3.7 2.6 -4.9
Mali 2.7 6.3 3.4 4.3 0.7
Senegal 1.6 2.3 3.3 -0.8 -0.5 0.1
Cameroon 2.4 8.9 7.0 -0.4 5.7 4.5
Unweighted
Average 3.9 4.5 2.5 1.4 1.4 -1.0
Non-CFA countries
Ethiopia 3.9 1.6 0.9 1.1 0.0 -1.6
Botswana 14.7 10.5 13.0 9.3 7.3 8.0
Nigeria 8.4 3.4 -1.7 5.3 1.2 -4,8
Ghana 3.4 -0.3 1.4 1.0 -2.1 -2.0
Gambia 4.4 2.0 5.0 1.7 0.2 0.8
Mauritius 2.4 5.7 5.5 0.8 3.9 4.4
Mauritania 2.6 2.6 1.4 1.2 -0.6 -1.6
Sudan 7.9 4.8 3.8 -1.7 3.5 -4.3
Liberia 5.4 2.0 -1.3 2.4 -0.7 -5.2
Kenya 7.9 4.8 3.8 4.7 1.3 -0.9
Tanzania 4.8 2.3 1.7 2.0 -0.9 -1.7
Zaire 3.6 -2.0 1.6 0.3 -4.7 -2.5
Unweighted
Average 5.7 3.1 2.9 2.3 0.7 -0.9
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(Table 3.9 cont.)
Average Annual Inflation Rate (%) 
1965-73 73-80 80-87
CFA- Zone Countries
Benin 2.9 11.6 8.2
Central A.R. 3.0 14.8 7.9
Cote D'Ivoire 2.7 16.0 4.4
Congo 4.4 9.2 1.8
Gabon 5.8 15.8 2.6
Togo 2.9 8.2 6.6
Niger 4.1 8.5 4.1
Mali • •* 10.8 4.2
Senegal 3.0 8.8 9.1
Cameroon 7.5 10.4 8.1
Unweighted
Average 4.0 11.4 5.7
Non-CFA Zone Countries
Ethiopia 2.0 5.7 2.6
Botswana 4.4 11.6 8.4
Nigeria 9.1 16.2 10.1
Ghana 8.1 45.4 48.3
Gambia 3.0 13.5 13.8
Mauritius 5.5 12.5 8.1
Mauritania 4.1 8.5 9.8
Sudan 7.2 15.3 31.7
Liberia 1.6 9.1 1.5
Kenya 2.4 11.6 10.3
Tanzania 3.4 15.4 24.9
Zaire 19.0 42.1 53.5
Unweighted
Average 5.8 17.2 18.6
Source : World Bank, World Development Reports, and 'Accelerated Development
in SSA1, 1981, and 'Sub-Saharan Africa - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth', 1989.
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Table 3.10
Ratio of General Government Consumption to GDP in Selected SSA 
countries (%).
1950-60 1960-70 1970-81
Botswana 14.8 21.4 19.8
Burundi 2.7 6.5 12.9
Ethiopia 7.8 9.8 13.5
Gabon 9.9 12.4 12.2
Gambia 14.6 14.8 20.4
Ghana 7.8 13.2 10.5
Cote D'Ivoire 9.6 11.6 16.6
Kenya 10.1 14.1 18.8
Liberia 7.3 11.6 14.0
Mali 11.5 15.9 21.4
Mauritania 25.4 18.3 28.5
Mauritius 10.0 12.6 12.4
Nigeria 4.9 7.1 10.1
Senegal 17.3 16.7 17.8
Tanzania 8.9 10.8 15.2
Zaire 13.7 22.3 18.0
Zambia 9.5 14.3 25.3
Zimbabwe 11.3 12.3 16.0
Source : World Bank, World Tables, Third Edition.
Furthermore, in most countries, the tendency has been for the government 
sector to significantly expand during 'boom' periods without giving sufficient 
attention to what would happen when the boom ended. In periods of relative 
prosperity (due, for example, to a rise in world demand for African exports), 
there was a tendency to increase spending on the various sectors of the 
economy, such as health, education, and infrastructure, with increased 
staffing levels, materials, and equipment. Inevitably, when the boom ended, 
many of those commitments have had to be abandoned or reduced, with 
serious effects resulting from those cuts (Greene, 1989). Staffing levels 
were not usually affected, but the provision of materials, equipment, and 
maintenance suffered significantly.
Perhaps the most notable exception to such financial mismanagement has 
been Botswana, who, according to the World Bank (1989), has attempted 
not to overspend in periods of boom and, instead, to build sufficient reserves 
to be able to cope better during recessionary periods. Other factors such as 
real exchange rate devaluation when necessary (eg. 1980-87) and the
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continuity of leadership since independence have contributed to Botswana's 
relative prosperity. Sound financial management by the government is 
clearly an essential factor in the growth process.
Tables 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 below give indicators of public sector 
employment and growth rates for selected countries in selected years. 
According to the World Bank (1981), in all of the SSA countries, public 
employment as a percentage of formal employment is high and has risen 
significantly for the periods under consideration with the exception of 
Uganda, which has had a 'steady', relatively high rate over the whole period.
The public sector employs between thirty-five and seventy per cent of those 
recorded in paid employment, and employment in this sector is (and has 
been) growing at a much faster rate than of the private sector (Table 3.11). 
Furthermore, during the 1970s, Table 3.12 indicates that the growth of the 
government sector itself has also been rapid, compared with most of the 
other (non-SSA) selected countries in Table 3.13, of spending on public 
administration and defence.
Total resources available to governments in SSA typically exceed 25% of; 
GNP, sometimes reaching as much as 40% (World Bank, 1981 and 1989). 
This is a high share compared to other regions. In India, for example, in 
1977, taxes of central and state governments combined totalled 15% of 
GDP, foreign aid was 1.1% and expenditures by central and state 
governments were 26%. Therefore, African governments have been 
relatively successful at mobilising economic surplus for public use. With 
output rising so slowly, it is important to compare the resources allocated 
each year to basic government services (defence, administration, health, 
education, roads,etc.) with the use of resources to support, say, agriculture 
or industry.
Also according to the World Bank (1989), it is not the size of the government 
sector itself that is so much under criticism, but the way that the public sector 
resources have been utilized. It is argued that the sector would benefit from 
decreasing in size, (as difficult as this may be politically in some countries), 
but more importantly, the resources available to it must be more efficiently 
managed, and the unnecessarily large degree of intervention and direct 
control exercised by the authorities needs to be reduced. It is also argued 
that another vital role for the government is to set guidelines and provide
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direction as to what is needed for the better operation of the economy. 
Decisions at the micro-economic level are better left to the individual 
farmers, traders and industrialists, since they will be the ones who ultimately 
increase output and growth.
Table 3.11
Public sector employment and growth rates, selected countries
Country Year Formal 
emplo­
yment as 
a perce- 
tage
of Working 
age Popul­
ation
Public
employment 
as a percen­
tage of formal 
employment
Formal employ­
ment Growth 
Rates
Public Private Total
Ghana 1957 51.4 4.9 -2.2 2.3
1972 10.1 73.9
Tanzania 1962 27.0
1974 6.3 66.4 10.7 -4.8 2.3
Cote D'lvoire1970 10.2
Kenya 1963 29.6
1977 12.4 41.7 6.0 2.4 3.7
Malawi 1968 33.4
1976 9.6 39.2 9.0 8.0 8.6
Uganda 1962 41.8
1970 5.9 42.2 4.0 4.8 4.5
Source : World Bank, 1981
The discussion so far was of the main internal and policy-induced problems 
facing the SSA countries. To summarise, these include rapid population 
growth, relatively under-developed human resources (lacking skilled, 
organisational, technical, managerial, and administrative powers), 
insecurely rooted and ill-suited institutions which have been a drain on 
scarce resources, poor health, educational and infrastructural services, trade 
and exchange rate policies, agricultural pricing, marketing, and distribution 
policies, and the large size and inefficient operation of the public sector. 
Clearly, other problems exist. One such problem is the sizeable rural-urban
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migration that has resulted primarily from poor agricultural policies and the 
resulting social problems in urban areas (discussed in section 3.4.1.). 
Another is the unbalanced regional development, that has left many of the 
rural areas largely deprived from whatever development effort was taking 
place in and around the cities, which has led to increased urban migration,
Table 3.12
The growth of public administration and defence relative to GNP
Country Expenditure on Public Average annual growth rates,
Administration and 1970-79______________________
defence as a percen- Expenditure
tage of GDP, on public. Relat- Expe-
annual average, admin & ive to nditure
defence GDP on Public
1970-79 admin.
Mauritania 18.0 13.9 1.8 12.1
Kenya 17.1 8.4 6.5 1.9
Sudan 16.1 4.5 4.3 0.2
Tanzania 14.9 10.2 4.9 5.3
Chad 14.2 6.1 -.2 6.3
Somalia 13.7 6.5 3.1 0.2
Congo 12,7 2.3 2.9 -.6
Botswana 12.1 16.3 13.5 0.5
Madagascar 12.1 16.3 13.5 0.5
Benin 11.0 4.8 3.3 1.5
Rwanda 10.3 6.5 4.1 2.4
Lesotho 9.2 3.3 7.0 -3.7
Upper Volta 9.1 6.2 -0.1 6.3
Uganda 9.1 5.9 -0.4 6.3
Sierra Leone 8.3 9.6 1.6 8.0
Cote D'Ivoire 8.1 8.9 6.7 2.2
Liberia 8.0 6.7 1.8 4.9
Cameroon 7.1 6.2 5.4 0.8
Nigeria 6.4 13.3 7.5 5.8
Mauritius 4.7 12.9 8.2 4.7
Burundi 4.4 5.9 3.0 2.9
Unweighted
Average 9.9 7.4 3.9 3.3
Source : World Bank, 1981
as well as to the production of a 'lower than potential' rural output. This is a 
consideration of equitable development and is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.
I l l
Another set of problems of a different nature have also formed obstacles to 
growth in SSA. These are external to the African economies. Due to the 
heavy dependence on external trade, the African economies have become 
very exposed to world trade shocks and international disturbances. What 
made the matter worse for some countries is their virtually complete 
dependence on the Income generated from one or two main primary 
commodities. Changes in the international conditions of supply and 
demand, via their direct effect on the prices of those commodities, are of 
great importance to those economies. Kenya, Uganda , and Tanzania for 
example, suffer tremendously when world prices for coffee, tea, or sisal fall 
markedly. Conversely, their economies enjoy (temporary) prosperity when 
the prices of these commodities rise.
This problem, as well as others, will be discussed below as the 'external' 
problems facing SSA.
Table 3.13
Expenditure on Public Administration and Defence, selected non-SSA 
countries, 1970-81
Country As percentage of GDP Average annual growth rate
Peru 4.8 3.8
India 4.7 8.1
Indonesia 6.9 n/a
Republic of Korea 4.5 2.0
Pakistan 7.6 10.3
Paraguay 3.7 5.5
Singapore 3.3 n/a
Thailand 4.0 6.6
Brazil 7.8 n/a
Algeria 10.8 5.9
Greece 9.3 5.0
France 11.3 2.7
Norway 4.6 4.3
Source : World Bank, World Tables, third edition
3.5 External Problems
As mentioned above, these are the factors that appear to have impaired the 
African economies due to no fault of their own. They are external factors,
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upon which the African countries have no control, but whose effects may 
have been severe and significant on their economies. (An attempt at 
quantifying their effect can be found in chapter six). We will start with the 
export markets.
3.5.1 Export Revenue Instability and the Terms of Trade
Given that most SSA countries depend on the foreign exchange generated 
from one or two main export products (eg. coffee in Kenya , cocoa in Ghana, 
copper in Zambia, and tea in Tanzania), fluctuations in the prices of these 
products in the international markets could be extremely harmful for their 
exporters. The consequences of a marked fall in world prices of any of these 
products are severe not only in their effect on the producers of these 
commodities, but also in their indirect effect on all other sectors in the 
economy.
Once the world price of coffee falls, for instance, then the country exporting it 
will receive less foreign exchange than it previously did. This will erode the 
incomes of coffee producers, who will spend less money on other goods in 
the economy, thus lowering the incomes of other traders and producers. 
Lower foreign exchange earnings will also mean less resources will be 
available for the purchase of capital and intermediate goods imports, which 
are necessary for the operation of certain industries, such as the often 
protected import-substituting industries. If those capital goods are not 
available, then the operation of those industries will cease or they will 
function well below capacity. Again, incomes will be eroded, goods will be 
in short supply, and the economy's growth rate will be lowered. In chapter 
six, the degree to which lower export prices relative to import prices, (the 
external terms of trade), affects growth will be further examined and 
quantified in a regression model.
During the 1970s, not only did the growth of world trade in primary 
commodities slow down considerably, but oil prices also soared (1973/4 and 
1978/9) and so many mineral and agricultural commodity exporters suffered 
severe deterioration in their terms of trade (with the exception of the oil 
producers and exporters, such as Nigeria and Gabon). The SSA countries 
appeared to be amongst the worst hit of the developing world. However, as 
was discussed in chapter one (see also Tables 1.6 and 1.7), Africa as a
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whole did not suffer from a more severe deterioration in its terms of trade 
than did other regions. There were some years during the 1970s when the 
prices of some of the leading agricultural exports were high (such as coffee 
and Cocoa, 1977). Yet, according to the World Bank (1989), there is little 
hope of a significant increase in world demand for primary commodities, and 
in areas were Africa has a comparative advantage.
In the early to mid-1980s, the African economies suffered a further set-back 
due to the fall in commodity prices. Table 3.14 below shows the decline in 
the prices of the primary commodity exports of SSA. However, in 1985 and 
1987 there was some improvement in the prices of some commodities, but 
not all (for example, Cocoa and Coffee in 1985, and Groundnuts in 1987). 
Not only are there frequent fluctuations in international commodity prices, 
but the actual share of commodities in world trade has steadily declined from 
47% in 1960 to 35% in 1986 (United Nations, 1988). This has significantly 
added to the economic problems of SSA, for whom commodity prices still 
determine their capacity to import and to service their external debt. This 
also illustrates the need for SSA countries to diversify their export structure, 
and to increase the share of manufactures in exports if possible.
There is conflicting evidence regarding the role of the deterioration in the 
external terms of trade in the growth process. Some argue that there is a 
very close relationship between economic growth and the improvements in 
the terms of trade (e.g. Wheeler, 1984, and Svedberg, 1991), while others 
(such as Pickett, 1990 and Sparks, 1988) have found that the African 
countries have, on the whole, not suffered a greater deterioration in their 
terms of trade than did other developing countries. The effects of terms of 
trade movements on growth is examined empirically in chapter six.
Therefore, the influence of this factor on economic growth may not be as 
large or as significant as previously thought, especially since other regions 
have experienced similar terms of trade deterioration, but a relatively faster 
growth of aggregate output. This tends to indicate that SSA's problem was 
more related to the slow growth of exports and imports, reflecting domestic 
policy failings, than to term of trade deterioration and export price 
fluctuations. Again, this is all examined in chapter six.
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Table 3.14
Selected Commodity Prices
1980 1982 1985 1987
Aluminium 
(US cents/pound)
80.51 44.98 47.21 70.99
Cocoa Beans 
(US cents/pound)
126.86 85.54 107.87 93.88
Coffee
(US cents/pound)
147.15 111.04 121.24 102.34
Copper
(US cents/pound)
101.40 72.91 65.57 81.17
Groundnuts 
(US$/metric ton)
485.57 383.2 349.85 933.02
Palm Kernels 
(US$/metric ton)
344.5 264.83 284.83 181.42
Sisal
(US$/metric ton)
765.0 593.17 524.67 511.67
Tea
(US cents/pound)
101.06 87.62 89.98 77.45
Tin
(US cents/pound)
761.03 581.95 523.16 315.61
Iron Ore
(US$/metric ton)
27.25 26.21 22.66 22.23
Sorghum 
(US$/metric ton)
128.86 108.35 102.97 72.82
Petroleum
(US$/barrel)
28.67 33.47 30.15 18.52
Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1988.
The share of SSA's major crop exports also fell during the 1970s and early 
1980s. According to the World Bank (1989), the share of African exports in 
all world trade fell form 2.4% in 1970 to 1.7% in 1985. Another, more 
serious deterioration has been that of SSA's share of non-oil primary
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commodities, from 7% in 1970 to less than 4% in 1985. The Bank 
concludes that:
" If Sub-Saharan African countries had maintained their 1970 market 
share of non-oil primary exports from developing countries and prices 
had remained the same, their export earnings would have been $9 
billion to U.S. $10 billion a year higher in 1986-87. The difference is 
approximately equal to the region's total debt service payments in 
this period".
All of the above demonstrates the importance of the export sector in SSA, 
and the figures in Table 3.15 below indicate the degree to which export and 
import growth have deteriorated from 1965-73, until 1980-87.
Table 3.15
Average Annual Growth Rates (%)
1965-73
Exports
■73-80 '80-87
Imports 
1965-73 '73-80 '80-87
SSA (Total) 15.1 0.2 -1.3 3.7 7.6 -5.8
SSA (excluding
Nigeria) 5.7 2.0 1.7 3.4 2.9 -1.5
Source : World Bank, 1989
Many reasons have been suggested for this poor export performance. 
World trade in most primary products grew more slowly than world trade in 
manufacturing over the period 1970-80 (World Bank, 1981). Africa is more 
dependent on exports of primary products than any other region (hence 
policy mismanagement and the inherent bias against exports in Africa may 
have had more damaging effects than in other countries). This has inhibited 
product diversification and expansion of manufacturing.
However, there have been exceptions, such as Kenya and Mauritius, both of 
whom diversified slightly away from primaries and toward manufactures 
(World Bank, 1989). Yet the majority have not acted to take advantage of the 
changing structures and emphasis of world markets. Primary commodity 
exports accounted for 93% of total export earnings in 1970, declining to 88% 
by the mid 1980s.
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Also, most SSA countries did not take advantage of the expanding South- 
East Asian and middle-Eastern markets, selling over 50% of their exports to 
Europe throughout the considered period (up to 1986) (Africa South of the 
Sahara, 1988). This is despite the fact that those markets have expanded 
rapidly, and their economies achieved high growth rates, with a 
corresponding increase in income.
There are other explanations for the slow growth of exports in Africa. One is 
the fact that for certain mineral products (eg. copper in Zambia), exploration 
had reached a mature and fully-developed phase, whereby significant 
further expansion in output was not possible. For other crops, drought and 
civil strife seriously affected production of food and export crops. Finally, 
trade restrictions imposed by the developed countries, such as tariff 
structures which escalated with the degree of processing of the product, 
agricultural price support for their own products and non- tariff barriers to 
trade, further impeded the growth of African exports.
Thus even if they had adopted more appropriate policies, African economic 
growth rates would still have suffered to an extent due to the world recession 
and stagflation of the 1970s. Falls in world demand for primary products, 
and the creation of alternative synthetic and fabricated products (eg. 
polyesters and cheaper fabrics) which compete with the African primary 
commodities also negatively affected their exports.
In chapter six an attempt to assess the strength and significance of export 
(and import) growth on economic growth is made. The role of the terms of 
trade in the process is also investigated.
3.5.2 Climate and Geography
In most SSA countries, climatic and geographic conditions have given rise 
to soils which are deficient in organic materials, and in general are only 
moderately fertile. Well-watered areas are only about one quarter of the 
total; elsewhere, rains are inadequate in volume and highly variable in time. 
Problems of weed and pest control are also rife. Soil-erosion, population 
pressure, over- grazing and shorter rotations have resulted in falling 
productive capacity of land (World Bank, 1981 and 1989). Mineral
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exploration is also more difficult in such areas than in temperate zones, 
where rock formations are well exposed. Also, human energy and 
productivity are adversely affected because the tropical climate is 
particularly receptive to bacterial and parasitic diseases such as malaria, 
schistosomiasis, and onchocerciasis.
The role of drought has also been large and negative in many SSA 
countries. In particular, the Sahel experienced a quick succession of 
drought years between the late 1960s and the mid 1970s, with only a year or 
two of recovery in between. After another short period of recovery after 
1974, another succession of very poor conditions followed, starting 1977/8 
both in the Sahel and North-Eastern Africa. For example, Lele (1984) 
concludes that the droughts of the mid-1970s have significantly affected 
agricultural output in Tanzania during that period. Another severe drought 
occurred in 1984/5. These droughts resulted in a very sharp drop in crop 
production, severe losses in livestock, and immense human misery.
Evidence is not yet conclusive as to whether this indicates a long term 
process of the 'advance of the desert'. There are many indications of over- 
grazing and expansion of cleared land areas and over-population, all 
negatively affecting the evaporation and rainfall (World Bank, 1981 and 
1989 and Africa South of the Sahara, 1988). If however, this desertification 
process proves to be under way as a long-term phenomenon, then the 
consequences will clearly be catastrophic. Unless corrective measures, 
such as research into and the introduction of drought-resistant crops, and 
keeping a check on population movements are taken, it is argued that 
SSA's underdevelopment will be aggravated and extended into the twenty- 
first century.
Another difficulty related to Africa's geographical nature is due to the 
continent's large physical size and dispersed population. These create 
special transport needs and problems. Fourteen countries in Africa are 
landlocked (of the world's twenty developing countries) - that is, almost a 
third of the SSA countries, often being more than 1000 kilometres from the 
sea by the shortest land route. This creates obvious financial and practical 
difficulties in providing transport facilities for the country's imports and 
exports. Regional integration and cooperation have been suggested as 
factors contributing to a solution to this problem (Todaro, 1989, and World 
Bank, 1989).
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Therefore, it may be said that the climatic and geographical conditions in 
SSA have somewhat retarded output and income growth. The scarcity of 
fertile land and water resources, frequent occurrence of droughts, and lack 
of easy access to the sea have all acted together, adversely affecting any 
development efforts undertaken during the last two decades. How sizeable 
this effect may be is difficult to assess but it seems plausible to conclude that 
climate is not largely responsible for Africa's poor growth record. To a 
degree, these problems can be alleviated by irrigation, conservation and 
flood control and they are as much a symptom of the lack of the 
development, as a cause.
The above discussion has outlined the major factors that are thought to have 
retarded Africa's growth during the period 1960-1986. These have been 
divided into two categories : Internal Factors, being mainly the following: 
population growth, agricultural policies, pricing policies, trade and exchange 
rate policies and the size of the public sector. The other category was a set 
of external factors, including fluctuations in world export prices for African 
products, world recession, and climatic and geographical conditions. All 
these facts together have, to varying degrees, contributed to impair Africa's 
growth record. In the following chapters, the degree to which each factor 
has contributed to Africa's dismal growth record will be explored in a 
regression model. Next, however, a very serious problem facing all SSA 
countries will be examined - that of the growing debt and debt-service 
burden.
3.5.3. Africa's Debt Problem
Incurring a national debt is a situation which arises due to both internal and 
external factors. Internally, factors such as balance of payments problems, 
government policy mismanagement, and budget deficits may force the resort 
to external finance and loans. Externally, unforeseen interest rate changes 
exacerbate the debt problem by raising the costs of the loans and the debt- 
service payments. (The lending rate is determined as a mark-up on the 
LIBOR - the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate, and it depends on the 
creditworthiness of the borrower, and on the general conditions existing in 
financial markets at the time the credit is initially extended) (McKenzie and 
Thomas, 1992).
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During the 1960s, when various third world countries were starting their 
development programmes, bilateral and multilateral loans were in operation 
to a limited extent. In the following decade, the international debt market 
changed substantially. The 1973/4 oil price hikes presented most 
developing countries with very difficult economic problems - the 'easiest' 
solution for which appeared to be the resort to borrowing in sufficiently large 
quantities to cover their budget deficits and development needs. Obviously, 
the more developed the country, or the richer its prospects looked, and the 
greater was its debt bearing capacity.
At that time, the international lending institutions viewed such lending as not 
abnormal banking business, and not particularly unsafe, as they thought 
that lending governments of countries, be they third world or otherwise, was 
a safe enough venture as it was difficult to perceive that whole countries 
could go bankrupt, rendering their investment irretrievable (Eichengreen 
and Lindert, 1989). Thus lending to developing countries was expanded. 
The largest borrowers were the South American countries as well as the 
South-East Asian countries. The SSA countries also had their share of the 
emerging loan industry.
In the subsequent few years, the South East Asian countries proved to be 
not so risky for the lending banks, as they grew fast and earned the title of 
the 'Newly Industrialised Countries'. The South American countries also 
achieved some success at industrialisation, but to a much more limited 
degree than the Asian countries. Consequently, they turned out to be some 
of the world's most heavily indebted countries, and they have helped create 
what has become known as the world 'debt crisis'. As for the SSA 
countries, the story was somewhat different. Table 3.16 shows the size of 
the SSA debt burden and it illustrates how the problem had escalated since 
1970.
Despite the fact that it is not the absolute size of the debt that is important, 
rather, it is the debt/GDP or debt/exports ratios which indicate the relative 
size of a country's debt problem, Africa's debt in absolute size is about one 
quarter of that of Latin America and the Caribbean, and just over a half of 
that of East Asia and the Pacific. Africa's debt crisis has been more 
prolonged and severe than that of other developing countries, due to the 
difficult set of chronic problems that SSA faces. The debt burden is a large 
constraint on the regions' economic growth, and often undermines the
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effectiveness of its development efforts. Within SSA itself, the low-income 
countries face even more severe problems. Revenue generation through 
exports is too small to cover the service payments on loans, as well as 
maintain domestic living standards. Living standards in those countries 
have been declining steadily over the last ten years, and are now lower than 
they were in the 1970s (World Bank, 1989).
In 1979, of the principal borrowers in the developing world, no African 
countries were included. Latin American and South East Asian countries 
dominated the scene. In 1988, Cote D'Ivoire and Nigeria were among the 
world's seventeen highly indebted countries (the rest being mostly South 
American, Yugoslavia, Morocco and the Philippines [World Bank, World 
Development Reports, 1978-91]).
Declining commodity prices and higher energy import bills led many SSA 
countries to heavy external borrowing, in order to maintain levels of 
expenditure experienced in earlier boom times. By 1988, the regions' debt 
was nearly equal to three and a half times its export earnings. Since 1980, 
SSA's debt has also grown faster than that of other developing regions.
One of the main factors that has rendered debt more of a constraint on 
growth in SSA is the slow growth of exports and export revenues (World 
Bank, 1989). The share of African exports in all world trade fell from 2.4 % in 
1970 to 1.7 % in 1985. Its share of non-oil primary commodities fell even 
more dramatically from 7% to less than 4% over the same period. By and 
large, the expansion of world trade since the 1960s appears to have by­
passed SSA (World Bank, 1981 and 1989).
It is often argued that given the existing structure of SSA's exports, the most 
viable option for SSA seems to be to pursue a more aggressive exports 
promotion strategy, combined with diversification of exports and markets. 
Eliminating biases against exports and the adoption of appropriate 
marketing, tariff, and exchange rate policies are seen as important first steps 
in such a programme (Killick, 1992, Rose, 1984, and World Bank, 1989). 
This does not necessarily mean a shift from agricultural exports, but a more 
concentrated effort to raise agricultural production to begin with, and to use 
the foreign exchange generated for the production of other, non-agricultural 
commodities. Some countries have already started this process, the most
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notable of which has been Mauritius which appears to have successfully 
diversified into light manufacturing industry (World Bank, 1989).
Again, with regards to markets, African countries need to look more seriously 
to the Asian and American markets as the potentially large importers of their 
products. The traditional European markets have seen a general 
contraction in developing country imports from 34% to 20% over the period 
1970 -1985.
Low investment levels have contributed to poor export performance and 
diversification. However, it also seems that domestic financial 
mismanagement is responsible to a large extent, for these low investment 
levels and the low returns on many projects. For example, the role of banks 
and other financial institutions as financial intermediators has been 
negligible in most of the SSA countries (Hanson and Neal, 1985). It 
appears to be mostly the case that the allocation of funds and the 
determination of the levels of interest rates are a role assumed by the 
governments, rather than the markets, or a combination of both. A major 
cause of debt accumulation was investment in ill-considered and ill- 
conceived projects, with 'over-invoiced' capital costs. Furthermore, for the 
developing countries as a whole, approximately 20% of their debt (OPEC 
excluded) can be attributed directly to arms purchases (George, 1988).
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Table 3.16
External Public Debt and Debt-Service Ratios
1970 1980 1987
External Public Debt Outstandina and Disbursed :
-US$(mill.):
SSA (total) 5,373 41,273 105,949
excl. Nigeria 4,921 37,069 78,180
East Asia 5,654 52,583 147,605
South Asia 11,327 33,062 68,696
Europe, Middle
East, & N. Africa 8,832 56,570 227,861
Latin America &
Caribbean 15,878 129,325 338,331
-% of GNP:
SSA (total) 13 21 81.0
excl. Nigeria 18 38 74.0
East Asia 15 10 24.9
South Asia 15.1 16 21.6
Europe, M. East,
& N Africa 13.5 17 47.9
Latin America &
Caribbean 10.5 19 45.5
Interest Pavments on External Public Debt USStfmill.l
SSA (total) 168 1,919 2,428
excl. Nigeria 148 1,479 1,906
East Asia 566 3,613 27,904
South Asia 724 768 5,355
Europe, M. East,
& N. Africa 1,197 3,365 32,355
Latin America &
Caribbean 2,430 12,870 31,256
Debt-Service as % of G N P:
SSA (total) 1.2 2.1 4.1
excl. Nigeria 1.5 3.6 4.2
East Asia 1.5 1.4 4.7
South Asia 1.0 0.9 1.7
Europe, M. East,
& N. Africa 1.8 2.3 6.6
Latin America &
Caribbean 1.6 4.0 4.2
Debt-Service as % of ExDorts of aoods and services :
SSA (total) 5.3 7.2 14.7
excl. Nigeria 5.5 12.3 16.1
East Asia 7.9 13.6 17.2
South Asia 17.9 12.1 20.8
Europe, M. East,
& N. Africa 12.3 19.0 26.7
Latin America &
Caribbean 13.1 38.5 26.5
Source : World Bank, 1989, and World Development Reports, 1978-91.
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Table 3.17
Total External Debt, various regions, US$ millions
1980 1982 1984 1986 1987
SSA 55,982 69,740 81,713 109,399 128,779
East Asia 
& Pacific 90,531 127,176 150,669 189,109 206,347
Latin America 
& Caribbean 242,633 333,210 377,429 406,031 442,481
% SSA debt 
to East Asia 
& Pacific 61.8 54.8 54.2 57.8 62.4
% SSA debt 
to Latin 
America & 
Caribbean 23.1 20.9 21.6 26.9 29.1
Source : World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1988-89
Another factor that has accentuated the debt burden in the 1980s is the level 
of world interest rates, since external debts are usually denominated in U.S 
dollars. According to McKenzie and Thomas (1992), the industrial countries’ 
responses to the oil-price rises of the 1970s have greatly affected the 
debtors' ability to re-pay, and more importantly, to service their debts. The 
developed (lender) countries adopted contractionary policies designed to 
defeat inflation. These included a reduction in the demand for non-oil 
developing country primary commodity exports, and due to the monetary 
contraction, real interest rates rose sharply. Increases in those rates has 
meant that debtors had to pay extra millions or hundreds of millions due in 
debt service. New loans were necessary to pay off old loans. Thus 
indebtedness accelerated beyond rates conceived possible during the 
1970s.
Some action is being taken by both the borrowers and the lenders to 
improve the situation. More debt relief rescheduling has been granted to an 
increasing number of SSA countries by the World Bank and the IMF, in 
return for the implementation of adjustment programmes by the borrowers 
(IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1990). Other measures include more
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concessionary loans to help service previous loans, and some degree of 
swaps of debt for equity is taking place.
However, until recently, the SSA debtors have received much less attention 
than the Asian and/or the Latin American borrowers, primarily because of 
SSA's small share in total developing country debt (nearly 10%) and 
because of the relatively small exposure of the private financial institutions in 
Africa, thus forming no significant threat to the international financial system 
(Greene, 1989). Furthermore, the debt crisis is not uniform across the 
African countries. The low-income countries face the most severe difficulties 
among the SSA countries, and the middle-income African borrowers suffer 
a more severe debt-burden than other developing countries, despite having 
a smaller debt total (in absolute terms).
According to the World Bank (1989), the
"debt service obligations [of SSA] rose in the 1980's to a point where
they could not be met  No more than a dozen SSA countries have
serviced their debts regularly since 1980  Altogether, during
1980-88, twenty-five SSA countries rescheduled their debt one 
hundred and five times".
Therefore, by ail accounts, the debt burden can (and has) impaired Africa's 
development efforts. The impact of the debt burden on economic growth is 
tested empirically in chapter six, using TDS ratios and the size of total debt 
stocks as independent variables in the growth equations.
3.5.4 Aid
Eventhough aid is not a 'problem' facing SSA, the basis of its provisions and 
uses have frequently been subjects of discussion (e.g. Mosley, 1987, 
Riddell, 1987, and Bauer, 1979 and 1984). The aid controversy itself is 
discussed at much greater lengths in chapters six and seven. This section 
mainly deals with the levels of aid received by the SSA countries.
On top of their considerable access to domestic resources, African 
governments received sizeable aid flows. Table 3.18 gives an indication of 
ODA received by the SSA countries.
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From Table 3.18, it is clear that SSA as a region has received more aid (in 
terms of net ODA disbursements and as a percentage of GNP) than any of 
the other regions included in the table. This, perhaps, reflects the fact that 
over the reported years, SSA as a whole (in terms of per capita income 
levels, World Bank, 1991), was the least developed region, and accordingly, 
received the highest aid levels. The fields in which these funds were 
invested are difficult to identify, and it is often suggested (e.g. by Mosley, 
1987, and Riddell, 1987) that the impact and benefits of aid depend, to a 
large extent, on the attitudes and judgments of the recipient government, the 
extent of rent-seeking, the domestic political power distribution (e.g. the 
urban-rural divide), the manner in which it is used, and the form in which it is 
provided. The latter is often a function of the donor country's motives in 
giving aid (such as securing political or strategic leverage).
Table 3.18
Aid Indicators for SSA.
ODA (Millions of US $)
1975 1980 1985 1987
SSA (total) 3,237 7,126 8,222 11,066
SSA (excluding 
Nigeria)
3,155 7,091 8,190 10,996
East Asia 3,451** 3,577 5,548
South Asia 4,761** 4,655 5,630
Latin America 
& Caribbean •• 1,965** 3,328 4,116
Source : World Bank, 1989, and WB, World Development Reports, 1978-91
Bilateral Aid (% of Total) Grants as % of net ODA
1980 1987 1980 1987
SSA (Total) 68 66 71 66
SSA (Excluding 68 66 71 66
Nigeria)
Source : World Bank, 'Sub-Saharan Africa - From Crisis to Sustainable Growth1, 1989, and WB- 
WDRs, 1978-91
126
(Table 3.18 cont.)
ODA from all sources as a percentage of GNP 
1984 1989
SSA (Total) 9.0 7.9
SSA (exc. Nigeria) 9.3 8.1
East Asia 0.8* 0.7
South Asia 1.7* 1.7
Latin America 
& Caribbean 0.4* 0.4
Source : WB, 1989, and WDRs, 1978-91 
1987 
** 1981
It is not easy to reach a definite conclusion regarding the effect of aid on 
economic growth. However, aid is incorporated in the empirical analysis of 
chapter six in order to assess its significance (or the lack of it) in the growth 
process.
3.6 Political instability
Very few African countries have enjoyed an uninterrupted stretch of political 
stability. Most have experienced an upheaval of some kind (coup, 
attempted coup, border dispute or civil war) every few years. Clearly, this 
does not help a government, however well meaning, to implement smoothly 
an economic programme. Instead, immediate (short-term and temporary) 
measures may need to be taken so as to prevent further political 
deterioration. This undoubtedly interferes with the progress of any long term 
plans adopted in advance. Yet, there are some countries which have had 
impressive stability records. Botswana, Mauritius and Senegal have been 
the most obvious exceptions, with uninterrupted political stability records.
The pluralism of African societies, multiplicity of cultures, languages and 
ethnic diversity have all heightened the difficulties of post-colonial political 
consolidation and the process of national integration. Chapter five is 
completely devoted to the examination of political instability and its 
influences on economic growth. Reverse causality between economic
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growth and political instability is also investigated. In chapter six, a political 
instability index is incorporated in the econometric analysis as a factor 
affecting growth. Therefore, the discussion in this section will be brief.
Political instability most often means that the regime in power spends vast 
sums of foreign exchange on arms and defence - funds that could have 
been spent on development.
Table 3.19 below illustrates how government expenditure was divided 
amongst different services for selected years and for selected countries 
world-wide. For most of the SSA countries (except Mauritius and, perhaps, 
Botswana), defence expenditure was generally much greater than 
expenditure on any other sector except education. In some years, it even 
surpassed educational spending. Clearly, this seriously affects the pace of 
development and perhaps reflects misplaced priorities among those African 
governments who appear to spend far more on defence than on the 
betterment of the population's living standards.
Thus insecurity of a regime will most likely cause the diversion of large 
amounts of funds into military spending purposes, and the defence of the 
country would be reduced to the defence of the regime in power.
Comparing the central government expenditure rates of the SSA countries 
with those of other countries (Table 3.19 above) reveals that in the sector of 
defence, non-African countries exhibited variable rates, some higher (e.g. 
India and Pakistan) and some lower (e.g. Mexico and Spain) than the 
African countries. Clearly, that is a mainly political choice, and it depends on 
many factors, the main one being whether a particular country is involved in 
a domestic or border conflict.
In the sector of education, other countries' expenditure was not particularly 
higher than that of the African countries. However, that may reflect the 
higher initial education levels of those other countries. Expenditure on the 
health sector is similar to that of the African countries.
Finally, expenditure on housing and other services appears to be generally 
higher in other countries than in the African countries, with the clear 
exception of Mauritius.
128
Table 3.19
Central Government Expenditure, 1972,1980 and 1987 
(Percentage of Total Expenditure spent on each sector)
'72
Defence
*80** '87 '72
Education
'80** '87
Malawi 3.1 12.8 6.6 15.8 9.0 10.8
Tanzania 11.9 9.2 15.8 17.3 13.3 8.3
Uganda 23.1 25.2 26.3 15.3 14.9 15.0
Kenya 6.0 16.4 9.1 21.9 19.6 23.1
Nigeria 40.2 23.5 2.8 4.5 4.5 2.8
Ghana 7.9 3.7 6.5 20.1 22.0 23.9
Liberia 5.3 5.8 8.9 15.2 11.9 16.2
Botswana 0.0 9.8 7.9 10.0 22.2 18.4
Mauritius 0.8 0.8 0,8 13.5 17.6 12.4
Togo ».  k 7.0 7.6 « ,  * 12.6 13.1
Cameroon 9.1 8.1 12.4 12.7
Cote D'Ivoire 3.9 , . . 16.3 *,  ,
India 26.2 21.5 21.5 2.3 1.9 2.7
Pakistan 39.9 34.8 29.5 1.2 3.1 2.6
Indonesia 18.6 11.7 8.6 7.4 9.4 8.8
Philippines 10.9 13.6 9.2 16.3 25.6 18.0
Venezuela 10.3 5.2 5.8 18.6 19.1 19.6
Mexico 4.2 2.0 1.4 16.4 11.0 8.7
Morocco 12.3 14.6 14.5 19.2 18.6 16.9
Thailand 20.2 19.8 18.7 19.9 20.7 19.3
Yugoslavia 20.5 ». . 55.1 0.0 0.0
Spain 6.5 4.4 5.6 8.3 6.0 5.5
New Zealand 5.8 4.9 4.7 16.9 11.9 11.1
Singapore 35.3 18.5 19.0 15.7 21.6 18.2
Italy 6.3 3.5 3.2 16.1 8.6 7.4
UK 16.7 12.9 2.6 2.2
Australia 14.2 9.7 9.3 4.2 7.9 7.0
Uruguay 5.6 12.7 10.2 9.5 6.5 7.1
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(Table 3.19 cont.)
71
Health
'80** '87 7 2
Housing, etc’ 
'80**
k
'87
Malawi 5.5 5.5 7.1 5.8 1.6 2.3
Tanzania 7.2 6.0 5.7 2.1 2.5 1.7
Uganda 5.3 5.1 2.4 7.3 4.2 2.9
Kenya 7.9 7.8 6.6 3.9 5.1 1.7
Nigeria 3.6 2.5 0.8 0.8 6.6 1.5
Ghana 6.3 7.0 8.3 4.1 6.8 7.3
Liberia 9.8 5.2 7.1 3.5 4.3 1.9
Botswana 6.0 5.4 5.9 21.7 7.9 10.1
Mauritius 10.3 7.5 7.6 18.0 21.4 17.4
Togo »•, 5.6 3.8 •. * 5.2 9.9
Cameroon • • . 5.1 3.5 •»• 8.0 11.9
Cote D'Ivoire »• » 3.9 • •. •.. 4.3 ■ • «
India 1.5 2.4 1.9 3.2 4.6 5.7
Pakistan 1.1 1.0 0.9 3.2 9.3 8.7
Indonesia 1.4 2.2 1.5 0.9 1.4 1.7
Philippines 3.2 6.8 5.5 4.3 4.9 3,8
Venezuela 11.7 8.6 10.0 9.2 9.7 11.7
Mexico 5.1 1.2 1.3 25.0 12.5 8.5
Morocco 4.8 2.9 2.9 8.4 7.1 6.9
Thailand 3.7 5.1 6.1 7.0 4.6 5.2
Yugoslavia 24.8 * * i 0.0 35.6 11.2
Spain 0.9 0.6 12.7 49.8 64.2 40.4
New Zealand 14.8 12.6 12.4 25.6 30.2 29.7
Singapore 7.8 6.4 4.1 3.9 5.6 15,9
Italy 13.5 11.5 9.6 44.8 34.3 36.3
UK 12.2 13.1 26.5 • * ■ 31.6
Australia 7.0 7 A 9.5 20.3 30.0 28.6
Uruguay 1.6 3.4 4.8 52.3 52.1 49.5
Source ; World Bank, "Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth1, 1989. 
World Development Reports, 1978-91 
Not available
* This includes amenities, social security, and welfare.
** For all the countries from India downwards (to Uruguay), 1980 figures were not
available, therefore, 1982/83 were used instead
3.7 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter is intended to give an overview of the main problems facing the 
Sub-Saharan African countries. These problems have been categorised as 
either ’internal1 or ’external’.
The internal problems were population growth, domestic agricultural, 
pricing, trade and exchange rate policies, slow export and import growth, 
and the size and mismanagement of the public sector.
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As to the external problems, these were primarily concerned with export 
price fluctuations and the changes in the terms of trade, world stagflation, 
climatic, goegraphic and regional conditions.
Political instability was more difficult to categorise. It was thought better to 
regard it as more of an external or exogenous problem, rather than an 
internal one, because it was not particularly within the control of the 
authorities of a country. It results from various factors, some of which are 
policy induced by the government and some are not. These will be 
examined in much greater detail in chapter five.
The debt problem of SSA Africa was also examined due to the large and 
important role that it plays in retarding the continent's economic growth. As 
mentioned before (section 3.5.3), it is regarded as a partly interna! and partly 
external problem. Finally, the special circumstances of Francophone Africa 
were discussed because of the effect of the special links they have with 
France.
The purpose of this descriptive analysis of the internal and external factors 
affecting SSA's economic growth, is to provide a background to the 
econometric work of chapter six, in which these factors (or proxies to them) 
will be incorporated into a regression equation, in an attempt to quantify the 
effect of each on the growth of aggregate output. The following chapter 
(chapter four) will provide the background to the econometric work, including 
data sourcing, definitions and methodology.
Notes
1 CFA zone countries in 1988 are : Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MODEL & METHODOLOGY
4.1 Introduction
Before embarking on the econometric work which assesses the impact of 
different factors on economic growth in SSA, the methodology and the 
model which have been employed in chapter six are described. The factors 
isolated as independent explanatory variables in the equations as a result of 
the discussions in chapters two and three are defined. The sources of the 
data are also detailed, and, finally, the potential problems associated with 
the statistical analysis are examined.
The discussion is regarding all three main groups of regressions; the growth 
function, the saving-rate function (l/GDP), and the incremental capital-output 
ratio function (ICOR).
4.2 The model
Regression analysis is used, with the first group of equations containing 
growth as the dependent variable and a group of fifteen factors as the 
independent variables determining the growth rate for a cross-section of 
forty-five Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries (where it was possible to 
assemble a complete set of data). These factors are defined below, along 
with the proxies used for those difficult to estimate directly.
The two other dependent variables tested are the investment ratio (l/GDP, 
assumed equal to S/GDP - the savings ratio), and the ICOR.
Regression as a tool of analysis is considered to be suitable for the kind of 
cross-sectional analytical exercise to be performed here. One problem is 
the difficulty of obtaining complete and reliable data for all the countries 
involved and for the period in question.
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The sample started with 45 Sub-Saharan African countries, but after a 
survey of the reliable data sources (section 4.4 below), it was only possible 
to assemble a comprehensive data set that included most of the explanatory 
variables required for 32 countries. The 1960s proved to be the most difficult 
decade, and data for this period is relatively patchy. However, for the 1970s 
and 1980s, the data available appears more reliable and comprehensive.
Another common problem with regression analysis is that it is not always 
clear whether changes in the independent variables are a cause or an effect 
of the movement in the dependent variable. Certain tests can be carried out 
(namely those based on the work of Granger and and Sims) to attempt to 
clarify the direction of causality. This is done for selected dependent 
variables.
The main equation for this part of the work is, therefore, of the form 
y = ao + bi xi + b2 X2 + .... + bnxn + u , 
and is estimated by ordinary least squares.
The relationship is assumed to be linear as this was found to be a good 
approximation of the nature of the relationship and of the effects of the 
factors xi to xn.
Separate regressions are performed for separate decades (1960-69, 1970- 
79, and 1980-86) as well as for the period as a whole. Decade averages 
are employed in order to reduce the possibilities of measurement errors. 
Running separate regression equations for each decade is considered 
useful in order to assess the changing strength and significance of each 
factor over each sub-period, while the overall impact is made clear from the 
whole-period equations.
Data deficiency problems for the 1960s, regarding the real rates of interest, 
debt indicators and black market exchange rates were mentioned 
previously. These indicators were also excluded from the whole period 
regressions, but not from the 1970s and 1980s equations.
In chapter three, a table of the growth rates of GDP was presented (Table 
3.1). For most countries, these rates were obtained by running a regression 
of GDP over time. The equation was of the type :
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In GDP = a + blnt + e
where t = time, and 'e' represents the random error term.
These compared well with World Bank figures for the growth rates of 
aggregate output. The World Bank rates were employed for the dependent 
variable in the regression equations for economic growth.
The majority of the econometric work of chapter six consists of multiple 
regression analysis. However, one of the factors, political instability, 
exhibited possible signs of reverse causality with economic growth, after the 
Granger-Sims test of reverse causality was performed. This indicated the 
possibility of simultaneity bias. Therefore, the equations which included 
instability as an independent variable were not only performed using 
multiple regression analysis, but they were all performed again using the 
method of two-stage least squares (Gujarati, 1988, and Johnston, 1985).
Furthermore, the graphic representations of the relationships between 
economic growth and each of the independent variables, were performed 
using the method of partial regression and not standard regression analysis, 
in order to obtain a more 'true' picture of the association between the two 
variables. This occurs because a partial regression plot of 'Y' on 'xj' is a
two-way scatter plot of both variables, after removing the linear influence of 
all other regressors on each of them (Gujarati, 1988).
4.3 Explanatory factors
A detailed discussion of the explanatory factors which affect growth (both 
internal and external) was given in the previous chapter. These are now 
defined as they appear in the regression model.
Fifteen factors are involved in this study of growth performance in SSA. The 
factors, or indicators used are the following:
1. Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) as a percentage of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP).
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This factor was calculated as the ratio GDI/GDP to examine the effect of 
domestic investment on growth. In terms of the Harrod-Domar model, this 
was taken to be the savings ratio 's' in the equation g = s/v. Neo-classical 
theory argues that in long-term growth equilibrium, a rise in 's' does not raise 
the growth rate, but it leads to a shift to a growth path with a higher level of 
GDP. However, a rise in the saving rate will raise the growth rate for a 
period during the transition, and the assumption here is that the African 
economies are in this transitional period (see chapter two), and none have 
achieved equilibrium.
Thus in the growth equations, GDI/GDP is included as an explanatory 
variable which is expected to have a positive effect on the growth of 
aggregate output. However, this variable is also tested as a dependent 
variable in the saving ratio function, where the extent to which other factors 
affect it is assessed.
2. The ratio of the black market exchange rate to the official exchange rate - 
BM/E - was formulated as an index of price distortions in the economy. It is 
expected that the relationship of BM/E to growth will be a negative one (the 
higher the ratio, the more distorted the markets and the less efficient the 
distribution of resources between tradables and non-tradables, and 
therefore the lower the rate of economic growth). This variable was also 
included in the ICOR equations, were it is expected to have a positive effect, 
with the productivity of capital lowered due to market price distortions.
3. An inflation indicator was obtained (AP/P) - that being the implicit overall 
GDP deflator. It is expected that this will be negatively related to growth at 
'high' levels of inflation but the effect will diminish at low levels of inflation. 
The main argument being that high inflation rates waste resources through 
an increase in 'shoe-leather' and 'menu' costs (see chapter six). High 
inflation may also be associated with high public sector spending, financial 
repression, and overvalued currency. These three latter factors are included 
as explanatory variables, and as a result of this, the equations are examined 
for multicolinearity.
4. The growth of each country's export volumes (X-gr) was obtained to 
examine the effect of export growth on economic growth. The two variables 
(the growth of exports and that of GDP) are expected to be positively related, 
the argument resting on the allocation benefits of production specialisation
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and comparative advantage, with exports providing the necessary foreign 
exchange to stimulate import and GDP growth.
5. An index of import volume growth (M-gr) was obtained from the same 
source to assess the effect of the growth of imports on economic growth. 
The relationship of imports with growth can be either positive or negative 
depending on the type of goods imported. However, the usual argument in 
SSA is that there is strong complementarity between domestic production 
and imports. It is argued that there are fixed coefficients between domestic 
inputs and imported inputs which cannot be produced domestically (such as 
fuels, spare parts, agricultural and industrial raw materials). It is therefore, 
expected that the overall effect of imports on growth is positive.
6 . A weighted political instability index was formulated (Pol-ln), taking the 
values of one for any year in which a coup, coup attempt, war, civil war 
occurred (all of which are serious enough to pose a threat to the stability of 
the system or regime in power), and zero otherwise. Greater weight was 
placed upon the more serious events (such as a war or a successful coup 
d'etat), than on less serious events. This examines the effect of political 
instability on economic growth. It is anticipated that there will be a negative 
relationship between this index and growth (i.e. the more unstable the 
country the lower the growth rate) primarily due to the effect of political 
instability on savings, investment and capital flight. Chapter five examines 
this factor and the formulation of this index in greater detail.
7. Another factor considered to affect economic growth is the size of the 
public sector. The indicator for this incorporated in the equations is the size 
of General Government Consumption in millions of the domestic currency, 
for each country, as a ratio to GDP (G/GDP). A negative relationship 
between G and the growth rate is expected, since it is argued that 
government production leads to inefficient resource allocation, through lack 
of efficiency incentives in the public sector.
8 & 9. It is argued that the size of the debt-burden also affects growth. Two 
indicators are used to assess the impact of this. The first is the total debt 
service ratio relative to GNP (TDS/GNP) on official public loans for each 
country. The second is the size of the actual debt (public and publicly 
guaranteed) relative to GDP. The two variables are not included in the same 
equation together, as they are clearly correlated. However, they are
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interchangeably included to assess which of the two has a greater impact on 
economic growth. It is expected that these will have a net negative influence 
on growth through two effects : the first, by lowering the ability to import (as 
the TDS to exports ratio rises as debt size increases), and the second, by 
lowering the ability to invest as the ratio of TDS to GNP increases.
10. Another factor included in the study is aid. This is related to the ’two- 
gap1 constraints on growth, with aid acting as a supplement to increase the 
savings level or import capacity, whichever is the constraining factor. This 
effect is tested here by using as an indicator for aid levels the ratio of Official 
Development Assistance to GNP (ODA/GNP), given in the equation as ODA.
11. A terms of trade index (ATOT) is obtained to assess the effect of export 
prices relative to import prices on growth. The indicator used in the analysis 
is the annual change in the TOT index. There are two effects of an 
improvement in the terms of trade : the first being the general increase in the 
access to resources, and the second is raising the ability to import thereby 
reducing the constraint this constitutes. A positive relationship between the 
terms of trade index and the growth rate of GDP is expected.
12. It is argued that interest rates have an effect on investment and saving 
behaviour, which in turn strongly affect growth. Real lending and deposit 
rates were obtained, but it was found that this was an indicator for which the 
data available was very patchy during the 1960s. However, data availability 
improved significantly for the 1970s and 1980s. Higher real interest rates 
are expected to raise domestic savings rates with a positive effect on growth. 
Furthermore, in Africa it is argued that negative real interest rates have lead 
to unproductive investments. It is therefore, expected that higher real 
interest rates will raise capital productivity and economic growth.
The last three indicators are social factors:
13. An education indicator, assessing the quality of labour, is obtained. 
Literacy rates were used for this indicator (LIT). It is expected that there will 
be a positive association between literacy and growth.
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14. It is argued that high rates of population growth affect economic growth. 
Average growth rates of population were included in each equation for each 
country (POP). The arguments are that, one the one hand, an increase in 
population growth rates should lead to a more rapidly growing labour supply 
and should increase economic growth, as well as create a larger market, 
thus allowing sizeable enterprises to benefit from economies of scale. On 
the other hand, it raises the dependency rates and lowers savings and the 
ability to invest in human capital. Thus the relationship between this 
variable and economic growth could be positive, negative, or it could cancel 
out, depending on whichever effect is the stronger one.
15. Finally, an health indicator (life expectancy at birth) was included to 
capture the impact of the state of health on labour productivity. Initially, we 
expected a positive impact of life expectancy on growth rates. However, 
reverse causality between the two variables proved strong, as it is clear that 
faster growth allows higher life expectancy, as it raises per capita incomes. 
Therefore, this variable was excluded from the equations reported in chapter 
six.
4.4 Data Sources
Data on each of the indicators was collected and properly manipulated to fit 
the requirements (for example, reproducing the data for a common base 
year where the series differed in time periods). The data sources varied 
from The World Bank - WB, The IMF, The UN Economic Commission for 
Africa, and others (see Appendix I after chapter seven), depending on 
availability. The study was initially of forty-five SSA countries, some of which 
were too small and not included in the larger, more reliable and better 
known data sources (such as the WB or the IMF statistical books), and so 
research had to be done elsewhere. Eventually, the sample had to be 
reduced to thirty-two countries because of such data problems. To an 
extent, this variability of data sources produces some inconsistency. 
However, upon examination of general trends for each country, this problem 
was not found to be significant and the data was taken as relatively reliable 
from whichever source. Most of the data was eventually obtained from two 
sources only : the World Bank and the IMF statistical books.
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The data obtained covers the period 1960-1986. For many countries, data 
for the whole period was obtainable. However, this was not the case for all 
the indicators and for all the countries. Clearly, this produced a problem of 
completeness. However, for our purposes, what was available was found to 
be sufficient, as we are trying to determine the factors that affect the 
economic growth in SSA, and the size of such effects in a continent of very 
different countries, but which seem to fall within groups that exhibit similar 
trends and behavioural patterns. For the factors that were listed above, 
sufficient data was available for the whole period and for the thirty-two 
countries.
As mentioned above, Appendix I provides greater detail and defines exactly 
the variables employed in the analysis.
4.5 Measurement Errors and Other Related Problems
In this section, statistical problems associated with regression analysis will 
be briefly discussed.
To begin with, autocorrelation is not regarded as a problem applicable to 
cross-sectional studies.
The main problem concerned data availability and reliability. This problem 
is particularly acute for many Sub-Saharan African countries. As previously 
mentioned, this study began with forty-five countries and, after eliminating 
those countries for which there were severe data availability problems, thirty- 
two countries remained for which the data was relatively reliable. For those 
32 countries, some problems still persisted, particularly for variables such as 
interest rates throughout the period, and Black market exchange rates and 
total debt service ratios for the 1960s. In general, data reliability improved 
as we moved in time, with the 1960s providing the weakest data, but 
significant improvements in both the quantity and quality of the data 
occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.
This problem is particularly important given that measurement errors in the 
independent variables tend to bias the estimates of the coefficients. 
Furthermore, the World Bank data was checked against the IMF and other 
data to eliminate inconsistent observations. Also, the main reason for
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grouping data (decade averages) was to reduce the bias problem from 
measurement errors.
Multicolinearity, often a matter of degree not of kind, did not appear to be a 
serious problem, (high R2 were not often associated with insignificant t- 
values). However, there were some occasions when multicolinearity 
appeared a problem, and these are discussed in the results section of 
chapter six.
Finally, the possibility of heteroscedasticity exists. Residuals from the 
equations were computed, and where heteroscedasticity appeared a 
possibility, a Spearman test was employed (Pindyck and Rubinfeld,1985, 
and Steel and Torrie, 1981).
4.6 Summary
This chapter summarised the methodology and the econometric approach 
which was used in the analysis of the growth, savings and ICOR functions. 
These functions comprise the majority of chapter six, concentrating mostly 
on the factors determining economic growth.
The empirical work seeks to explain growth rates, savings rates, and 
incremental capital-output ratios of a cross-section of African countries, 
using fifteen explanatory variables. Linear regression analysis is the main 
research method employed.
The sources and limitations of data were discussed, and in order to reduce 
the impact of the problem of measurement errors, decade averages of the 
data were employed.
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CHAPTER 5 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND GROWTH
5.1 Introduction
During the period under study (1960-86), the majority of the Sub-Saharan 
African counties experienced political instability of one kind or another and 
to varying degrees of seriousness, ranging from riots and demonstrations to 
bloody coups d'etat and civil wars. The effects of such instability can be 
expected to be detrimental to economic growth, particularly in cases of long- 
running civil wars.
Many political scientists (e.g. Huntington 1965 & 1968, and Sanders 1981), 
argue that political instability is more likely to arise under a system of 
authoritarian, autocratic rule, than under a democratic style of government.
Yet whether the system of government in itself has been sufficient to ensure 
stability in SSA is another matter. Democratic institutions generally tend to 
perform well as vents for popular discontent, but they are not common in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is possible to have political stability (in the limited 
sense considered here) within an authoritarian framework. However, the 
matter of political structure is beyond the scope of this paper and is not 
discussed at any length.
This chapter is directed towards an examination of the role of political 
instability in the economic growth process of SSA and some of the different 
ways that have been used to capture its effects. Three indices measuring 
political instability are examined, and then one is formulated to include the 
elements argued to be most relevant in relation to economic growth (this 
'modified' index is incorporated into the econometric work of the next 
chapter). An attempt is also made to determine the direction of causality 
between political instability and economic growth.
We will first examine briefly the causes and consequences of political 
instability.
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5.2 Causes of Political Instability in SSA
The roots of political instability have often been traced back to the colonial 
heritage in SSA (e.g. Onimode, 1989, and Nafziger, 1983). It has been 
argued that the economic and social structures implanted by the colonising 
powers were of such a nature as to benefit the regions which were resource- 
rich generating tropical agricultural exports or minerals, or were of strategic 
importance, such as being a prime trading post or port. This regional 
concentration within the colonised country naturally led to unbalanced 
development and unequal wealth distribution in that country. After political 
independence, it is argued that neo-colonialism tended to prevail whereby 
the development pattern of the colonial times remained in effect, although 
with an indigenous elite cooperating with the former colonial powers, in 
time, the populations of other under-developed regions became dissatisfied 
with the situation as certain groups dominated economic as well as political 
life and wealth became concentrated in their hands. The establishment of 
certain institutions and restrictions by one-party governments lead to rent- 
seeking activities. Examples of such government-imposed restrictions are 
import licensing, credit rationing, public investment licensing, and access to 
foreign exchange. As these licences would be relatively difficult to obtain, 
they became a valuable commodity to possess and, perhaps, trade 
(Krueger, 1974).
This 'institutional' corruption would be further exacerbated by the political 
reality of the importance of the urban population to the survival of a one- 
party state system. It has been argued that the political relationship between 
governments and their urban constituents often determined agricultural 
policy (Bates, 1981). To avoid the dangers of strikes, riots and worker 
unrest, many SSA governments have had to appease the urban workers 
and the military, in order to maintain their political support. This involved 
adopting policies to keep the cost of living (essentially food costs) low. This 
was done at the expense of the rural population, whose interests were often 
neglected.
Therefore, government restrictions and the political pressures of the urban 
population and the military, as well as the protection of elite interests (the 
owners of capital, the large employers of urban populations, and the large 
investors), ail lead to greater rent-seeking and corruption.
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Often the dissatisfaction of the poorer areas and their peoples culminated in 
public disorder, and perhaps riots and demonstrations. Severe repression 
was the normal reaction by the authorities in most countries, but eventually, 
a coup attempt might surface, unless something was done to improve the 
fortunes of the less privileged people. Still, in Sub-Saharan Africa some 
countries did experience apparently uninterrupted stability over long 
periods. Botswana and Mauritius for example, had no reports of coup plots 
or coup attempts throughout the period 1960-1986(1\
It has been argued (Nafziger, 1983), that education is important in 
politicising African populations. As the younger sections of the population 
became better educated, they saw more clearly the failures of the authorities 
and the corruption that was widespread among the ruling elite. It is not the 
mere fact of observing corruption that led to outright demonstrations and 
rioting. It was exacerbated by not being able to fulfil their expectations of 
what higher education should bring: primarily, a higher income level. Jobs, 
particularly in the civil service, were highly desirable but becoming 
increasingly scarce and lower paid in real terms. Furthermore, the wealth 
gap between the top civil servants with access to rent-seeking, and the lower 
echelons was widening. Naturally, this dissatisfaction, if not remedied, could 
lead to unrest. Dissatisfaction and unrest could also arise when income and 
wealth distribution gaps exist between non-native nationals (expatriates and 
immigrants), such as the Asians in East Africa, and the native population, 
where the former own and control many commercial and business activities, 
giving them a higher living standard.
A more important factor leading to political instability relates to the morale of 
the army, given that many of the political upheavals in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are of a military nature. It is clear that without the loyalty of the army, the 
ruling elite cannot survive. Often, low morale among the junior sections of 
the army, due to low pay and promotion conditions, produced resentment, 
especially if the top ranks and positions in the army were primarily filled by a 
favoured ethnic group to which, say, the president of the country belonged. 
This has often been a strategy aimed at keeping the army loyal to the ruler, 
as their favoured position depended upon the continued rule of their 
kinsman.
143
Even more dangerous army unrest is that emanating from senior officers. If it 
was the case that they were receiving tow wages or that they could not 
command a high enough budget (Nafziger, 1983), or if they believed that the 
recessional state of the economy was due to direct action from the president 
(as Flight-Lt. Rawlings often claimed in Ghana), then they may well initiate a 
military coup d'etat believing, perhaps, that they could improve the economic 
situation. Failing that, they might simply desire more personal power and 
greater access to rent-seeking.
Another factor which has led to instability in many less developed countries, 
SSA included, is the application of IMF economic short term stabilisation 
programmes. Countries that resort to the IMF for loans and assistance 
usually have to adhere to a set of conditions which the IMF imposes upon 
the acceptance of the loan. Some such conditions would be the reduction of 
the size of the civil service, and the removal of price subsidies, all aimed at 
improving the balance of payments situation. Beneficial as such policies 
may be for the long-run alleviation of a country's economic problems, it is 
almost certain that in the short-run the higher prices and lower employment 
would lead to dissatisfaction and hardship among the population.
This sometimes leads to serious political upheavals. That is often why the 
recipient countries stop such a programme soon after its implementation. 
However, IMF conditionality programmes in themselves have rarely been 
the cause of the downfall of a particular regime, (with the exception of 
Nimeri's regime in Sudan in 1985), and any riots or demonstrations ensuing 
due to such programmes are typically harshly and speedily dealt with. 
However, another (more cynical) view concerning the role of IMF 
programmes is that riots in response to structural adjustment programmes 
have sometimes been encouraged by governments as an excuse for 
abandoning the programme (e.g. Zambia, 1986).
Yet, in the last few years, the IMF appears to have become aware of the 
political difficulties of imposing these short term programmes. Accordingly, 
they have recently moved to more long-term adjustment programmes, 
similar to those of the World Bank (Killick, 1991).
Finally, the most often-cited factor for political instability, and indeed for the 
general state of under-development of an economy is, as mentioned above,
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the mode of government in a particular country. Many observers argue that 
the lack of democracy and multi-party ruling systems are the roots of 
instability (Sanders, 1981). The obvious reason being that under an 
authoritarian regime which is unwilling to relinquish power, any desired 
change to the system would have to be implemented by resorting to non­
constitutional means, as the opposition to the regime have no alternative but 
to plot against the ruler. Change cannot be implement by the vote - the most 
peaceful instrument of change. However, there have been situations in SSA 
whereby even an elected government suffered a coup attempt for one 
reason or another and the power-hungry opposition seized the rule by force. 
Such incidents are relatively common in Africa, and the importance of 
democracy and multi-party ruling systems, within the context of secure 
institutions, remains paramount as the primary means of ensuring peaceful 
political change.
In summary, the main causes of political instability are seen as the lack of a 
democratic style of government, the inheritance of a markedly inegalitarian 
society at independence, ethnic and tribal rivalries, the concentration of 
wealth in the hands of a privileged minority (such as expatriates or other 
migrants - e.g. Asians in East and Southern Africa or the Lebanese in West 
Africa), the implementation of severe economic reforms, domestic policy 
mismanagement, and bad pay and promotion conditions in the civil service 
or the army.
5.3 Consequences of Political Instability
The social and economic consequences of instability depend on the form in 
which it is expressed - a coup attempt, a successful bloodless coup, a 
successful bloody coup d'etat, outright civil war (e.g. Nigeria 1967-1970), or 
cross-border wars (such as that between Tanzania and Uganda in the 
1970s, and the frequent Somalian-Ethiopian Conflicts).
Clearly, the least severe consequences in terms of human life, arises in the 
first two cases - an attempted or a bloodless coup d'etat. However, in many 
instances in SSA, the discovery of a plot or an attempted coup d'etat have 
been followed by severe recriminations and executions - clearly a heavy 
cost in terms of human lives.
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If it is the case that a bloody coup occurs to dispose of the ruling elite, then 
the consequences tend to be more severe, but the most devastating event is 
an outright civil war or cross-border war.
To begin with, the human costs; the loss of lives, starvation, displacement 
and misery are compelling enough reasons for seeking a more stable 
political system.
As to the economic consequences, they are also crippling. The more 
widespread the conflict, the greater the loss of production that can be 
expected. Some countries (e.g. Angola) have managed to a degree to 
insulate their export sectors from instability, but this leads to an economy 
with a relatively high-income enclave sector, and a stagnant subsistence 
sector for the rest. Infrastructure can also be destroyed during instability, 
investment levels fall, and export market shares drop.
Furthermore, there tends to be a deterioration in the balance of payments 
position and a reduction in the foreign exchange earnings of the country, not 
only because exports fall, but also due to the expected increase in 
government expenditures overseas, primarily for defence purposes. This 
links to another problem. The increased defence expenditure is often 
accompanied by reduced expenditure on other sectors of the economy, and 
this, along with the destruction and neglect of infrastructure, will put back 
previous development efforts and retard economic growth even further.
Finally, domestic political instability discourages investment, both from 
domestic and foreign sources. Given the traditional view of the prime 
importance of investment in the growth process, this is a very significant 
factor hampering growth efforts. There is also increased capital flight and 
loss of valuable foreign exchange. This is all further exacerbated if political 
instability is a frequent occurrence in a country, leading to a more general 
loss of confidence in the economy.
The above discussion of the economic consequences of severe political 
instability have been in terms of the macro-economy. On the micro- 
economic level, there will also be severe disruptions in the operation of the 
markets (financial, capital, goods and labour markets.). In summary, most 
aspects of the social and economic life will be disrupted if serious political
146
upheavals eventuate, especially if those upheavals are frequent or long­
term in nature. Inevitably, this will negatively affect economic growth.
5.4 Measurement of Political Instability
There have been many different attempts at measuring political instability. 
Three of those will be examined here, including the TMIS and Wheeler 
indices. The other one will be the Euromoney country risk Index.
5.4.1 The Wheeler Index
In an article in "World Development" (1984), David Wheeler set out to 
investigate the "Sources of Stagnation In Sub-Saharan Africa." In that 
article, several policy and environmental variables were considered, such as 
trade and exchange rate policies, climate, export prices, foreign aid, export 
diversification, and violence. Wheeler attempted to assess the impact of 
each variable on economic growth using reduced-form econometric 
estimation methods. He concluded that
"...The results suggest an extremely close relationship between 
movements in export prices and average [economic] performance.... A 
primary finding is that the environmental variables seem to have had more 
impact on growth as a group than the policy variables...Among the policy 
variables....those identified with retrenchment during periods of declining 
commodity prices seem most significant.... The results [also] suggest that 
some 'success stories' may owe much to good luck, while some 'failures’ 
may well be due less to bad management than to adverse circumstances".
It is only with one of Wheeler’s environmental variables that we are here 
concerned - what he terms ’violence’.
Wheeler distinguished between four distinct types of violence : coups, 
colonial wars, post-colonial wars and armed incursions by mercenaries or 
opposition forces across national frontiers. Further experimentation with the 
violence variables in a pooled time-series cross-section model, relating 
annual GDP growth to the environmental variables yielded three major 
conclusions:
. Colonial wars had no significant impact on output change .
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. The separate impact co-efficients for coups and post-coloniai wars 
were not significantly different from one another, so that aggregation 
was possible.
. A composite dummy variable whose value was one for a year in 
which any violent event occurred and zero otherwise, performed 
better than the aggregated violence Index mentioned above 
(Wheeler, 1984, p.5).
When computing his index, Wheeler considered the period 1970-1980 (a 
total of eleven years inclusive). He arrived at the final Index by subtracting 
the composite dummy variable from 11 (the total number of years 
considered) to produce a measure of the number of stable years for the 
period he studied.
In order to assess this index, Wheeler's basic methodology was employed 
but to slightly different variables and to a longer time period. The events that 
were included in the formulation of the index were expanded to include 
attempted coups d'etat, successful coups, wars and armed border 
incursions. An index was then formed for each sub-period 1960-1969, 
1970-1979 and 1980-1986 (the latter being normalised to make it 
comparable to a ten year period instead of the actual seven).
Thus the index was formed by assigning a value of
1 for a year in which a violent event occurred, and 
0 otherwise.
Similar to Wheeler's method, the total incidence of violence was taken to be 
the sum of ones in the composite dummy variable defined above. It was 
then subtracted from ten to produce a measure of the number of stable 
years. Thus, it is a stability (not instability ) index. The results of these 
calculations are shown in Table 5.1 below, where our index is termed the 
'modified Wheeler’ index (MW).
From the table, it can be seen that all of the countries in the 1960$ were 
relatively stable ( having D > 7), except Nigeria (the Biafran war) and Ghana 
(several known attempts at Nkrumah's life, a coup attempt, and a successful 
coup in 1966) .
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Table 5.1
Stability Index per decade over the period 1960-86 tor 32 Sub-Saharan African countries1. 
MW = number of stable years.
Country MW(60-69) MW(70-79) MW(80-86) MW{60-86)
Benin 7 7 10 8.0
Botswana 10 10 10 10.0
Burundi 8 8 10 8.6
Cameroon 10 6 7 7.7
Central A. R. 9 8 6 7.7
Congo 9 5 9 7.7
Cote D’Ivoire 8 10 9 9.0
Ethiopia 8 6 0 4.7
Gabon 10 10 8 9.3
Gambia 10 10 8 9.3
Ghana 6 3 2 3.7
Kenya 9 10 7 8.7
Lesotho 10 8 4 7.3
Liberia 10 10 4 8.0
Madagascar 10 7 6 7.7
Malawi 10 10 10 10.0
Mali 9 9 7 8.3
Mauritania 10 8 3 7.0
Mauritius 10 10 10 10.0
Niger 9 8 9 8.7
Nigeria 6 8 6 6.7
Rwanda 10 8 9 9.0
Senegal 10 1 0 10 10.0
Sierra Leone 9 9 9 9.0
Sudan 9 7 2 6,0
Swaziland 10 10 5 8.3
Tanzania 9 8 9 8.7
Togo 7 6 10 7.7
Uganda 9 4 3 5.3
Zaire 9 3 10 7.3
Zambia 10 10 7 9.0
Zimbabwe 9 8 7 8.0
SSA Unweighted
Average 9 8 7 8.0
SSA Weighted 
Averages** 
including Nigeria 8 7 6
excluding Nigeria 9 7 6
No.of countries with
D < 7 2 7 11 5.0
D > 7 30 25 21 26.0
D = 10 14 11 8 4.0
No. of countries experiencing a 
fall in stability 16 18
rise in stability 3 9
no change — 13 5
1. The countries included were those for which data availability
throughout the period was sufficient and reliable (same as those listed in chapter 5) 
Weighted by populations
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For the 1970s, the situation became slightly worse, with many countries 
showing a fall in 'MW' and so experiencing more political instability. Over 
the period 1980-1986 the overall situation, again, became slightly worse 
than the 1970s (eleven countries had D < 7 in the 1980s whereas the 
corresponding number was seven in the 1970s).
The unweighted and weighted averages reflect those trends. Excluding 
Nigeria, the weighted averages show more stability in the 1960s, but the 
results are unchanged when Nigeria is included in the weighted average for 
the 1970s and 1980s. The unweighted averages indicate falling stability 
over the period 1960-86 (9 to 8 to 7).
The Wheeler index has certain shortfalls, the main one being that it gives 
equal weighting to all violent events. In the index, a successful bloodless 
coup d'etat, which might be a palace revolution, for example, has the same 
impact on the index as a debilitating civil war.
A second limitation is that, in seeking to use the index to measure instability 
effects on the economy, it does not pick up conditions which reflect potential 
instability, and this discourages investment or trading relations. An example 
would be Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) in the 1960s. Zimbabwe's index is 
high for this decade, as few instability incidents occurred. However, the 
circumstances in Zimbabwe of minority rule and the unilateral declaration of 
independence led to a condition of incipient instability which affected the 
economy.
5.4.2 TMiS
Another attempt at measuring political instability in SSA was given by 
Johnson, Slater and McGowan (1984) in formulating an index based on 
Jackman’s work (1978). The instability index they devise is called the TMIS - 
Total Military Involvement Score. This was based on Jackman’s model used 
to predict coups d'etat, but extended in time period (to 1960-1982) and 
sample size (35 SSA countries). They also limit their analysis to military - 
not civilian - coups and coup-related events. Their major findings indicate 
th a t:
"Black African states with relatively dynamic economies whose societies 
were not very socially mobilised before independence and which have
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maintained or restored some degree of political participation and political 
pluralism have experienced fewer military coups, attempted coups and
coup plots than have states with the opposite set of characteristics."
The formulation of TMIS involved according each state one point for each 
reported coup plot, three points for each attempted coup and five points for 
each successful coup. The final index ranged from zero to forty-eight. This 
scoring system clearly accorded more importance to the seriously 
destabilising events, such as a successful coup, and less weight to the 
relatively less serious events, such as a coup plot.
Table 5.3 below was formulated employing Johnson et aV s basic 
methodology but the following modifications were made, in an attempt to 
make the index more comprehensive :
1. The time period was extended to 1960-1986, and divided into the
three sub-periods: 1960-69, 1970-79 and 1980-86.
2. Civilian events (coups, attempted coups and coup plots), civil wars 
and border wars were included, as well as military events. The 
weighting system was therefore also changed. (See Table 5.2 
below).
The sample size used was 32 and is the same as that used throughout the 
analysis of chapter six.
Table 5.2
The weights assigned to every destabilising event in formulating the 
Modified Jackman (MJ) index
Event Weight
Coup plot 1 point
Unsuccessful coup attempt 2 points
Successful coup attempt 4 points
Civil or external (border) war 6 points (per year of war)
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Table 5.3
Pol-ln scores.
The higher the score, the more unstable the country, in terms of the occurrence of politically 
destabilising events.
Country 1960-69 1970-79 1980-86 1960-86
Benin 12 8 0 6.7
Botswana 0 0 0 0.0
Burundi 8 6 0 4.7
Cameroon 0 6 3 3.0
Central A.R. 4 6 7 5.7
Congo 4 11 0 5.0
Cote D'Ivoire 2 0 1 1.0
Ethiopia 8 18 42 22.7
Gabon 0 0 6 2.0
Gambia 0 0 6 2.0
Ghana 10 18 21 6.3
Kenya 2 0 3 1.7
Lesotho 0 2 18 6.7
Liberia 0 0 10 3.3
Madagascar 0 7 6 4.3
Malawi 0 0 0 0.0
Mali 4 0 8 4.0
Mauritania 0 10 16 8.7
Mauritius 0 0 0 0.0
Niger 1 6 2 3.0
Nigeria 26 8 9 14.3
Rwanda 0 6 2 2.7
Senegal 0 0 0 0.0
Sierra Leone 4 2 2 2.7
Sudan 4 6 38 16.0
Swaziland 0 0 5 1.7
Tanzania 1 7 1 3.0
Togo 10 5 0 5.0
Uganda 2 20 26 16.0
Zaire 1 17 0 6.0
Zambia 0 0 8 2.7
Zimbabwe 2 12 7 7.0
No. of countries with score
<10 28 25 25 27.0
10 -<20 3 6 3 4.0
20 - <30 1 1 4 1.0
Total 32 32 32 32.0
SSA Weighted averages
inc. Nigeria 9.5 8.9 12.4
exc. Nigeria 3.3 9.4 13.7
SSA Unweighted averages
inc Nigeria 3 6 8 17.0
exc. Nigeria 2 6 8 16.0
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Above is Table 5.3, containing the values of our modified Jackman index, 
termed "Pol-ln".
From the table, it is clear that according to this index, the most stable 
countries over the whole period (with a score of zero) are Botswana, Malawi, 
Mauritius and Senegal, while the least stable have been Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Nigeria, Sudan and Uganda. Breaking down the data per decade reveals 
that in the 1960s, Nigeria was the most unstable country, followed by Ghana 
and Benin. During the 1970s, instability increased but only marginally, as all 
countries scored 20 or less, the highest scorers being those for Uganda, 
Ghana and Ethiopia. In the 1980s, most countries still scored less than 20, 
except Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda and Ghana.
The weighted averages excluding Nigeria indicate a relatively stable 
environment during the 1960s (average of 3.3), but the situation 
deteriorates in both the foliowing decades (9.4 and 13.7 for the 1970s and 
the 1980s respectively).
5.4.3 The Euromonev Index
The Euromoney magazine (a specialist banking Journal) started publishing 
what they call the "Country Risk League Tables" annually, from 1979 
onwards. According to Euromoney, these ratings show how the 
international banking community, through its lending activities, rates the 
countries that borrow from it in terms of the general 'risk' that is attached to 
each loan. The ratings therefore reflect how, primarily, the international 
commercial banking sector and the market views investment in each 
country.
The index is the result of Euromoney's statistical analysis of the terms and 
conditions for all sovereign borrowers that have tapped the Eurodollar and 
floating rate Deutschmark syndicated loan market. This measure includes 
some economic indicators, thus implicitly assuming that economic 
performance has an effect on stability - a proposition we test later on.
The calculation of this index was essentially unchanged throughout the 
years since 1979 except for slight changes in the weights accorded to each
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factor. The total scores were out of a possible 100, and these were arrived 
at as follows :
Market indicators :
15% 
10% 
15%
40%
15%
5%
20%
15%
10%
15%
40%
Each country was accorded a subjectively assessed score for each indicator 
by the surveyed bankers/economists, according to how their own institution 
handled that country's debt (e.g. 8 out of 15 for Access, 6 out of 10 for 
selldown, etc.), and the final score that each country amassed was out of 
100. That reflected the total risk associated with investing in or lending to 
each country. The index was calculated for all countries (industrial, East 
European and developing countries). The Industrial countries, such as 
Japan, U.S.A., U.K, etc., scored highest. SSA countries scored very low. 
Table 5.4 below shows the final annual scores accorded to each SSA 
country over the period 1980-86, and Table 5.5 exhibits the final average 
scores given to each of the countries included in the sample.
Access to bond markets
Selldown
Forfeiting
Credit indicators :
Payment Record 
Rescheduling
Analytical indicators :
Economic Indicators 
Economic Risk 
Political Risk
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Table 5.4
The Euromoney index 
Individual Country scores, 1980-86
Country 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 Ave­
rage of 
observations
Angola 18 26 20 34 26 26 23.1
Botswana - - 26 31 44 31 33 34.7
Cameroon - - 25 33 42 31 36 34.9
Congo - 27 30 38 41 32 33 33.5
Cote D’Ivoire 19 21 54 49 37 19 27 32.7
Ethiopia - - 24 20 30 7 16 19.8
Ghana 5 - 23 10 9 20 26 18.9
Gabon 19 - 43 44 42 35 43 36.0
Kenya - - 46 39 38 19 38 37.5
Lesotho 7 > 25 20 10 10 21 19.7
Liberia - - 30 10 13 15 19 26.0
Madagascar 19 - 25 - - - - 22.3
Malawi 19 - 24 26 11 15 24 21.8
Mauritania - - 28 10 16 16 17 20.1
Mauritius - - 30 15 27 21 40 30.8
Mozambique 7 - 27 29 38 28 26 24.9
Niger 7 25 30 25 10 15 17 19.6
Nigeria 31 35 59 43 39 10 17 33.1
Senegal - 16 24 10 9 24 23 19.3
Seychelles - - 42 - - - - 42.0
Sudan - - 24 16 9 10 6 13.9
Swaziland - - 25 10 32 20 36 23.7
Tanzania - - 25 10 15 11 27 20.3
Uganda - - - 9 5 10 17 11.0
Zaire - - - - - 20 21 20.7
Zambia 19 24 27 16 9 12 20 18.4
Zimbabwe - 23 27 44 39 25 34 32.5
South Africa 19 41 74 - 73 71 41 49.4
Source : Euromoney Magazine, 1979-1990.
155
Table 5.5
The Euromoney Index, 1980-86 
Total scores for SSA countries out of 100
Country Average Score Rank
South Africa 53.2 1
Seychelles 42.0 2
Gabon 37.7 3
Kenya 36.0 4
Congo 33.5 5
Cameroon 33.4 6
Nigeria 33.4 6
Botswana 33.0 8
Cote D'Ivoire 32.3 9
Zimbabwe 32.0 10
Mauritius 26.6 11
Mozambique 25.8 12
Angola 25.0 13
Swaziland 24.6 14
Madagascar 22.0 15
Zaire 20.5 16
Malawi 19.8 17
Ethiopia 19.4 18
Niger 18.4 19
Zambia 18.1 20
Senegal 17.7 21
Tanzania 17.6 22
Mauritania 17.4 23
Liberia 17.4 23
Lesotho 15.5 24
Ghana 15.5 24
Sudan 13.0 24
Uganda 10.3 25
Unweighted Average 
(all countries)
25.4
Unweighted Average 24.0
(excluding Nigeria and S.Africa)
Source : Derived from Euromoney Magazine, 1979-1990
The index frequently fluctuates from year to year for each country, making no 
individual country a consistently best or worst performer. Table 5.4 above 
shows the individual and average scores for the period 1980-86. The 
averages for the whole period in Table 5.5 indicate that the Seychelles,
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Gabon, Kenya, Cameroon and Congo were the most favoured countries in 
the commercial banking sector, whereas Uganda, Sudan, Ghana, Lesotho 
and Liberia were the least favoured, indicating that the international banking 
community were most reluctant to lend to those African economies due to a 
variety of economic and political factors.
In examining the Euromoney Index, it has to be kept in mind that in its 
calculation, political and economic indicators have become more prominent 
in the later years than in the earlier, when the market and credit indicators 
were more significant. This is reflected in the modifications of the weights 
accorded to each set of indicators. For example, in 1986, The weight given 
to market indicators was 60%, that given to credit indicators was 20%, and 
that to analytical indicators was 20%. In 1987, the respective weights 
became 40%, 35%, and 25% respectively.
Furthermore, many SSA countries have been left out by Euromoney, 
regardless of their economic or political records. Examples of these are 
Togo, Gambia, and the Central African Republic. Furthermore, there was no 
consistency in country coverage, whereby some countries were included in 
some years but not in others. For example, Madagascar was included in the 
index in 1980 and 1982, but excluded from the survey in other years.
Another point is that the index is highly subjective. This subjectivity is 
particularly reflected in the assessment of the political situation in each 
country, as the market and economic indicators are cardinal measures to 
which numbers can be assigned. It was clear that a country's score for the 
political stability indicator was more dependent upon that country’s 
international reputation instead of definite research into each country's 
circumstances.
In order to see if the three examined stability indices give the same general 
outlook of the political environment in SSA, it is useful to look at the country 
rankings of each index. This is summarised in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 below, 
where all the indices were re-calculated for the period 1980-86, in order to 
make them comparable.
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Table 5.6
The 7 most stable countries as indicated by each index.
Modified Wheeler 
(1980-86)
Pol-ln
(1980-86)
Euromoney
(1980-86)
Botswana Botswana Seychelles
Mauritius Mauritius Gabon
Senegal Senegal Kenya
Zaire Zaire Congo
Benin Benin Cameroon
Burundi Burundi Nigeria
Malawi Malawi Botswana
Table 5.7
The 7 least stable countries as indicated by each index.
Modified Wheeler 
(1980-86)
Pol-ln
(1980-86)
Euromoney
(1980-86)
Ethiopia Ethiopia Uganda
Ghana Sudan Sudan
Sudan Uganda Ghana
Mauritania Ghana Lesotho
Uganda Lesotho Liberia
Lesotho Mauritania Mauritania
Liberia Liberia Tanzania
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 indicate that the Euromoney Index gives different results 
from the Wheeler Index and Pol-ln (both of which give very similar results), 
regarding the best performers. This perhaps reflects the subjectivity of the 
Euromoney index, since, as mentioned before, it is based heavily on 
commercial banker's opinions. However, the results of all three indices are 
very similar regarding the worst performers.
In order to test the correlation between the three indices, Spearman's Rank 
correlation coefficients were calculated. Table 5.8 presents the results.
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Table 5.8
Spearman's correlation coefficient values
MW Euromoney
1960-69:
Pol-ln -0.75 -
1970-79 :
Pol-ln -0.77 -
1980-86 :
Pol-ln -0.90 -0.55
MW - 0.47
The table indicates a strong correlation between the modified Wheeler index 
(MW) and the modified TMIS (Pol-ln), but a weaker one between both and 
the Euromoney index. Again, this strengthens the conclusion that the 
difference in calculation of the indices, and the higher subjectivity of the 
latter render the indices different in their conclusions.
Before we continue in the chapter, it is worth mentioning that there are other 
methods that we could have used to quantify the effects of political instability 
in a country. Some of those are more sophisticated statistical methods (such 
as factor analysis), and some not (such as the rate of turnover of government 
ministers). However, it is felt that for the purposes of this study, the Wheeler 
index and TMIS, have an advantage in simplicity, straight-forwardness and 
data availability. Finally, when a choice between the two was made for the 
regression work in chapter six, the modified TMIS (Pol-ln) was the preferred 
measure as it was more comprehensive in its coverage, and a weighting 
system was employed to distinguish between the events in their degrees of 
seriousness and effects on the economy and growth of the countries in 
question.
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5.5 Instability and Economic Growth
It could be argued that an environment of stability is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for economic growth and development. It is in its ability 
to contribute to growth by encouraging investment, savings and fostering 
confidence in the economy that stability appears important. Furthermore, 
frequent regime changes, even of the non-violent variety, render the 
formulation of long-term or even medium-term plans by investors and
businesses a very difficult, and sometimes useless task, as the new
government is highly likely to adopt a different set of rules for businesses
compared with its predecessor.
From the previous discussion of the causes of instability, it became clear that 
it is not a purely random phenomenon. There are factors and events that 
precede political instability which can be used as possible predictors of, say, 
an attempted coup. Naturally, there can never be complete certainly in the 
process, and indeed, many predictive models have failed to explain more 
than 50% of the variance of different aspects of instability (see Sanders, 
1981 ).
This section is concerned with the link between economic growth and 
political instability. Given the possibility of a two-way relationship, it would 
be beneficial to attempt to test the direction of causality between the two 
variables.
Low or negative growth and economic hardship breeds discontent and 
dissatisfaction with the governing authorities, but whether this translates into 
a coup or an attempted coup is less clear, and far less certain. Some 
political scientist support the view that economic hardship could lead to 
political instability. Many of these arguments are based on what Huntington 
(1965 and 1968) termed social mobilisation, social frustration, and political 
participation. Sigelman (1979) summarised Huntington’s argument in a 
simple schema, reproduced below in Figure 5.1.
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Fig. 5.1
Summary of Huntinton's approach
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High ?
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Is Social Mobilisation Rapid ?
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The diagram demonstrates how instability could result in one scenario 
where rising aspirations, combined with low economic development, result 
in public frustration. If that country has a particularly low level of mobility, 
then mass participation with the absence of suitable political 
institutionalisation could lead to instability, or, in Huntington's own words, 
(1968, p.47) :
"Urbanisation, increases in literacy, education and media exposure all 
give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which, if 
unsatisfied, galvanise individuals and groups into politics. In the 
absence of strong and adaptable political institutions, such increases 
in participation mean instability and violence."
Despite its apparent simplicity and logic, Huntington's approach has been 
accused of being vague, using all-encompassing concepts, and based more 
on ’intuitive observations than on empirical evidence’ (Sigelman, 1979).
The possibility of a two-way relationship between economic growth and 
instability in Sub-Saharan Africa, can be explored by using the Granger- 
Sims approach. According to Sims (1972, p.545) :
"...We can always estimate a regression of Y on current and past X.
But only in the special case were causality runs from X to Y can we 
expect that no future values of X would enter the regression if we 
allowed them. Hence we have a practical statistical test for 
unidirectional causality : regress Y on past and future values of X, 
taking account by generalised least squares or prefiltering of the 
serial correlation... Then if causality runs from X to Y only, future 
values of X in the regression should have coefficients insignificantly 
different from zero as a group."
Thus, if we regress growth on past and future values of instability, and apply 
the appropriate significance tests, we could obtain an indication of the 
direction of causality. If the coefficient of the future variable is significant (as 
indicated by the t-values), then, according to Sims and Granger (1972 and 
1969) , we could conclude that a two-way causality exists. If, however, the 
future coefficient is insignificant then the causality would run in one direction 
only*3*.
To test this two- way process, OLS regressions were performed using this 
approach. The results are shown in the equations below:
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Equation .CD
(t-values in parenthesis)
gf>o = 1.13 + .23 GDI + .11 X-gr - .81 TDS - .02 Pol-ln6o - -04 Pol-in8o 
(3.1) (1.3) (2.2) (.20) (.94)
R2 -  .53 
n =31
gf*7o = growth of GDP over the period 1970-79
Pol-ln60 = instability over the period 1960-69
Pol-lnso = instability over the period 1980-86
GDI = Gross Domestic Investment
X-gr = the growth of exports, and,
TDS = Total Debt Service payments
Equation (2)
Pol-ln7o = 8.66 - .51greo --29 grso R2 = -05
n = 30
(-88) (.75)
Equation (1) includes instability as well as other independent variables, in 
order to minimise the possibility of misspecification, as it is clear that other 
factors play an important role in the growth process (this will become clear in 
the following chapter).
The equation indicates that future instability has an insignificant and 
negative effect on growth, and that past instability has a negative and 
insignificant effect. This tentative evidence suggests that there may not be 
reverse causality between economic growth and political instability for the 
sample of countries used in this analysis and for the definition of instability 
given here.
The results of the second equation further support the conclusions of the 
first, as the t-value of the future instability coefficient is not significant.
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The results of equations (1) and (2) are not surprising. Slow or negative 
economic growth is ultimately expected to breed discontent, but not 
necessarily any serious upheavals such as coups. Yet, further 
experimentation with these two variables has shown that there is a 
possibility of reverse causation (Appendix I at the end of this chapter). This 
suggested feedback or reverse causality, as given by the Granger test, 
implies that if political instability was used as an explanatory variable in a 
growth equation, simultaneity may bias the results. Therefore, in the 
following chapter, OLS is not entirely relied upon in estimating those 
equations in which instability enters as an explanatory variable, Two-Stage 
Least Squares (TSLS) is used as an additional method of regression. This 
is further discussed in chapter six.
Applying the Granger-Sims test using growth as the dependent variable, 
and past and future instability as the independent variables, yielded the 
following results :
gr70 = 4.94 - .06 Pol-ln6o - .09 Pol-lnso
(0.6) (2.0) R2 = . 14
n = 32
(t-values in parenthesis)
gr7o = growth of GDP over the period 1970-79
Pol-lneo = instability over the period 1960-69
Pol-lnso = instability over the period 1980-86
This equation indicates that reverse causality appears to exist between
these two variables in SSA, as the t-statistic of Pol-lnso is significant at the 
5% level. In chapter six, this has lead to the use of TSLS (Two-Stage Least 
Squares) instead of OLS, in estimating the equations in which political 
instability is used as one of the independent variables, to guard against the 
consequences of simultaneity. However, as will be seen in the following 
chapter, the results of employing TSLS are not too dissimilar from those 
resulting from the use of OLS.
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It must also be borne in mind that the period for which the regression was 
performed is the 1970s; a decade of unusual economic shocks and strong 
recessions. This might explain why, for this particular decade, economic 
hardship was reflected in political instability. Still, for more certain 
conclusions the tests need to be performed for other periods.
Finally, for additional illustration of the relationship between political 
instability and economic growth, Pol-ln was plotted against growth for each 
sub-period and for the period as a whole. These plots were estimated using 
the partial regression method, as it produced a more 'pure' reflection of the 
association between the two factors involved (Gujarati, 1988). Equation (1) 
from chapter six was used for this purpose, as it related growth to a variety of 
factors, one of which was instability. The graphs all confirm the positive link 
between stability and economic growth throughout the period considered. 
This relationship is further expanded upon in section 6.3.4 of the following 
chapter.
Figure 5.2
Partial regressions of political instability and economic growth 
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y = -.128x - 1.779E-19, R-squared: .13
201 01 0 5 1 55 0
e2 (Pol-ln)
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(d) 1960-86
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5.6 Democracy and development
At independence, it was thought that the newly-independent states of SSA 
would pursue a relatively democratic style of government, as most of the 
leaders at the time were charismatic nationalists who took part in the 
independence struggles. Democracy was seen as the only alternative to 
colonialism. In many countries, the leaders appeared to believe that 
socialist ideology was better-suited than the free-market/capitalist approach 
to deal with SSA's economic problems at that time. This tendency towards 
socialism did not necessarily preclude the operation of the market system, 
but it also resulted in a great expansion of the role and size of the state in 
most African countries.
It is argued that this tendency towards socialism also resulted in the 
emergence of predominantly single-party, authoritarian rule throughout 
SSA, with the exceptions of states such as Botswana and Mauritius. 
However, it is clear that the belief in socialist ideology does not necessarily 
result in authoritarian rule. There is a clear distinction between communism
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and socialism, and it is only the former that would necessarily result in 
authoritarian rule. Other, personality-re lated and power-seeking 
explanations lie behind the tendency of most African rulers towards 
authoritarianism and the subsequent elimination of political competition, 
either gradually, constitutionally, or by force (Jackson & Rosberg, 1982).
There are many important aspects of the choice of a particular mode of 
government, the causes behind it, and the political, social, economic and 
developmental consequences of such a choice. However, in this paper, we 
will focus on the consequences of the choice of a particular style of 
government - authoritarian or multi-party/democratic - on economic growth 
and development in Sub-Saharan Africa, and whether a move to increased 
political democracy will necessarily produce increased economic 
development (Healey & Robinson, 1992).
With the exception of Botswana and Mauritius, the predominant style of 
government in post-colonial SSA has been authoritarian of one form or 
another. "Authoritarianism" is used here to describe single-party rule, 
monarchic rule and military rule. Naturally, the despotic nature of each 
varies considerably, and depends to a large extent on the personality of the 
ruler and the limits (or the lack of them) of his power ambitions. For example, 
Kenneth Kaunda's single-party rule in Zambia was one of relative liberty 
compared to that of Bokassa in CAR, Mobutu in Zaire or Biya in Cameroon. 
However, since the late 1980s, there has been a strong movement at grass 
roots level to introduce more democracy throughout the continent.
Indeed, these demands for a "second independence" have succeeded in 
many SSA countries and have resulted in the re-introduction of Multi-party 
Democracy (MPD) in many countries, such as Zambia, Congo, Gabon, 
Kenya, Cameroon, and Benin, and a move towards MPD in many of the rest 
(Decalo, 1992). There are some countries in which MPD has not yet been 
introduced, such as Malawi, but it is clearly a matter of time before such 
democracy is forced upon the ruling elite.
Historically, the rise of authoritarian rule in post-colonialist Africa has been 
attributed to several factors, some of which are the following : firstly, the 
significant ethnic divisions which exist in many countries and the failure of
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appeasing and incorporating different ethnic groupings into the mainstream 
political process. Secondly, the weakness of the political institutions, 
administrative structures and technical capacity of the state sector which 
dominates economic and political life. Thirdly, significant economic 
dependence on external markets and powers. Fourthly, the perceived high 
returns from rent-seeking and the sustainability of such activity. Fifthly, while 
the cold war existed, and while alternative external powers competed for the 
continent's resources and strategic loyalties, some foreign powers found it in 
their interests to 'nurture' loyal autocratic rule (e.g. in Zaire). Finally, the 
ease with which dictatorial rule and its financial benefits to the ruling elite 
could be maintained, against the background of a generally uneducated, 
uncohesive, and easily subdued population (by force or by 'rewards' for 
loyalty). All of these factors can be said to be both the result and the cause 
of the economically underdeveloped states of most African economies, 
relative to the economically more advanced states of many non-African 
countries.
What the above also suggests is that the stage of economic development at 
which a country is in, is closely related to the degree of political democracy it 
experiences. In other words, some observers have argued that democracy 
must be preceded by the development of a strong and vibrant capitalist class 
and a corresponding market economy. It is argued that once such a class 
exists, the economic growth and prosperity it generates, by and for itself, will 
mean a higher level of education and expectations of political freedoms and 
political choice, in addition to the freedom of economic choice. The strength 
of this class and its economic significance in the economy is thought to 
provide the impetus for political change and the introduction of a more 
democratic style of government - one which would allow this class even 
more economic freedom and greater prosperity. Taking this argument into 
the African context, it is clear that such a class does not exist in the most of 
the African countries, and thus the existing surge of democracies in the 
continent must have an alternative base for its durability and sustainability, 
until such a class develops.
It is necessary at this stage to define "democracy" as related to the African 
experience. Historically, it may be concluded that since independence, very 
few countries in the continent have experienced democracy, in the sense of
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having the power to chose the political leadership from a number of 
candidates every given number of years, whereby such candidates are not 
chosen by a ruler but are elected through a free and fair electoral process, 
and are representative of a lternative parties or independent 
political/economic ideology. Since 1990, there has been a strong move 
towards the introduction of MPD throughout the continent. In some 
countries, these have been successful and have resulted in the actual 
introduction of a MPD constitution and elections (such as Zambia), while in 
others (such as Malawi) the demands for political democratisation have not 
yet met with success.
This upsurge in demands for democratisation has arisen as a result of both 
internal and external pressures. External pressures to democratise have 
come from the multilateral and the bilateral aid agencies, who are 
increasingly making political democratisation an important part of loan and 
aid conditionality. As to the internal factors, these have been manifested in 
strong and frequent riots and demonstrations in many countries, demanding 
political change. The political demands of the domestic population cannot- 
be separated from their demands for economic change. Many sections of 
the African populations have reached a level of economic hardship and 
deprivation where only radical political and economic change can have any 
impact. At that point, it appeared that they had reached a stage where they 
have very little to lose and everything to gain from pressing for change in 
their governance.
However, coercion into political democracy has not always worked, no 
matter how much internal and external pressure was applied. The results 
seem to depend on the intrinsic nature and actual "personality" of the leader 
under pressure. For example, in Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda accepted 
demands for MPD and held free and fair elections in which he was defeated 
by Frederick Chiluba - the latter taking office in October 1991. He then 
gracefully accepted the results of the elections and proceeded with life as an 
opposition leader (now resigned from the party's leadership). However, in 
other countries, such as Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko still refuses to hand 
power to the elected prime minister Etienne Tshisekedi, and the country is 
now in near total chaos. Thus the historical role of how and when the 
particular leader came to power (whether immediately after independence
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or as a result of military coup d'etat, for example), plays a role in impeding 
or assisting the success of political change.
This brings into question the type of democracy which is relevant to Africa 
and its predicaments. The traditional Western orthodox notions of liberal 
democracy relate to a situation when "the powers of government are limited 
by law and citizens enjoy freedom of association to compete for office in free 
elections at regular intervals", and which could take the form of a "direct 
democracy", whereby all citizens participate in decision-making, or 
"representative democracy" (not to be confused with ’proportional 
representation’ in government), whereby people elect representatives who 
then take decisions on their behalf. Western democracy is also seen to be 
one in which it is increasingly the case that individualism and self-interest 
determines political choice.
In Africa (at the risk of generalising) Western notions of democracy seem 
unapplicable, as most of the African countries are still at a pre-industrial 
stage of development, in which the majority of the population are 
subsistence rural dwellers. For Western-type democracies to survive and be 
stable and sustainable, it is not only necessary to have a well developed, 
strong and large capitalist class, but it is also imperative that at least a 
minimal level of education and political awareness is spread throughout the 
social spectrum and the majority of the population. This is necessary so that 
the voting process is understood and participation is increased.
It is a fact that more widespread and higher levels of education are a definite 
cause of increased politicisation and demands for civil rights. Demands for 
political democracy increase as the spread of education widens and its 
levels increase. One example of this progression is South Korea, where an 
autocratic regime pursued industrial and economic growth targets, including 
an education and manpower development policy, for more than thirty years, 
until the late 1980s, when demonstrations and riots forced the introduction of 
labour and civil rights, and free elections were finally held in 1992 (The 
Economist, various issues, 1992-93).
African countries are now at a critical point in their history. The "second 
independence" stage can be said to have started. There is increased 
education and understanding of political, civil and economic rights
171
throughout the population. However, there is no accompanying strong 
'capitalist' tradition which would allow the democratisation process in those 
countries to follow a similar trend to that in Western countries in the transition 
to democracy. Therefore, it may well be the case that democratisation has to 
be tailored to suit the particular set of African conditions.
This may mean that a "socialist" democracy will have to be introduced - a 
representative democracy in which citizens can vote for representatives who 
must follow economic policies which are more socialist in nature. This could 
send the wrong signals in the sense that it may be a deja vu of post­
colonialist independent Africa. However, given the set of economic 
problems facing Africa, there may not be an alternative. Pursuing pure 
market-oriented policies seems too early for economies which are not yet 
developed or industrialised. Given these conditions, the quality of the 
elected rulers will be one of the deciding factors in the speed and success of 
economic and political development in Africa. Indeed, it has been argued 
that at this level of development, "too much" freedom of choice can hinder 
economic growth, as is the case in India.
Thus while democracy does not necessarily lead to growth, there is a strong 
case that growth leads to democracy. Authoritarianism cannot survive 
indefinitely. It lacks the legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Yet, there is 
evidence of rapid economic growth under a totaltarian regime, primarily 
exeplified in the case of China. At best, the most "tolerable" case of 
dictatorship - that of a benevolent dictator - can achieve growth and 
development and keep his people 'contented' for only a given time period.
By allowing freedom of economic activity, trading, profit-making, physical 
mobility, financial and capital accumulation, and general prosperity and no 
deprivation at grass-roots level exist, then the population will remain content 
(provided, of course, that there is no severe brutality in dealing with dissent). 
However, at some point, all their basic economic needs will be fulfilled and 
the level of their education and political awareness will be such that it will 
lead them to demand more civil rights and political freedoms. Their 
demands will be further strengthened by the fact that communications 
technology is now at such a developed phase that it is easy to "know how 
the other half lives". If democracy is seemto be spreading in neighbouring 
countries then it would be very difficult to prevent it from spreading into that
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particular country. Therefore, at this point, a flexible and prudent ruler will 
have to begin introducing gradual political freedoms. Otherwise, evidence 
shows that the removal of even the most benevolent dictator would be 
imminent. However, evidence also shows that the rapid unprepared-for 
introduction of democracy can lead to chaos and a deterioration in the 
economic and political environment (as seen in the former Soviet Union 
and, in the extreme, Yugoslavia).
What, then, are the economic consequences of authoritarian rule in SSA ? 
These can be discussed in two sections : Policy making and policy 
implementation.
Policy making
Under an authoritarian ruler, there is very little or no policy debate and 
discussion. The ruler or a small group of the ruling elite determines what 
policies to pursue, subject to the constraint that these policies must not 
conflict with their power ambitions. Thus there is no pressure to "get it right" 
first time as the political leaders cannot be removed as a result of policy 
failures (except by non-constitutional means). Thus the lack of policy 
debate, feedback and learning will result in formulating inferior polices, 
which are likely to be short-term in nature, and determined more by crises 
than by long-term perspective and design. Furthermore, the nature of 
dictatotrial rule is such that even if some of the advisers to the ruler knew of 
the policy failure, it is likely to be the case that they would refrain from, or at 
best would delay, informing the ruler of the failure and the need to change 
policy, out of fear for their lives or their livelihoods. Furthermore, the 'quality' 
of the decision makers would be inferior in the sense that the policy maker 
would not necessarily be appointed for his merits as, say, an economist or a 
scientist, but it is more likely to be the case that he would be 'politically' 
appointed.
Furthermore, the process of policy-making is determined to a large extent by 
the relative importance of the various interest groups in society. Five main 
interest groups can be defined and are common to all African countries.
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1. The press.
The role of a vibrant and free press is very important under a system of 
democracy. It creates public awareness and discussion of political, policy­
making and economic development issues. Individual members of the 
ruling elite can be scrutinised for failures to perform their public duties. 
Greater debate of policy requirements and policy implementation creates the 
need for a suitable reaction from the policy-makers, either justifying their 
decisions of changing them in response to constructive criticism. This 
dynamic process was, until very recently, missing from all the African 
economies, and has now begun to take hold in countries where MPD has 
already been introduced and effected.
2. Trade unions and industrial workers.
Trade unions (TU) have traditionally existed in many African countries, but 
have often been persecuted and unempowered. Yet their role and influence 
on policy-making has always been relatively strong. Their role was strong 
long before that of the press. Many of the already converted democracies of 
Africa were built on a strong active movement of trade unionism, whereby 
trade union pressure, in the form of strikes and demonstrations, has been an 
effective force in the transition to democracy. Indeed, Zambia provides an 
example where a former trade union leader is now president as a result of 
the introduction of MPD (Riley, 1992).
However, trade unions usually tend to represent the industrial, 
predominantly urban population, whose demands are often in conflict with 
those of the majority of the population, which is usually concentrated in rural 
areas and is often engaged in subsistence farming. As a result of TU 
pressure, governments have often had to adopt policies to meet their 
demands - usually to the detriment of other sections of society. For example, 
protectionism may be introduced to allow 'infant industries' to grow, 
regardless of the fact that the output of these industries is often permanently 
uncompetitive, and the indigenous business class is often weak or 
nonexistent. Furthermore, there is no incentive to become more efficient, as 
the system of rent-seeking renders it profitable to maintain the status quo.
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3. Medium peasants versus large farmers.
The interests of these two groups and their relative influence on policy­
making is contradictory. It is usually the case that large farmers produce 
cash crops for the export markets, while small-scale farmers produce 
predominantly food crops for the domestic markets. The influence of the 
former group is usually very strong in the policy-making circles. This results 
in policies that favour exports of primary products (such as undervalued 
exchange rates) and discriminate against food crop producers (such as low 
producer prices). Thus a bias is created against small-scale farmers - 
traditionally, the most underprivileged sections of the population and the 
most in need of social help and development.
Thus in the absence of an authoritarian regime, agricultural policy would be 
more egalitarian and efficient, as democracy would ensure policy debate 
and ultimately, increased votes for the elected government who should act in 
favour of the more numerous and least-advantaged group. A democratically 
elected government can therefore, survive if the number of voters it benefits 
from a change of policy is larger than the number of voters which lose out 
from a new policy. This would be democracy at work and would ensure that 
policies are made to benefit the larger underprivileged sections of society, 
while employing other policies to minimise the harm to the rest.
4. Urban force Versus rural force.
Under an authoritarian regime, the ruler can only maintain his position of 
power by the appeasement of the more organised and politically aware and 
active urban population, whose demands are therefore given preference 
over those of the less organised, more geographically scattered rural 
population. This is linked to the strength of the trade unions in directing 
economic policy. If a ruler fails to satisfy the minimum demands of the urban 
population, then the political instability likely to arise due to the 
dissatisfaction of the urban population and the urban labour force can 
undermine the regime and its hold in power.
Therefore, policies are undertaken to appease the urban population at the 
expense of the rural population (Sandbrook, 1982). Examples of such 
policies are the allowance of cheap food imports which would be further
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subsidised to be afforded by the urban population, thus substituting for the 
output of farmers. Another consequence of inefficient and biased 
government policies against agriculture is the increased marginalisation of 
large sections of the rural population, and their gradual "exit" from the official 
sectors into the informal sectors, as the benefits accruing to them from 
remaining in the official sectors are continuously being eroded under an 
authoritarian system which takes account of the politically organised and 
more wealthy sections of the populations only.
Finally, budgetary allocations will tend for the provision of more social 
services to the urban areas than to the rural areas due to the political power 
of the former, and despite the greater need of the latter. This urban 
skewness in the policy-making process in many African countries has very 
negative implications on their economies, as the current state of many 
African economies is such that economic growth and recovery depends to a 
large extent on reviving the agricultural sector. Thus policy mistakes and 
biases have cost the African economies many years of development. The 
introduction of political democracy will again balance the power scales 
giving more rights and attention to the more numerous sections of the* 
country, which often tend to be the rural population.
5. External forces.
The main external forces affecting African policy-making are the multilateral 
donors, primarily the World Bank and the IMF, and bilateral donors. The 
environment and the power play can be separated into two distinct periods : 
Before 1989, i.e. during the the cold war, and after 1989 - after the end of the 
cold war.
The influence of the multilateral aid agencies became stronger in line with 
the increase in influence of Western bilateral donors since the late 1980s, 
following the demise of the Eastern communist bloc. Their main effect on 
policy-making in a predominantly authoritarian Africa was the imposition of 
the well-known set of conditions which accompany their lending activities. 
These tend to be centred around trade and foreign exchange liberalisation 
for the ultimate aim of improving the balance of payments.
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However, before the demise of the Eastern bloc, conditionality was very 
loosely adhered to, as sources of funding were not restricted and it was 
rarely the case that the African policy-makers agreed with or strictly adhered 
to the policies of retrenchment demanded by the IMF, and to a lesser extent, 
by the World Bank. However, as communism collapsed, the sources of 
funding became more limited, and even the funds available from multilateral 
and bilateral sources were diminishing as there was increased competition 
for development funds from the newly-market-oriented Eastern economies. 
This made it easier for both the multilateral and bilateral lenders to insist 
upon the adoption of those policies which they regarded as the best policies 
for the African economies, including demands for more democratisation. 
Despite apparent faults in some of the policy demands of the multilateral 
institutions, African leaders had to at least begin implementing the policies 
recommended by those institutions, and some were forced to introduce 
MPD.
The impact of bilateral lenders before 1989 was somewhat different, and in 
many ways, American, Soviet, French and British governments pursued a 
foreign policy in Africa which consolidated Authoritarian rule in the process 
of increasing their strategic and economic gains from Africa. The situation 
changed dramatically since 1989, as there is now very little power-play and 
strategic competition from the former Soviet Union/Eastern bloc in Africa. 
This resulted in an increasing isolation of the African authoritarian rulers, 
and rising demands, both domestically and internationally, for the 
introduction of democracy in Africa.
Therefore, the changing international political environment and power play 
can be argued to have formed an added source of pressure for political 
reform in Africa, albeit for reasons that are not necessarily motivated by the 
good of the African people. Western governments and their donor 
institutions tend to favour democratically elected governments because of 
the fact that such governments are more likely to implement their policy 
demands of greater trade and foreign exchange liberalisation, as they are 
likely to meet with less resistance from the population and the voters who 
have 'elected' them as their representatives, and are therefore legitimately in 
power for a given term of governance.
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Therefore, for those reasons and due to the conflicting interests and 
influences of the different interest groups, the process of policy-making 
under authoritarianism in Africa has been and is inferior to that under 
democracy, where it should be the case that the interests of the majority 
prevail, but not to the detriment of the minority. In addition, there is the 
important aspect of policy flexibility and ease of adjustment to a changing 
economic environment. This flexibility of policy-making is likely to be more 
prevalent under a more democratic system of government than under 
authoritarianism, as policy failures will be scrutinised and publicly discussed 
under a democracy, thereby affecting the elected government's re-election 
hopes, whereas an autocratic ruler does not have to consider this aspect or 
worry about his hold on power (except by unconstitutional means).
Folicv-implementation
The other impact of the system of government on the economic sphere is 
that related to policy implementation. Once the policies have been decided 
upon by the ruling political elite, the implementation of these policies is 
again likely to be inefficient and inferior to policy implementation under 
democracy. To begin with, the apparatus which is used to implement 
government policy under authoritarianism is inefficient. Nearly all of the 
African countries have a very large state sector, both in size and extent 
(SandbrooK, 1985). The actual size of the government sector is not in itself 
a problem, if it were efficient and productive. However, this is nearly never 
the case in Africa or anywhere else.
The public sector has often been a tool of hindrance rather than of help to 
the working of the economy. The quality of decision-making in public sector 
institutions from the top downwards is typically poor, and again, 
appointments are politically motivated (rather that merit-based) and rent- 
seeking activities are commonplace (such as in the system of issuing import 
licences). Furthermore, the burden of the parastatals is often extended into 
the financial sector, where investment and lending decisions are made on 
political grounds rather than efficiency grounds. An added problem of 
implementation is that it is often the case that even if there is potential for 
efficiency in policy implementation, this is frequently not realised as public 
institutions do not have autonomy in implementation, and 'short-termism' of
178
policy dominates, according to the wishes of the ruling elite. The will of the 
elite dominates and there is no transparency or accountability. Thus, in all, 
policy implementation is also more inefficient under an autocratic system of 
government than under a democratically-elected one.
One of the most important consequences of living under a democratic 
system of government is the confidence and political stability generated by 
the knowledge that, while there may be changes in government every four 
years or so, the changes in the fundamentals of economic activity are likely 
to be minimal. That is to say, there will not be totalitarian rules abruptly 
imposed regarding, for example, the mobility of people or capital, or the 
ownership of capital and property rights, as the government in power can be 
peacefully voted out at the following election - without devastation or 
violence. Furthermore, there will be more predictability, more transparency 
and less abruptness and erraticness in policy making under democracy than 
under authoritarianism.
Conclusion
It can be said that the recent surge of popular democracies in many SSA 
countries has come from a dissatisfied urban and rural population so 
hardened by economic deprivation that any change is seen as a good 
change. The demands for political change are thus inextricably linked to the 
demands for economic change - economic and social rights are demanded 
with as much fervour as the demands for legal and political rights. This may 
be dangerous in that it may generate new "democracies" which might well 
revert to the old ways of government once they are somewhat established in 
office and once they have introduced some seemingly beneficial economic 
policy changes.
The desirability of multi-partyism in government should not be an end in 
itself, but a means to achieving prosperity. Indeed, a multi-party system of 
government is not a guarantee of increased prosperity and economic and 
social development. What is essential, however, is the political stability 
generated by a democratic system of government. The continuity and
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confidence inspired by such an environment can enable economic activity to 
proceed in pursuit of faster development.
A very important question concerning the emerging African democracies is 
that of their sustainability, and how democratic culture can become a 
permanent feature in those countries. The existence of markets and a strong 
'capitalist' sector is seen as a necessary but not sufficient condition for this 
purpose. Strong institutions are also regarded as necessary, as well as the 
institution of contitutional checks and balances to prevent the re-emergence 
of autocract. For example, one such check should be made regarding the 
relationship between the military and the government.
It is worth noting at this point that there is no conclusive evidence one way or 
another: political democracy and pluralism does not necessarily generate 
economic development, and economic development does not necessarily 
generate political democracy. However, it is more likely that the latter 
assertion will hold, implying that an autocratic system of government cannot 
prevail once a certain 'threshold' of economic development has been 
achieved, due to the illegitimacy with which it is viewed.
The process of democratic transition in Africa has so far not been peaceful in 
all of the countries where MPD is being demanded. For example, it was 
peaceful in Zambia but far less so in Zaire. One of the lessons which can be 
observed is that for the opposition to authoritarianism to be effective, it must 
be completely united - otherwise what happened in Kenya and Cameroon 
would prevail throughout most of the continent, and democracy could be 
used to re-instate the ex-ruling single-parties for a further term in 
government, resulting primarily from a successful "divide and rule" policy by 
the old autocratic regimes. Another historical observation is that the 
transition process and what follows is significantly affected by the strength of 
the institutions upon which the whole system is built. A good government is 
a strong government, but one which emanates from popular choice, 
consultation, negotiation and consensus politics, and not from dictatorship, 
as the latter is inherently unstable in the long term. Thus democracy may not 
be perfect, but it is certainly preferable to autocracy.
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5.7 Summary
This chapter has dealt with one specific relationship - that between 
economic growth and political instability (or stability) in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Political science provides a considerable literature attempting to explain the 
causes and consequences of instability (e.g. Sanders, 1981, Huntington 
1965 and 1968, and Hibbs, 1973). Furthermore, various models have 
attempted predictions of instability.
The discussion here has centred around three different measures of 
instability, and the statistical relationship between those and growth. The 
results of the regression equations and the graphs presented earlier indicate 
that instability has a negative effect on economic growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and as will be seen in the following chapter, this effect is frequently 
significant. Furthermore, there appeared to be a negative but insignificant 
effect of growth on instability, i.e. reverse causality appears not to have 
existed in the 1970s.
It seems plausible (logically) to conclude that if it was the case that slow (or 
negative) growth persisted for a continuous number of years, with no upturn 
in sight and with no reprieve from a downward trend over all the (long) 
period in question, then regime-threatening instability is highly likely to result 
in this context, and economic growth is expected to significantly affect 
political instability. There is also evidence (chapter six) that the successful 
pursuit of economic growth and development requires a politically stable 
environment, wherein economic agents are able to concentrate on 
improving their living standards, instead of avoiding the cross-fire between 
the various power-seeking factions.
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NOTES
(1) Botswana, in particular, has attracted great attention due to its 
apparently exceptional stability record. The debate over the reasons for this 
record has been divided into the 'exceptionalists' arguments - those who 
argue that Botswana's circumstances are indeed exceptional and are unlike 
those of any other SSA country, (such as Goldsworthy, 1986, and Jackson & 
Rosberg, 1985 and 1986), and the 'typicalists' arguments - those who 
maintain that Botswana's stability is due to a common African pattern of 
bureaucratic control rather than an exceptional pattern, (such as Alien,1986, 
and Parson, 1984).
However, the main conclusions regarding Botswana's stability record are 
that it is a small country with a small population (of around one million), and 
is therefore, relatively easier to govern than bigger countries. Furthermore, 
there is no clear and wide ethnic diversity, as the Botswana form about 90% 
of the population. Even for those who argue that this is only because the 
Tswana minority has successfully imposed its culture on the majority of the 
ethnically diverse people (Charlton, 1985), it is still widely agreed that very- 
few ethnic problems exist in the country.
Another factor cited as enhancing the country's stability is the low level of 
politicisation of the population, and the unusually high degree of elite unity. 
Political participation is strictly controlled, and potentially fierce ethnic 
competition was not allowed to materialise. Furthermore, the advantages of 
a windfall natural resource - diamonds, has helped maintain stability 
(Charlton, 1987).
(2) It should be mentioned that the Granger-Sims test has its critics. 
According to Jacobs, Learner and Ward (1979, p.409),
"The Sims test for causality is often incorrectly viewed as a test for 
exogeneity....We also demonstrated that the Sims test for causality is 
actually a test of the informativeness hypothesis(3) and is not a test 
for exogeneity or causality as is generally believed.... evidence that 
apparently casts doubt on the causality hypothesis can be attributed 
to the slightest misspecification"
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(3) The informativeness hypothesis, according to Jacobs et a l , is one of the 
hypotheses that describe the extent to which X influences V. This posits that 
an optimal prediction of Y does not depend on X. That is to say, X is 
informative about Y, but the relationship is not necessarily causal.
183
CHAPTER SIX 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
6.1 Introduction
In chapter three, a descriptive analysis of social, economic and political 
factors affecting growth was presented. Some of those factors are now 
examined in the context of regression analysis and efforts are made to 
quantify their relative effects. This exercise concentrates on examining 
theories previously presented, particularly those in chapter two, which stress 
the primary role of saving and investment in the growth process.
Three main sets of regressions are estimated : the first is for the growth of 
GDP, the second, the saving-ratio function, and the third is the Incremental 
capital-output ratio (ICOR) function. Following the results, a discussion and 
a graphic representation of the regression results is presented, and finally, 
the implications and policy conclusions of those results are discussed.
6.2 Explaining GDP Growth
The first regression model contains growth of GDP as the dependent 
variable (Y) and a total of fourteen explanatory variables were used in the 
different regressions. These variables are the following :
POP The population growth rates
X-gr The growth rates of the volume of exports
M-gr The growth rates of the volume of imports
AP The rate of inflation
AToT The change in the terms of trade
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GDI/GDP Gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP
LIT Literacy rates
G/GDP Government consumption as a percentage of GDP
ODA/GNP Aid as a percentage of GNP
Pol-ln Political Instability Index
i-lend, i-dep Lending and deposit rates of interest in real terms
BM/E The black market exchange rate as a percentage of the official
exchange rate
TDS/GNP Total debt service as a percentage of GNP
D/GDP Debt Stocks as a percentage of GDP
Due to the lack of data for some variables in the 1960s, some regressions 
were performed only for the 1970s and the 1980s. The missing variables 
(from the 1960s) were the rates of interest, total debt stocks and debt service 
ratios, and the ratio of the black market to the official exchange rates.
A number of regressions were performed, with different variables included in 
each. The results are fisted in Table 6.1 below.
The total sample size is thirty two. Of the original forty-five SSA countries, 
thirteen had great data deficiencies on a large number of factors, it was 
therefore, thought better to exclude them altogether. The countries included 
in the sample are listed in Appendix II. Chapter four also described the 
methodology employed in estimating the equations and the partial 
regression graphs, where some of the equations were estimated employing 
TSLS (Two-Stage Least Squares), and others using OLS. TSLS was 
employed to estimate the regressions which included political instability as 
one of the independent variables, in case simultaneous equation bias 
existed, if instability and growth were interdependent. Below are the results
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of the OLS equations only, and Appendix 111 contains the results of the TSLS 
equations and the corresponding partial regressions.
The period under study was 1960-86. This was divided into three sub­
periods : 1960-69, 1970-79, and 1980-86. Each regression equation was 
performed for each decade as well as for the period as a whole in order to 
see how the effects of the variables included seemed to change overtime.
6.3 Results
Table 6.1 below presents the results of the regression equations performed 
with the growth of GDP as the dependent variable. The equations, (1) to 
(12), contain various groupings of the explanatory variables. When 
equations for particular periods are omitted, it is because data on the 
variables is not available.
Table 6.1
Determination of GDP 
Results of OLS regressions 
Dependent Variable : Growth of GDP 
Values of t-statistics in parentheses.
Equation 1
Const.Pop GDI G ODA LIT AP X-gr R2 n
1960-69 -.13 1.34 .15 -.10 .18 -.02 -.29 .06 .62 26
(2.05) (2.19) (1.19) (1.12) (.71) (2.30) (1.64)
1970-79 3.21 .05 .15 -.14 .15 .01 -.11 .15 .46 30
(.07) (2.23) (1.29) (.86) (.38) (1.20) (1.64)
1980-86 -3.58 .81 .05 -.10 .01 .06 -.01 .42 .75 27
(1.21) (1.87) (1.20) (.25) (2.44) (.30) (5.92)
1960-86 1.03 .13 .12 -.05 .005 .01 -.07 .21 .62 22
(.20) (1.76) (.42) (.40) (.49) (1.03) (2.14)
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Equation 2
Const. GDI Pol-ln LIT G AP X-gr R2 n
1960-69 5.17 .14 -.13 -.03 -.15 
(2.12) (1.89) (1.38) (1.96)
-.06 .06 
(.90) (1.70)
.39 31
1970-79 4.36 .10 -.17 .007 -.08 
(1.60) (1.60) (.29) (.88)
-.06 .14 
(.61) (1.74)
.50 30
1980-86 -1.85 .06 -.05 .06 -.06 
(1.90) (1.37) (3.04) (.74)
-.01 .37
(.51) (5.66)
.75 27
1960-86 1.61 .14 -.03 .008 -.07 
(2.79) (.55) (.47) (1.06)
-.04 .21 
(.90) (3.58)
.72 27
Equation 3
Const.AToT Pol-ln Pop ODA AP LIT R2 n
1960-69 .94 .005 -.05 1.67 .15 -.41 -.02 .49
(1.3) (.70) (2.1) (1.1) (2.5) (.50)
1970-79 2.8 .001 -.19 .40 .17 -.07 .03 .54
(2.5) (2.0) (.60) (1.2) (.90) (1.1)
1980-86 -.27 .001 -.08 -.01 .02 -.01 .06 .27
(.90) (1.6) (.01) (-3) (-3) (2.1)
1960-86 .36 .001 -.02 .60 .18 -.11 .03 .35
(.04) (•2) (.8) (1.7) (1.6) (1.1)
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Const. D GDI Pol-ln LIT X-gr ODA R2 n
1970-79 1.5 -.1 .16 -.18 .009 .1 .3 .60 31
(1.99) (2.4) (2.2) (0.4) (1.1) (1.6)
1980-86 -1.7 -.01 .05 -.04 .06 .35 .02 .77 29
(1.8) (1.6) (1.5) (3.3) (6.2) (■5)
Eauation 5
Const. BM/E TDS GDI Pop AToT R2 n
1970-79 .06 -.009 -.96 .24 .76 .0002 .36 26
(1.4) (1.7) (2.0) (1.0) (•7)
1980-86 -.31 -.009 -.14 .21 .22 .002 .32 30
(1.0) (1.7) (2.7) (•2) (1.4)
Eauation 6
Const. LIT.-j Pol-ln GDI Pop M-gr TDS AP R2 n
1970-79 .99 .02 -.15 .20 .13 .15 -.68 -.02 .69 31
(.56) (1.75) (3.28) (.25) (2.42) (2.1) (.25)
1980-86 -1.51 .03 -.09 .19 .21 .24 -.25 .04 .52 30
(1.05) (2.02) (2.50) (.28) (3.01) (1.69) (1.26)
1970-86 -.91 .01 -.07 .23 .04 .21 -.42 -.03 .62 30
(-43) (1.3) (3.5) (.07) (2.18) (2.00) (.70)
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Eauation 7
Const, i-lend Pol-ln TDS M-gr GDI R2 n
1970-79 1.6 -.08
(.80)
-.16
(2.1)
-.31
(.80)
.19
(3-0)
.14
(1.9)
.63 22
1980-86 .29 -.05
(1.1)
-.1
(2.0)
-.25
(1.4)
.24
(2.8)
.20
(2.5)
.48 28
Equation 8 (Non - Franc-Zone countries onlv)
Const. BM/E TDS GDI Pop AToT R2 n
1970-79 4.1 -.01
(1.2)
-2.0
(2.5)
.4
(2.5)
-.9
(■6)
.0002
(-5)
.54 17
1980-86 -1.3 -.01
(1.4)
-.14
(.5)
.12
(1.4)
1.2
(1.3)
.005
(2.9)
.58 20
Equation 9
Const. Pop G Pol-ln ODA LIT R2 n
1960-69 -4.9 1.1
(1.3)
.07
(.8)
-.23
(2.6)
.27
(1.8)
.03
(.8)
.32 25
1970-79 3.1 -.5
(■9)
-.13
(1.8)
-.19
(2.4)
.3
(2.3)
.03
(1.4)
.38 31
1980-86 1.98 -1.6
(1.8)
-.04
(-3)
-.12
(2.3)
.02
(.3)
.07
(2.1)
.37 27
1960-86 1.5 -.3
(•4)
-.05
(.5)
-.07
(1.0)
.03
(-2)
.03
(.8)
.17 23
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Equation 10 f Internal factors only)
Const. Pop GDI G LIT X-gr AP R2 n
1960-69 .42 1.1
(1.8)
.1
(1.5)
-.06
(-8)
-.01
(■4)
.06
(1.7)
-.03 .38 
(•4)
31
1970-79 4.1 -.06
(-1)
.14
(2.1)
-.1
(1.0)
.002
(.1)
.17
(2.1)
-.12 .44 
(1.4)
30
1980-86 -3.9 .87
(1.5)
.05
(1.9)
-.1
(1.3)
.06
(3.0)
.42
(8*1)
-.01 .75
(■2)
27
1960-86 1.3 -.03
(•1)
.14
(2.9)
-.07
(-9)
.009
(■5)
.22
(3.6)
-.04 .71 
(1.0)
27
Eauation 11 ( External Factors onlvl
Const. ODA Pol-ln AToT R2 n
1960-69 4.2 .08
(-5)
-.08
(.9)
.0001
(-2)
.07 25
1970-79 4.19 .16
(1.4)
-.25
(3.6)
.001
(2.6)
.49 26
1980-86 3.3 -.03
(1.4)
-.07
(1.6)
.001
(1.0)
.13 29
1960-86 3.1 .15
(1.4)
-.12
(1.9)
.004
(.6)
.22 23
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Equation 12 (Oil-importing countries only)
Const. Pop M-gr AToT R2 n
1960-69 -2.4 2.5 .008 .0001 .29 23
(2.4) (.05) (•3)
1970-79 2.7 .02 .26 .0002 .39 23
(.03) (3.1) (.3)
1980-86 -.5 1.1 .13 .004 .28 26
(1.3) (1.3) (2.1)
1960-86 1.4 .26 .30 .02 .34 26
(-4) (2.8) (1.7)
Following is a description and analysis of those results, taking each variable 
(or group of variables) in turn.
6.3.1 Investment
As expected, gross domestic investment appears to be one of the strongest 
factors affecting growth, having a coefficient value of between 0.1 and 0.2 
(being significant at the 10% or 5% level). This is apparent from the two 
main equations {(1) & (2)} and also from others where it was included. 
Some equations have been designed to study the effects of certain factors 
and not others {e.g. equations (4) & (6)}. These also indicate a strong effect 
of GDI. The effect appears most significant in the earlier part of the period, 
even though it remains significant throughout. This result was expected and 
fits with what traditional theory predicts regarding the importance of 
investment in the growth process, when an economy is accelerating from a 
lower growth path to a higher one. The declining impact of investment is 
consistent with the view that poor domestic policies reduced the productivity 
of capital in later decades (see Lele, 1984).
Partial regression graphs are presented below in Figure 6.1 (a - d), showing 
the relationship between growth and GDI more clearly. Ail the graphs which
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GDI & Growth 1960-69
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are presented in this chapter {(6.1) - (6.14)} have been performed using the 
partial regression technique in order to obtain a clearer, more 'purified', 
representation of the relationship between the variables concerned 
(Gujarati, 1988, and chapter four). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that due to 
rounding error, the fitted lines in some graphs do not pass through the origin.
6.3.2 Trade Variables
In general, of the three trade-related variables (export growth, import growth, 
and the terms of trade), the effect of export growth appears to be the most 
significant (as indicated by the values of the t-statistics of the X-gr coefficient 
in the various equations).
Equations (1) & (2) show the effect of export growth on the growth of GDP. 
This is consistently significant, becoming more so in the 1980s.
M-gr and X-gr were not included together at the same time in any of the 
equations due to the link between the two (exports generate the funds 
necessary to buy imports which are used to increase the production of* 
exports and so on).
Equations (6) & (7) indicate the effect of import growth on the growth of GDP. 
Both equations point to a significant effect (at the 5% level). Again, these 
results are consistent with what traditional theory has maintained regarding 
the central roles that the growth of exports and imports play in the growth 
process, being the main sources of foreign exchange for the purchase of 
non-competitive imports, and providing benefits from efficient specialisation.
As to the change in the terms of trade, this was weighted by the ratio of 
exports to GDP (X/GDP). The results concerning the effect of AToT on 
economic growth are unexpectedly weak. Equation (3) shows this variable 
to have a positive but insignificant effect, except for the 1970s where t = 2.5 
(significant at the 5% level). This was a period when oil price rises can be 
expected to have had positive growth effects on the five oil exporters 
(Angola, Nigeria, Cameroon, Congo and Gabon), and strong negative 
effects on the oil importers.
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Equation (12), however, is interesting in that it includes only the oil importing 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The results now indicate that AToT have a 
positive but insignificant effect on the growth of GDP. However, the effect 
becomes significant at the 5% level (t = 2.1) during the 1980s, and remains 
significant (at the 10% level where t = 1.7) over the period as a whole.
In the 1970s, the impact of the oil-price rise on oil importers was offset by 
higher capital inflows. However, this led to higher debt service payments in 
the 1980s, which is perhaps where the declining terms of trade in the 1970s 
for the oil importers made its impact.
The graphs below (Fig.6.2 - Fig.6.4) indicate how each of these variables 
was related to growth in each of the periods considered, and how the 
strength of these relationships changed over time.
Fig. 6.2
Export growth and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = ,056x + 3.S66E-19, R-squared: .13
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(b) 1970-79
y = .147x - .047, R-squared: .107
1 0 1 551 0 5 01 5
e2 (X-gr)
1 980-86
y = .419x - 4.392E-19, R-squared: .649
1 51 051 5 1 0 5 0
e2 (X-gr)
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(d) 1960-86
y b .205x - 6.179E-19, R-squared: .247
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6 84 42 2 1 06 0
e2 (X-gr)
Fig. 6.3
Import growth and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = ,055x + 2.571 E-19, R-squared: .015
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(b) 1970-79
y = .218x - .047, R-squared: .288
1 0 1 5 201 5 1 0 55 0
e2 (M-gr)
1980-86
y = .295x - 3.667E-19, R-squared: .245
0..
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e2 (M-gr)
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(d) 1960-86
y = ,347x - 3.199E-19, R-squared: .325
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Fig. 6.4
AToT and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y a 4.626E-4x - .029, R-squared: .085
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(b) 1970-79
y = .001 x - .228, R-squared: .234
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 700C-3000 -2000 -1 000 0
e2 (AToT)
1980-86
y = .0Q1x - 5.184E-19, R-squared: .034
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(d) 1960-86
y s 1.061 E-5x - .099, R-squared: 9 .280E-5
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e2 (AToT)
6.3.3 Aid
Despite appearing to always have a positive effect, the inclusion of aid in the 
regression equations was rarely significant.
Equations (1), (3), & (4) show the effect of aid. In equation (1), the effect is 
not always significant.
In equation (3), and for the whole period, it is close to significance at the 
10% level (t= 1.7), but insignificant in each of the sub-periods. This is 
perhaps because investment was excluded from this equation, and since aid 
affects the investment rate, the aid effect appears more significant.
In equation (4), it is, again, not significant (yet being closer to significance in 
the 1970s than in the 1980s).
Overall, it can be concluded that aid does not appear to play a particularly 
significant role in the growth process of Sub-Saharan Africa. This is not a 
surprising conclusion as the aid debate continues with conflicting evidence 
(see, for example, Mosley, 1987, Wheeler, 1984, and Todaro, 1989).
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Again, the aid-growth relationship and its changing pattern is shown below 
in Fig.6 .5.
Fig. 6.5
ODA and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = ,175x + .015, R-squared: .08
2 4 6 846 2 0
e2 (ODA/GNP)
(b) 1970-79
y = .149x - 1.417E-19, R-squared: .033
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e2 (ODA/GNP)
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(c) 1980-86
y = -.012x - 3 .500E-19, R-squared: .003
20 1 5 1 0 5 0 5 t 0 1 5 20
e2 (ODA/GNP)
1960-86
y = .005x - .119, R-squared: 8.816E-5
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6.3.4 Political Instability
This is the modified Jackman (weighted incidents) political instability index. 
Its effect on the growth of GDP appears in equations (2), (3), (4), and (7). 
The equations indicate that this factor is indeed significant and has a 
negative impact on economic growth. The results here confirm that a stable 
political environment is as important as the traditional factors (X-gr, M-gr, & 
GDI) in the growth process.
Fig. 6.6
Political instability and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = -.128x - 1.779E-19, R-squared: .13
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(b) 1970-79
y = -.167x - 1.689E-19, R-squared: .101
7.5 12.5 1 57.5 2.5 2.5 5 1 05 0
e2 (Pot-ln)
1980-86
y = -.047x - 3.568E-4, R-squared: .085
3520 25 301 51 5 -1 0 5 0 5 1 0
e2 (Pol-ln)
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(d) 1960-86
y = -.03x + .006, R-squared: .015
.5.
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However, it is noticeable that despite significant t-values in all the sub­
periods considered, in the whole-period equation (1960-86) it is not 
significant. This is interesting as it indicates that despite the importance of 
political stability in the short - medium term, in the longer term , the negative 
effect on growth persists but decreases in significance. This occurs perhaps, 
because for some countries, political stability conditions reverse as the 
decades progress, leaving fewer countries in the sample with continuously 
poor stability or good stability, thus leading to lower significance in the 
statistical analysis.
The graphs above {Fig.6 .6 , (a) - (d)} illustrate this relationship more clearly, 
and confirm the above observations.
6.3.5 Literacy
Equations (1), (2), (3), & (4) contain the variable LIT to assess the effect of 
literacy rates on the growth rates of GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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It is perhaps expected that the effect of this variable (LIT) would always be 
positive and significant. Yet the equations indicate a negative but 
insignificant effect during the 1960s; a positive but still insignificant effect 
during the 1970s and a positive and very significant effect (at the 5% level) 
during the 1980s.
For the 1960s and the 1970s, these results are perhaps surprising as 
literacy rates might be considered good proxies for the effects of investment 
is human capital. The use of other proxies such as primary and secondary 
educational enrolment rates did not improve the results.
Other studies (e.g. Barro, 1991) have also exhibited some difficulties in 
assessing the impact of education on growth during the early stages of 
development using adult literacy rates as a measure. Using other proxies, 
such as secondary education enrolment rates, also did not improve the 
results. Barro argues that this is possibly due to the fact that during the 
1960s, data collection for this variable was far less reliable than it is in the 
latter periods. This is borne out by the fact that the impact of this factor 
becomes increasingly significant during the 1970s and the 1980s, reflecting 
perhaps, the higher quality of data in those later periods.
An alternative explanation is that the effect of greater investment in human
capital transpires in later periods. Equation (6) examines the lagged effect 
of literacy (LIT_-j), considering the effect of 1960s literacy rates on the
average growth rates of the 1970s, and the 1970s literacy rates on the 
growth rates of the 1980s. The results indicate a positive but insignificant 
effect for the former (t = 0 .6 ), and a positive and increasingly significant effect 
for the latter (t = 1.1).
It could, therefore, be said that the impact of education does appear to 
become of greater importance as those educated in the current period 
become active in the labour force in later years. This could further explain 
the negative impact of literacy during the 1960s, as that period was 
characterised by increased public spending on education after 
independence, with resources being diverted from investment in physical 
capital to education. Clearly, no immediate returns would materialise from 
such an investment in the form of a more highly trained labour force, since 
those who entered education in the 1960s would most likely still be in
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education by 1969. There may also be a differential effect of increasing 
literacy through primary education as against adult education classes. The 
former might be considered to have a greater effect as it opens up the 
possibility of absorbing productivity-enhancing skills and career 
opportunities in the formative years. In the 1960s and 1970s, much of the 
literacy improvement was the result of widespread adult education classes 
to rectify the poor educational position in the colonial period (Hodd, 1991).
Fig. (6.7) below illustrates the nature of the relationship between literacy and 
growth over each decade, and for the period as a whole.
Fig. 6.7
Literacy and growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = -.019x + 7.999E-20, R-squared: .027
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(b) 1970-79
y s .01x - 5.993E-20, R-squared: .007
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(d) 1960-86
y s .014x - 1.965E-19, R-squared: .017
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6.3.6 Size of Government sector
Government consumption is the variable used to assess the impact of the 
size of the public sector on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(G/GDP).
The effect of G/GDP can be seen in equations (1) and (2). 
in both equations, the effect appears to be negative but insignificant (with the 
exception of the result in equation (2) for 1960-69). The significance, as 
given by the t-statistics, also falls as we move forward in the time period 
considered.
The lack of significance of this much-discussed variable is of interest. Once 
again the results may be due to measurement limitations. Much criticism of 
the state sector has been levelled at direct productive activities, and perhaps 
if a measure of the share of total resources engaged in state-owned
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activities could be obtained, this would show up better in the regression 
equations.
A further possible reason as to why the effect of government became 
insignificant during the 1970s and the 1980s could be the fact that during the 
1970s, world prices for oil and some minerals increased markedly. Given 
that these sectors were invariably controlled by governments in the Sub- 
Saharan African countries, the revenues generated from such sectors meant 
that the government was able to expand its consumption expenditure. This 
positive association may well have offset some of the negative efficiency 
effects of a targe public sector.
Fig. (6 .8 ) illustrates the association between the size of the public sector 
(proxted by government consumption) and growth, over each decade and 
for the period as a whole.
Fig. 6.8
Government consumption and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = -.098x + 7.064E-19, R -squared: .072
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(b) 1970-79
y = -.139x + .017, R-squared: .071
7.5 1 0 12.5 1 5 17.57.5 2.5 2.55 0 5
e2 (G/GDP)
1980-86
y = -,098x - .005, R-squared: .069
4 8 1 02 61 2 1 0 48 6 2 0
e2 (G/GDP)
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(d) 1960-86
y = -.049x - .065, R-squared: .012
1
1 .
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g2 (G/GDP)
6.3.7. Debt Indicators
Equations (5) & (7) demonstrate the effect of total debt-service payments on 
the rate of growth of GDP. There is no equation for the 1960s due to the lack
of reliable data (on TDS & DEBT) in this decade.
Equation(5) indicates a negative and significant effect of TDS on growth, 
and equation (7) points to the increasing significance of this factor in time (a 
higher t-value in the 1980s than in the 1970s). These results correspond to 
expectations regarding this factor.
The effect of total debt stocks reinforces this view. Equation (4) indicates a
negative and significant effect of debt on growth.
Actual debt stocks therefore, appear to be an important factor retarding 
growth, indicating perhaps, that much of this debt was not employed in 
productive investment in earlier decades.
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These observations are summarised in Fig. 6.9 and Fig. 6.10 below.
Fig. 6.9
Total debt service and economic growth 
(a) 1970-79
y = -.306x + 3.061E-19, R-squared: .043
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(b) 1980-86
y = -.246x + .016, R-squared: .084
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Fig. 6.10
Debt stocks and economic growth
(a) 1970-79
y s -.091 x + 4.602E-19, R -squared: .142
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6.3.8 Inflation
Equations (1), (2), & (3) demonstrate the effect of this variable on the growth 
rate of GDP.
It appears to be negative throughout the period under study, but it is most 
significant during the 1960s. The significance of this factor (as indicated by 
the t-values) falls markedly in the later sub-periods. Average inflation rates 
in SSA have steadily increased over the three sub-periods considered 
(from 5.9%, to 17.3% to 20.4%, excluding Nigeria), and it may be that the 
African economies have become better at adjusting, thereby minimising 
shoe-leather and menu costs.
In general, the relationship between inflation and growth is not a simple one. 
Evidence can be found to indicate a low correlation between the two 
variables (e.g. Sundrum, 1990, and Thirlwall, 1974). The direction of this 
relationship depends on the causes of inflation, as these affect growth 
differently. For example, if a country experiences wars or civil disturbances 
(as many SSA countries have), then we could expect low or even negative 
growth rates but high inflation. On the other hand, inflation could be used as 
a means of accumulating 'forced saving' by the government, and when 
there are high social rates of return for investment, it may be associated with 
a positive effect on the growth of GDP.
Finally, if it was the case that the growth in a particular country was mainly 
due to export demand and a balance of payments surplus, without these 
foreign exchange earnings being sterilised, we would again observe high 
inflation associated with high growth rates.
Fig. 6.11 below illustrates the relationship between growth and inflation over 
each decade and summarises our observations regarding this variable.
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Fig. 6.11
Inflation and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
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(c) 1980-86
y = .009x + 1.133E-19, R-squared: .005
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6.3,9 Price-Distortions
This variable is proxied by the ratio of the black market to the official 
exchange rate (BM/E). Equation (5) demonstrates the effect of this variable.
As expected there is a negative association between distortions of market 
prices and the growth rate of GDP. There is no equation for the 1960s due 
to the lack of data on the black market rates for this period.
In neither the 1970s nor the 1980s does this variable appear particularly 
significant, but it is more significant in the 1970s than in the 1980s (as 
indicated by the corresponding t-values).
An interesting change occurs in equation (8 ), where the same equation 
(equation 5) is performed excluding the Franc-zone countries. Here, the 
distortions still have a negative effect on growth (as expected), but the 
impact of this factor becomes more significant during the 1980s.
It is not always easy to arrive at solid quantitative conclusions when 
examining market distortions. Barro (1991) attempts to quantify market 
distortions using the deviation from the sample mean of the Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) numbers for investment goods as computed by 
Summers and Heston (1988).
The results of his regressions
"indicate a significantly negative relation between growth and the magnitude of the 
deviation of PPP"
on the one hand, but the result becomes insignificant when another variable 
(an algebraic value of PPP) is added to the equation.
Thus the regression results of the effects of market distortions on the growth 
rates of GDP are mixed and, as Barro himself puts it, they are preliminary 
and in need of further research.
For the period 1970-86, Fig. 6.12 summarises the results of our equations 
regarding this variable and its association with economic growth.
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Fig. 6.12
Market distortions and economic growth
(a) 1970-79
y = -.009x + 1 .124E-18, R-squared: .095
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e2 (BM/E)
1980-86
y = -.009x - .006, R-squared: .04
75 1 00 125 150 1 7575 2550 25 0 50
e2 (BM/E)
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6.3.10 Population Growth
Equations (1), (3), (5), and (6) demonstrate the effect of population growth on 
GDP growth.
This appears to mostly be positive, and with the exception of the 1960s, 
insignificant. These results are not surprising if we consider the population 
growth rate as a proxy for the growth of the country's labour force.
Unless a country's resources are highly stressed and scarce, the growth rate 
of the population should contribute positively to the growth rate of GDP 
(shown by a positive and significant coefficient during the 1960s). In time, if 
the population growth rates are maintained while a key resource, land, 
remains fixed, and countries have a high proportion of the labour force 
engaged in agriculture, then the positive contribution of the growing 
population can be expected to dwindle, becoming insignificant. Eventually, 
perhaps as a result of fragmentation of holdings and environmental 
deterioration, the effect of a growing population can become negative.
Fig. 6.13
Population growth rates and economic growth 
(a) 1960-69
y = 1.338X + 2.467E-19, R-squared: .189
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(b) 1970-79
y = .05x - 2.797E-19, R-squared: 2.345E-4
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1980-86
y b .805x - 5.410E-19, R-squared: .072
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(d) 1960-86
y = .126x - 3.898E-19, R-squared: .003
2  ■ ■ ■ * -  * » i  - « • ■ - ■ - » - ■
1 .5.
e2 (pop.)
Fig. 6.13 above summarises our observations regarding the relationship 
between the growth rates of the population in SSA and the economic growth 
rate over each decade, and over the period as a whole.
6.3.11 Interest Rates
Real lending rates of interest are included in equation (7) to see if these 
rates would have any direct significant effect on the growth rate of GDP.
The results indicate a negative but insignificant effect for both the 1970s and 
the 1980s at the 10% level. (No evidence for 1960s is available, due to the 
lack of reliable data).
There are two, opposite, possible effects of interest rate changes. If real 
interest rates rise, this should discourage investment and lower growth. On 
the other hand, low interest rates (often negative in real terms) have often 
meant credit being allocated on non-commercial criterion. In this case, low 
interest rates are associated with inefficient investment allocation and low 
growth. This was expanded upon in the analysis in chapters two and three.
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Fig. 6.14 and Fig. 6.15 below summarise the observed relationship between 
real lending and deposit rates of interest and growth, over the period 1970- 
86. The association between i-lend and growth during the 1970s appears 
positive, indicating perhaps, the fact that real lending rates in this period 
were very low and, at times, even negative. Clearly, this encouraged 
investment and accordingly stimulated growth. The situation was reversed 
during the 1980s, as real lending rates became much higher and positive. 
The opposite was true for the real deposit rates of interest, which appear to 
have been very low and, at times, negative. The situation was further 
worsened by the fact that the role of financial intermediation was negligible 
(as mentioned in sections 6.4 and 6.5 below).
Fig. 6.14
Real lending rates of interest and economic growth 
(a) 1970-79
y = .081x - .374, R-squared: .032
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(b) 1980-86
y = -,047x - .069, R-squared: .053
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e2 (i-lend)
Fig. 6.15
Real deposit rates of interest and economic growth 
(a) 1970-79
y s -.071x - .099, R-squared: .02
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(b) 1980-86
y s -.081x + .044, R-squared; .098
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e2 (i-dep)
6.3.12 Overall Evaluation
The results of these regressions indicate that the most significant factors 
affecting the growth of SSA are the growth rates of exports and imports, the 
investment rates, political instability, and, in the later decades the total debt 
servicing ratios. The other factors considered appeared to be significant at 
times, and not significant at others.
The explanatory power of the regressions as given by the values of 'R2, 
appear satisfactory, ranging between 0.17 and 0.77, being lowest on those 
occasions where an equation was specified especially to test the 
significance of a particular factor, thus leaving room for mis-specification 
error. For those equations with five or more explanatory variables, the value 
of 'R2' rises significantly.
This evaluation is perhaps strengthened when comparing our results with 
those of other similar studies, such as Barro (1991), where the range of the 
'R2, values was between 0.49 and 0.63 for a much larger sample of
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countries (up to 98 in most equations). On the other hand, Wheeler’s results 
(1984) for the X-sectional regression produced an 'R 2, of 0.86, bearing in 
mind that it was for one equation over the period 1970-80 only.
6.4 The Investment-ratio Function
In this section the first of two components of overall GDP growth, the 
savings-ratio or the investment ratio function, is examined. The study will be 
based on the simplified Harrod-Domar equation of the growth rate, 
discussed previously in chapter two.
Thus, given that g = s/v ,
the determinants of 's' (the savings or the investment ratio) are analysed.
It is expected that the following factors influence the savings ratio 's' :
G The ratio of government consumption to the Gross Domestic 
Product
GNPh Average per capita income
i-dep Real deposit rates of interest
Pol-ln Political instability
AP Inflation
Pop Population growth rates
It is expected that there will be a negative association between the size of 
the government sector and the savings ratio, primarily due to the crowding- 
out and distortionary effects. However, if it was not the case that 
governments in SSA 'replace' private savers and investors but complement 
them instead, then there might be a positive association between 's' and 
G/GDP.
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With regards to per capita income, it is expected that there is a positive 
relationship between this variable and the savings ratio. As income rises, a 
higher proportion of it is saved than at lower levels of income, as at low 
levels, there is little margin over subsistence.
A positive relationship between real interest rates and the savings ratio is 
also expected, as we are considering the deposit rates of interest which 
induce higher savings.
Political stability not only affects domestic savings behaviour directly, but it 
also has an indirect influence on the savings that end up overseas in safer 
investment havens. This is the endemic problem of capital flight which 
inevitably accompanies political instability. Therefore, we would expect a 
negative relationship between political instability and the savings ratio.
High inflation levels also deter saving, through effects such as 'shoe-leather' 
and 'menu' costs, which leave less surplus over subsistence for saving. We 
have allowed for the effect of inflation on the levels of interest by employing 
the real rates of interest, not the nominal ones.
A high rate of population growth indicates a high dependency ratio and 
therefore, a low savings rate. Population growth rates and the savings ratio 
are thus expected to be negatively related.
Using cross-sectional data for 32 Sub-Saharan African countries (those for 
which data is available), OLS regressions were performed for the savings- 
ratio function.
Chapter four provided a detailed description of the data collection process 
and the countries and sources involved. The results of the regression and 
the values of the coefficients of the independent variables are given below 
in Table (6 .2 ).
The table indicates that during the 1960s, the effect of G/GDP was not only 
positive, but also significant (as given by the t-values at the 5% level). This 
is perhaps explainable by the fact that the government was the biggest 
'saver' during that period. G/GDP was the most significant factor in the
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1960s and the 1970s, but it took second place during the 1980s and for the 
period as a whole (1960-86).
It was superseded by the levels of per capita income in the latter periods. 
Therefore, the level of GNP/h appears to be the next most significant factor, 
especially when pop-gr is dropped out of the equation.
Both political instability and inflation levels appear to have negative but 
insignificant effects on the savings ratio. A likely explanation is that the lack 
of significance of political instability and inflation in the saving process 
reflects the fact that it was the government which was the major force in 
mobilising savings and investment.
It was not possible to obtain interest rates for the 1960s and so AP was used 
as a proxy for this variable in the first two equations.
Table 6.2
Determination of the investment ratio.
Dependent variable : GDI/GDP (the Saving or Investment rate) 
t-values in parentheses
Equation 1
Const. Pop GNP/h G Pol-ln AP R2 n
1960-69 2.08 1.78 .006 .52 -.04 -.15 .45 32
(.96) (1.49) (2.95) (.22) (.77)
1970-79 11.92 -.24 .007 .40 i CO 4^. -.008 .40 30
(.13) (1.47) (1.91) (1.30) (.31)
1980-86 17.88 -.14 .01 .10 -.06 -.14 .38 28
(.06) (2.48) (.35) (.44) (1.39)
1960-86 6.11 -1.14 .01 .73 -.04 -.12 .73 28
(.80) (5.01) (3.9) (.24) (.99)
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Equation 2
Const. GNP/h G Pol-ln AP R2 n
1960-69 7.51 .006
CDOiCD -.21 .43 32
(1.71) (2.79) (.45) (1 .11)
1970-79 11.34 .007
COCO1o -.004 .40 30
(1.70) (1.95) (1.32) (.02)
1980-86 15.26 .005 .23 -.07 -.13 .40 29
(2.71) (1.02) (.55) (1.34)
1960-86 6.57 .01 .52 -.06 -.15 .69 29
(4.84) (3.18) (.33) (1.17)
Equation 3
Const. GNP/h G Pol-ln R2 n
1960-69 6.40 .006 .49 -.06
(1.57) (2.98) (.32)
1970-79 11.38 .007
COCO1o
(1.63) (2.11) (1.53)
1980-86 12.35 .006 .30 -.11
(3.01) (1.31) (.87)
1960-86 4.74 .01 .56 -.10
(4.79) (3.46) (.57)
.40 32
.40 30
.35 29
.67 29
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Equation 4
Const. GNP/h Pop Pol-ln G AP i-dep R2 n
1970-79 5.72 .009 -1.71 -.33 .33 -.20 .25 .59 22
(1.84) (.98) (1.08) (1.69) (.69) (.67)
1980-86 17.94 .005 -.07 -.13 -.03 -.02 .29 .41 26
(2.37) (-03) (.66 ) (.08) (.07) (.78)
Equation 5
Const. G GNP/h Poi-ln AP i-dep R2 n
1980-86 15.48 .17 .005 -.09 -.06 .19 .41 27
(.67) (2.50) (.47) (.26) (.56)
Equation 6
Const. G GNP/h Pol-ln i-dep R2 n
1970-79 9.18 .30 .01 -.18
(1.67) (2.54) (.66)
.34 .55 22
(1.23)
1980-86 15.17 .15 .006 -.10
(.64) (2.78) (.53)
.27 .41 27
(1.73)
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The deposit rates of interest have a positive but insignificant effect in all but 
one equation (Equation 6). In this formulation, the inflation rate was dropped 
out of the equation, as the rates of interest are measured in real terms, thus 
discounting inflation. The interest rate is significant at the 10% level. It was 
not possible to perform this equation for other sub-periods due to data 
problems. The fact that they appeared significant in the 1980s implies the 
increasing importance of the operation of the market and financial 
intermediation, as the rates of interest in the earlier periods tended to be 
government-determined.
The above findings are in some ways surprising (especially the roles of 
G/GDP and political instability - the latter being expected to play a more 
significant role in the saving process). The values of the 'R^' in the above 
table are not particularly high, but they are satisfactory, with only two sub­
equations scoring below 0.40. However, the best results appear to be those 
given for the whole-period equations, indicating perhaps, that the factors 
determining the investment ratio (or the savings ratio) are easier to quantify 
over longer time periods than over the relatively short term.
6.5 The ICOR function
The ICOR is a measure of the efficiency with which capital is utilised. A low 
V  indicates a more efficient utilisation of capital. If an economy is working 
below capacity, very little extra capital is needed to increase output and 
substantial growth may be associated with a relatively small incremental 
capital-output ratio (ICOR).
The factors examined for their influence the incremental-capital-output ratio 
are the following :
G The size of government consumption relative to GDP
Pol-ln Political instability
i-iend real lending rates of interest
LIT Literacy rates
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BM/E Ratio of the black market to the official exchange rates (an
indicator of distortions to the price system)
it is expected that there will be a positive association between G/GDP and 
V, indicating the lower efficiency in capital productivity that accompanies a 
large government sector. (This is expected to be true in SSA because of the 
wastage and inefficiency that, it has been argued, exists in many developing 
countries with large governments sectors).
The effect of political instability on the ICOR is positive, indicating the 
increased inefficiency of capital use in politically unstable environments. 
Instability causes disruption of production, which results in reduced 
utilisation of capital, hence the positive relationship between the two 
variables.
The role of the real lending rates of interest is expected to be negative due to 
the fact that higher rates limit investment to only high productivity projects. 
Also, higher rates of interest reduce investment and thus reduce the 
investment-to-GDP ratio.
Higher rates of literacy are negatively associated with the ICOR as increased 
education should lead to a more efficient and productive use of capital.
Finally, taking the ratio BM/E as a proxy to distortions to the price and the 
market system, this variable should be positively associated to V  since the 
increased distortions imply added misallocation of capital and hence 
increased inefficiency in its utilisation.
Again, a cross-sectional OLS regression was performed for a sample of 
thirty-two SSA countries. The results of those regressions for the period 
1960-86 (and the sub-periods) are presented in Table 6.3 below. The 
results for the 1960s are presented separately, as two particular variables 
affecting V  were not available for this period - BM/E and i-lend.
An added complication in the quantification of this function was the fact that, 
for the 1970s and 1980s, some countries had a negative ICOR ratio. This 
meant that as conditions worsened, for example, as market distortions or
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political instability increased, it appeared that a point was reached where V  
was no longer positive, but became negative, implying an actual fail in 
output with increments of capital, or a decrease in the capital stock itself.
This is not very easy to interpret. To illustrate this behaviour of the ICOR, Fig. 
6.16 presents the observed association between V  and political instability.
Fig. 6.16
Association between V  and Political Instability in SSA
Pol-ln
As instability increases, the ICOR increases, indicating a lower efficiency of 
capital utilisation, and falling increments to output (since v = AK/AY ) from 
existing (or increasing) capital stock. Eventually, a point is reached (N), 
where further worsening conditions in the form of higher political instability, 
are associated with negative V  or ICOR values. From that point onwards, 
increases in instability are associated with an increasingly negative ICOR 
(along CD).
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A negative V  implies that the increments in output (AY) between t = 1 and t = 
0 are negative, i.e. AYt1 < AYt0 . That is to say, total output has actually fallen 
between t=1 and t=0 .
This can only result if other, external, factors have contrived to reduce output, 
or to leave some of the existing capital redundant. For example, political 
instability could have become so severe, that the labour operating the 
capital is reduced to less then the minimum required for the operation of 
machines (assuming that capital represents physical capital only - 
machinery, equipment, and buildings). Alternatively, the production process 
could have become so overstaffed, that the marginal product of labour has 
become negative (too many labourers per machine impeding each other).
In the above diagram (Fig. 6.16), C'D' and C"D" represent what was done to 
obtain the regressions reported in Appendix II. Countries reporting negative 
V  values were given a positive V  (moving to C'D’), and a dummy variable 
was employed, having a value of one for each negative V  country, and zero 
otherwise.
The set of equations presented in table 6.3 have been performed excluding 
'negative v! countries from the sample. Over the period 1960-69, there were 
no negative V  countries. However, over 1970-79, three countries exhibited 
negative V  values and were excluded. These were Ghana, Uganda, and 
Zaire. Over the period 1980-86, seven countries were excluded, those 
being Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, Togo, and Zambia.
As mentioned above, further regressions were performed including those 
"negative-v" countries, but also including a dummy variable to take into 
account the fact that they had negative ICOR values. This was done in order 
to explore the effect of their inclusion on the ICOR and on the significance of 
the factors affecting it. These results are presented in Appendix II, although 
they are not particularly satisfactory.
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Table 6.3
Determination of the ICOR 
OLS Regression results
Dependent variable : v (excluding negative V  countries)
Equation 1
1960-69 only 
Const. G LIT Pol-ln R2 n
.96 .15 .03 .17 .19 32
(2 .21) (1-15) (2 .10)
Equation 2
Const. G LIT Pol-ln BM/E AP R2 n
1970-79 -53.38 .38 -.10 1.32 .14 3.37 .63 30
(.70) (.58) (1.85) (1.40) (3.88)
1980-86 25.43 -.05 -.36 .55 .03 .04 .43 20
(.06) (2.05) (2.07) (.30) (.15)
Equation 3
Const. G LIT Pol-ln BM/E R2
1970-79 -33.47 .01 -.07 1.55 .31 .40
(.01 ) (.34) (1.74) (2.81)
1980-86 25.70 -.11 -.35 .55 • .04 .43
(.16) (2 .12) (2 .22) (.48)
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Equation 4
Const. LIT Pol-ln BM/E R2 n
1970-79 -33.34 -.07 1.55 .31 .40 30
(.35) (1.78) (2.90)
1980-86 21.88 -.30 .36 .04 .29 23
(2.05) (1.67) (.73)
Equation 5
Const. G LIT Pol-ln BM/E i-lend R2 n
1970-79 14.16 -.15 i
COeg -.07 -.28 .16 22
(.36) (1.54) (.24) (1.03) (.35)
1980-86 19.51 -.51 -.23 .33 .09 .25 .31 18
(.57) (1 -21) (.99) (1.02) (.56)
For the period 1960-69, the equations indicate that the most significant 
factors affecting V  during this period appear to be political instability (Pol-ln) 
and the size of the public sector as indicated by the variable G/GDP. As 
expected, both are positively associated with V  and both are significant at 
the 5% level as indicated by the t-values for each variable. This implies that 
the greater the government intervention in the running of the economy, the 
less productive is the utilisation of capital due to government wastage and 
inefficiency. Furthermore, the greater the political instability, the lower the 
productivity of capital due to the above mentioned disruptive effects on the 
production process.
The effects of literacy rates appear insignificant as given by the t-statistics. 
What is disappointing, however, is the low value of R2 - the explanatory
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power of the variables combined. There are clearly other factors affecting 
capital productivity which are not included.
For the period 1970-79, it appears that the most significant factors were 
BM/E and Pol-ln. For BM/E, this indicates that distortions in market prices 
have a positive effect on 'v1, i.e. the more the distortions the lower the ICOR 
and so the more inefficient was the utilisation of capital. This was expected, 
as non-market allocations of capital (i.e. through government imposition) 
produce less efficient utilisation of capital.
The significance of political instability was also expected, as it is clear that 
greater instability produces lower efficiency in capital utilisation, due to the 
disruption of the production process.
Throughout the above table {with the exception of equation (5)}, the real 
lending rates of interest were excluded due to the bias introduced by the 
reduction of sample size from 32 to 18. When included (equation 5), this 
variable reduced the explanatory power of the equation by a significant 
amount. It was clear that excluding it was more advantageous than 
including it. In equation (1), AP (the inflation level) was used as a proxy for 
the effect of interest rates on V. The results indicate that this factor was 
significant in the 1970s but not in the 1980s, perhaps implying that the 
African countries became increasingly able to adjust to higher inflation rates.
For the period 1980-86, the most noticeable change is the increased 
significance of the literacy rates as a factor affecting the ICOR (at the 5% 
level). This indicates the increasing importance of education and greater 
investment in human capital, in raising the productivity of capital.
Another feature of the 1980s equations is the lack of significance of BM/E in 
its effect on the ICOR. This may be a reflection of the fact that in the 1980s, 
an increasing number of SSA countries were adopting IMF (and IMF-style) 
adjustment programmes, thereby reducing the (previously sizeable) 
distortions in market prices.
The values of the R2 in the 1970s and 1980s are higher than those for the 
1960s equation, implying perhaps the importance of BM/E in the process. 
However, all those values are disappointingly low overall, probably
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indicating that the factors included in the above equations of table 6.3 are 
not sufficient in explaining the behaviour of the ICOR, and that further 
research is necessary in this field.
6.6 Internal Vs. External factors
As a summary measure of the explanatory powers of the internal versus the 
external factors in the growth process of SSA, two equations, (10) and (11) 
in Table 6.2 above, were performed in an attempt to assess how much of the 
growth rate of GDP is accounted for by the internal or endogenous factors, 
and how much by the external or exogenous factors.
The results are interesting, but they are also preliminary. R2 is used as the 
indicative value of the explanatory powers of each group of variables.
Table 6.4
Internal Versus External factors
Values of R2 as given by equations (10) and (11) in Table 6.1
Period % explained 
by external 
factors
% explained 
by internal 
factors
%un - 
explained 
by either
Total
1960-69 07 38 55 100
1970-79 49 44 07 100
1980-86 13 75 12 100
1960-86 22 71 07 100
The table above indicates that in the 1960s, the internal factors played a 
more significant role in accounting for Sub-Saharan Africa's growth 
performance than the external factors. However, the largest part appeared
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'unexplained', perhaps implying the importance of the roles of factor 
productivities - the 'measure of our ignorance' - or what Denison called " the 
residual" (1962 and 1967).
In the 1970s, there appears to be a marked shift in emphasis, with the 
external factors becoming more significant than the internal factors, and very 
little was left unexplained. This is not surprising, as the 1970s subjected 
most of the African countries to the very harsh external shocks of the 
increases in energy prices.
In the 1980s, the situation was again reversed, with the internal factors 
becoming more significant, implying greater policy mismanagement by the 
African governments, and perhaps failure to adjust to the shocks of the 
1970s.
The overall picture for the whole period, 1960-86, also implies that the 
greater part of the explanation of the growth performance of the continent 
lies in the internal factors and policies adopted by many of the Governments 
of Africa.
6.7 Summary
The main conclusions that could be drawn from the growth equations are 
that the most statistically significant factors affecting the growth of GDP are 
the trade variables, as given by the growth of exports and the growth of 
imports, and the investment (or saving ratio) variable. The prominence of 
these factors was expected, as both traditional growth theory and the 
analysis of SSA's predicaments indicate this. These are followed in 
importance by political stability - a factor that is necessary but not sufficient to 
foster economic growth.
In the 1980s, the role of external public debt becomes important, due to the 
role that debt servicing plays in reducing the amount of foreign exchange 
available for the satisfaction of import requirements.
The results of the saving ratio regressions indicate that the levels of per 
capita income are an important determinant of saving behaviour, but it was 
also found that the governments of the SSA countries have played a positive
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and significant role in the process of saving mobilisation since 
independence, but one which has diminished in the later years.
The equations for the incremental capital-output function indicated that for 
the 1960s the most significant factors in the process were the size of the 
government sector and political instability, both displaying a positive 
association with the ICOR, implying the need for increased political stability 
and a smaller government sector involvement in investment in order to 
increase the efficiency of utilisation of capital.
During the 1970s and 1980s, the picture changes primarily due to the 
inclusion of the variable BM/E, the ratio of the black market to the official 
exchange rates, as a proxy to distortions in the market price. For the 1970s, 
this factor is significant implying that the more distorted the market price 
system, the lower is the efficiency of capital utilisation. However, the 
significance of this factor is greatly reduced during the 1980s, with political 
instability and literacy rates exhibiting the most significant effects on the 
ICOR.
In all the equations, a significant proportion of the variance of the dependent 
variable is not explained. This may indicate that, in addition to the problems 
of measuring these dependent variables accurately, there are almost 
certainly important influences on the growth process that have not been 
incorporated into the analysis.
Addendum
In an attempt to further consolidate the results of the OLS and TSLS cross- 
section regressions of economic growth, panel regressions were performed, 
whereby the same number of variables and countries were used in a 
number of equations, but the time periods were divided into five-year 
periods (1960-64, 1965-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84). This would 
provide the added advantage of a larger sample and a more detailed 
breakdown of the effects of the factors involved on the countries concerned. 
The results of the panel regressions are detailed in Appendix IV, along with 
a summary of the main conclusions of those regressions.
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One of the main purposes of performing the panel regressions was to further 
test the endogeneity of the independent variables employed in the analysis. 
More specifically, some of the endogenous growth debate concludes that 
factors such as export growth, import growth, aid and debt levels, and other 
factors may be endogenous to the economic growth process, whereby 
reverse causality is thought to exist between the growth rate of real GDP 
and, for example, export and import growth. Causality tests were therefore 
performed on the suspect variables, in an attempt to test if such an 
endogeneity has existed in the history of SSA's growth process over the 
period under study. The results, presented in Appendix IV, demonstrate that 
no strong endogeneity is perceptible.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a summary of the main results of this thesis is presented, and 
the empirical findings are related to the main policy issues in Africa. Some 
further thoughts are also expounded concerning the roles of the World Bank 
and the IMF in Africa, and finally, there is a brief discussion regarding the 
approach to Sub-Saharan Africa's economic problems - past, present and 
future.
We will begin with a summary of the econometric work of the previous 
chapters.
7.2 Summary of the Regression Results
Chapter six presented the results of the regression equations of three 
functions : the economic growth function, the investment-ratio (or saving 
ratio) function, and the incremental capital-output ratio function, in the 
following three sub-sections, the main results of each are summarised.
7.2.1 The Economic Growth Function
The main conclusions from these equations were that the most consistent 
and significant factors affecting growth over the whole period considered are 
the rates of export and import growth, the level of gross domestic investment, 
and political stability. In the later years of the study (1980-86), total debt- 
service levels became a significant factor.
The effects of literacy rates, debt stocks and inflation rates were less 
consistent than the above factors, exhibiting significance over parts of the 
period studied, but not all.
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The results regarding the effects of population growth rates, the ratio of 
Government consumption to GDP, aid levels and market distortions (as 
proxied by the BM/E ratio), exhibit generally low statistical significance, (with 
the exception of the effects of population growth rates in the 1960s, which 
appear to be positive and significant, and the BM/E ratio in the 1970s).
It is interesting to note that two factors in particular, population growth and 
the size of the public sector, appear of generally low significance. They both 
have ambivalent effects. Government can raise the investment ratio, but 
inefficient government investment will raise the ICOR. Population growth 
raises productive capacity, but may, through raising the dependency ratios, 
lower the savings ratio. Hence, both appear to have a net insignificant effect 
on growth.
An attempt was made to explore the relative impacts of internal and external 
factors on growth performance [equations (10) and (11) of Table 6.1, chapter 
six]. If the regression results are interpreted as the independent variables 
'causing' or 'explaining' the movements in the dependent variable, it 
appeared that over the 1960s, the growth rates of SSA were determined 
more by internal factors than by external factors. In the 1970s, the situation * 
was reversed with the external factors dominating, but in the 1980s, again, 
internal factors became the dominant influence on growth. For the period as 
a whole (1960-86), the internal factors appeared more than three times as 
significant as the external factors.
The tentative implications of the above are that internal factors - 
mismanagement and misguided policies by the domestic authorities - are 
largely to blame for SSA's predicament, with the obvious exception of the 
1970s.
Nonetheless, the external influences have been important. These have 
primarily come from the fluctuations of the international prices for the primary 
exports of Africa, and developed-country policies of restrictions on 
manufactured imports since the late 1970s. In many ways, the old 'aid or 
trade' debate, could now more accurately be described as the 'debt and aid, 
or trade' debate. Trade, it is argued, remains generally to the benefit of the 
richer countries, and within the poorer countries, its benefits tend to accrue 
to a small elite of people (Todaro, 1989). Yet, as Todaro puts it, the question
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is not 'to trade or not to trade' as trade is essentially beneficial, it is more 
'with whom and by how much to trade'. Many LDCs do not have such 
options. Therefore.the new approach to trade, may need to come from 
within the LDCs, rather than being imposed upon them by the richer trading 
nations. This issue will be discused in section 7.4 below.
7.2.2 The Investment-ratio
The analysis of this function resulted in the conclusion that the level of per 
capita income was the most significant factor determining savings behaviour 
over the whole period, being statistically most significant in the 1980s. This 
was followed by the size of government as proxied by the ratio of 
government consumption to GDP. During the 1960s, the effect of the 
government sector was stronger than that of the levels of per capita income, 
but this was reversed in the following decades.
This indicates that, perhaps, the government was a significant 'saver' in the 
majority of the SSA countries, particularly in the immediate post­
independence period.
This conclusion - that the SSA governments played a positive role in 
mobilising savings (and hence investment), is credible given that a large 
proportion of Africa's population are close to subsistence income levels 
(World Bank, 1981 and 1989).
The other factors included in the equations, (inflation, political instability, the 
real deposit rates of interest, and population growth rates) did not exhibit any 
significant influence on saving behaviour throughout the period under study. 
This strengthens the suggestion that the governments were the most 
powerful force in the mobilisation of savings, and that the private financial 
sector was less efficient or effective in doing so.
7.2.3 The Incremental Capital-Output Ratio (ICOR)
The results of these regressions are less clear or consistent than those of the 
above function. What is clear is that distortions to the free workings of the 
market, as proxied by the ratio of the black market exchange rate to the
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official rate, had a positive and statistically more significant effect on the 
ICOR during the 1970s, than in the 1980s, indicating, perhaps, the effects of 
the increasing application of adjustment programmes in the 1980s by many 
SSA countries.
The effect of political instability was generally more significant (statistically) 
than that of any other factor, indicating the important role of stability in 
fostering efficiency in capital utilisation. The effect of literacy rates was 
significant during the 1980s alone, suggesting the increasingly important 
role of education in raising the efficiency of capital utilisation.
As in the previous function, the role of interest rates appeared insignificant. 
This possibly indicates the weak role of the private banking sector as 
financial intermediaries, or that the rate of interest did not reflect the real 
price of capital, and therefore, it did not play an important role in its efficient 
allocation between different uses.
7.3 Policy Implications
Some policy conclusions can be deduced from the results of our empirical 
findings for Sub-Saharan Africa. These are discussed below. The main 
policy issues are regarding the roles of the market prices, investment levels, 
political instability, the size of the government sector, population growth, 
outward-inward orientation, aid and debt, and the role of other (less 
significant) factors included in the equations.
7,3.1 Market Prices
This was proxied by the ratio of the black market to the official exchange 
rates. In general, countries with significant divergences between official and 
market exchange rates, tend also to be characterised by having other prices 
not reflecting scarcities. It also indicates the direct importance of having 
exchange rates which reflect the market valuation of the currency. The 
results emphasize the importance of prices which are based on relative 
scarcities. The most significant effect appeared to be on the ICOR - the 
indicator of the degree of efficiency in the utilisation of capital. Reduction in
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government intervention, in terms of fixing prices in certain markets, such as 
agricultural producer prices, interest rates and exchange rates, can 
therefore, be expected to have a positive effect on growth. (More on the role 
of government in section 7.3.4 below).
Therefore, reducing the distortions in market prices has an effect on the 
growth rates of GDP, through improving the allocation and utilisation of 
capital, and taking advantage of the gains from international trade. This is 
particularly important for SSA as evidence points to the existence of 
significant black market activity in most of the countries in the continent 
(Hodd, 1991, Pick and Cowitt, 1960-87).
7.3.2 Investment levels
The empirical findings indicate that investment (and saving) levels are one 
of the most significant factors affecting the growth of the SSA countries (the 
other two being export and import growth levels). This implies the need for 
policies to attract further investment funds, and to a greater mobilisation of 
domestic savings.
Therefore, there appears to be a need for policies to liberalise interest rates, 
increase the role and efficiency of financial intermediaries, and perhaps, 
create special enterprise zones (as in Mauritius), and minimise the effects of 
the factors that lead to capital flight. One important factor in this regard is 
political instability.
7.3.3 Political Instability
The index used for instability produced statistically significant results in 
some equations but not in all. As previously discussed (in chapter six and 
section 7.2 above), this depended mostly on the period under consideration. 
Policies to improve stability are not easy to identify.
In the medium-longer term, it is possible that an increase in democratisation, 
so that any popular discontent could be expressed through effective, 
democratic and strong institutions will improve stability.
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The evidence of a two-way relationship between growth and stability 
suggests that a virtuous circle is possible, with improved economic policies 
leading to faster growth, which will improve stability, thus having a positive 
feedback on growth.
7.3.4 Size of Government
Our results have indicated that the size of the government sector, as 
measured by the ratio of government consumption to GDP, has no uniformly 
significant direct effect on economic growth.
However, given that we have also found that the government was a 
significant force in the mobilisation of savings, and hence investment, and 
that distortions to the market price (inevitably government instigated) were 
highly significant in affecting the ICOR, we can conclude that the indirect 
effect of the size of government on growth is important.
The role that the size of the public sector plays in affecting economic growth 
has perhaps been over-stressed in the literature, particularly by the IMF and 
previously, the World Bank (discussed in section 7.4 below). More important 
than the actual size of the public sector is the efficiency of this sector's 
operation. It is the latter which is more detrimental to economic growth than 
the former. It may be true that
'Africa needs not just less government but better government - 
government that concentrated its efforts less on direct interventions 
and more on enabling others to be productive' (World Bank, 1989).
Yet at this stage of development, SSA may need the direction and guidance 
of a well-informed and (relatively honest) government, taking the example of 
the governments of the NICs during the 1960s and 1970s, who played a 
significant role in directing their countries' development efforts at the start 
(see chapter three).
However, efficiency improvements often necessitate the reduction of the size 
of this sector, as over-staffing in SSA is common. There is much to be said 
though, for the reduction in the size of government and its intervention (in 
prices and tariffs, for example) being undertaken gradually, as many of the 
African countries are politically fragile. In particular, the decrease in
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employment brought about by reductions in the numbers of civil servants is 
very likely to create greater dissatisfaction and unrest. (This was discussed 
at greater lengths in chapter five, section 5.2). The case for gradualism in 
this respect is strengthened by past experiences of attempts to introduce 
structural adjustment instantly, which have often resulted in unrest, and very 
often, the adjustment programme has had to be abandoned (Killick, 1984, 
and Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970).
Therefore, the role of the government perhaps, needs to be more of a strong 
director of the development effort, and less of a direct intervenor. This 
involves reforming the operation of marketing boards, and relaxing price 
controls, particularly on producer prices. This should also help in 
eliminating the operation of black markets in many SSA countries. The 
liberalisation of the exchange rate system, has also been prescribed as a 
necessary policy reform in SSA (see chapter three, and Little, Scitovsky & 
Scott, 1970).
7.3.5 Population Growth
Our results indicate that the rate of population growth had no direct 
significant effect on economic growth, except in the 1960s, when the effect 
was positive and significant. In the later decades, the lack of significance is 
possibly due to the net effect of two forces : the growing population acting as 
a source of increased labour input, and, at the same time, raising the 
dependency ratio.
As the availability of fertile agricultural land is fixed, it is quite plausible that 
the output enhancing effects of increased population will diminish overtime. 
This interpretation would suggest that there are benefits from slower 
population growth, as population levels rise overtime.
ZJL6-—Onward: Inward jarientaUQ.n
Our results indicate the very significant role that the growth of exports and 
imports play in the growth process. This appears to support the arguments 
in favour of increased openness and trade for the SSA countries. This
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would call for policies to increase both exports and imports, such as the 
reduction of export and import duties, the reduction (or elimination) of 
restrictions on the foreign exchange and domestic prices, particularly 
producer prices, more diversification in the export base, and perhaps, more 
actively seeking new markets for their products, outside of Europe and North 
America, such as the Far and the Middle East.
However, the important role of trade in the growth process of the African 
economies does not necessarily imply indiscriminate liberalisation of trade. 
Given the vulnerability of those countries to external shocks, more attention 
might to be directed towards increasing regional and inter-developing- 
country trade and cooperation (Todaro, 1984, and World Bank, 1989), while 
at the same time exporting goods to and importing technology from their old 
trading partners.
7.3.7 Aid and Debt
Aid did not have a statistically significant effect on SSA’s growth, thus giving 
support to neither the pro-aid nor the against-aid arguments.
The results concerning the debt issue indicate the increasing significance of 
the negative effects of debt service payments on growth, as we moved from 
the 1960s to the 1970s and 1980s. This implies the need for policies to 
reduce the effects of the debt burden on the SSA borrowers.
The debt problem became severe in the late 1970s/early 1980s, when world 
real interest rates did not fall in line with inflation, and instead, started rising 
significantly (See chapter three). Prior to that, during the 1970s, the real 
international lending rates were low, and sometimes even negative. 
Naturally, this encouraged the developing countries to borrow, as it seemed 
to be a relatively easy option to adopt in order to solve their economic (and 
especially, their balance of payments) problems, Serious problems started 
to develop in the early 1980s, when the international real rates of interest 
began to rise significantly, and at the same time, the capability of the 
borrowers to service and repay their loans was not increasing in line. The 
debt crisis became severe around the mid-1980s, when some of the 
heaviest debtors (Mexico Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina) threatened to
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default and to declare a moratorium on service payments (Todaro, 1989, 
and George, 1988).
Policies to alleviate the debt problem are required of both the borrowers and 
the lenders. On the one hand, the lenders need to adopt measures such as 
increasing debt relief, rescheduling, and perhaps outright write-offs for part 
of the debt for the most-severely indebted countries, as their growth effort 
appears crippled by their service payments.
On the other hand, borrowers need to adopt policies to greatly increase their 
foreign exchange earnings. These include positive steps to stimulate the 
growth of exports, greater control (if possible) on the type of imports, and a 
conscious effort not to be too eager to borrow - tempting as borrowing may 
seem as a short-term solution to economic problems, especially when there 
is also an eagerness to lend by lenders (as was the case in the mid-late 
1970s and early-1980s - see chapter three for further details).
The problem of Sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt burden has received far 
less attention than that of other regions, primarily because of the relatively 
small size of the region’s debt and the commensurate minimum exposure of 
commercial banks. Recently, more than 70% of Africa’s external debt is 
estimated to be owed to bilateral and multilateral institutions (compared with 
less than one half of Latin America’s debt). This implies that the problem is 
more intergovernmental in nature, rather than one which could threaten the 
stability of the international financial system. Naturally, this does not reduce 
the seriousness of the problem, it merely adds to the effective 
marginalisation of the continent from the international economy.
Sub-Saharan Africa’s role as a force in the world economy has been 
decreasing, as the region’s impact on world commodity prices, financial and 
trade systems is falling. This is also reflected in the reduced attention 
awarded to the continent, except when the catastrophic problems of famine 
and wars are in the news. Such marginalisation detracts from the economic 
potential and wealth of the region, as well as from the relatively successful 
experiences of some countries (such as Botswana, Mauritius, Madagascar, 
and arguably, Ghana) . It further reinforces the continent’s predicaments and 
defers any possible solutions, unless those come purely from within the 
continent (Martin, 1991).
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The debt-crisis of the region as whole shows no signs of abating, as very few 
countries are experiencing strong enough rates of economic growth to be 
able to service their debt and invest in development at the same time. The 
recent monumental increases in debt-service payment-upwards of 20% in 
many cases, and close to 40% in others (such as Zambia’s position in 
1991 )-is an unsustainable situation, as this drains out more than one-quarter 
of a country’s total export revenues which would have been available for 
financing the development effort.
Furthermore the often-quoted debt-service ratios often understate the true 
debt burden on the African economies, as they reflect actual payments of 
service, not payments and obligations due (nafziger, 1993). If debt arrears 
and reschedulings are taken into account, the real debt-service ratio for 
many countries could well be close to 50%. This drain on scarce foreign 
exchange will clearly constrain imports, exports, and subsequently, 
economic growth. Moreover, if the countries concerned have no choice but 
to fully service their debt, then they could be entangled in a vicious circle of 
reduced imports and exports indefinitely (in theory), or incurring payments 
arrears, unless external intervention in the form of significant debt-relief, for' 
example, is affected.
What the regression results indicate is that there is, indeed, a significant 
negative impact of rising debt-service payments on the rate of economic 
growth. However, to “apportion the blame” for the creation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s debt crisis between external and internal factors would, at this stage, 
be an exercise of little importance, as it could be argued that, on this 
particular issue, it is more important to urgently resolve the problem than 
explain it-important as the latter may be for the avoidance of a repetition of 
the earlier mistakes and the crisis of the early-mid-1980s. An urgent solution 
is crucial because the sooner the problem is resolved, the less resources 
are drained put of the country in service payments and, hopefully, the more 
the investment in development.
The debt crisis was created because of factors within and beyond the control 
of African governments (see Chapter Three). Any solution would have to 
involve external assistance and strong debt-relief measures, avoiding, as 
much as possible, incurring new loans. Instead, a concentration of policy on
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increasing exports in order to generate sufficient funds to service what debt 
is left unwritten-off and finance the growth effort is far more important.
7t3-8 Other Factors
The other factors included in the empirical work were the terms of trade, 
literacy rates, interest rates, and inflation.
The results concerning the terms of trade have indicated that this factor 
showed most significance in the 1970s, when commodity prices were at their 
most volatile. The policy implications appear to be two-fold. Firstly, 
reflecting trends in world commodity prices in prices to producers will give 
producers the best possible signals on which to base their decisions. 
Secondly, in conditions of uncertainty, there is much to be said for policies 
that encourage diversification of sources of export revenues. Legitimate 
exercises in this direction for governments within the context of a market 
economy might be supplying producers with price forecasts and information 
on alternative products.
In the case of literacy rates, the results were mixed, but the main conclusion 
that could be made was that the significance of education as proxied by the 
literacy rates was increasing through time. The policy implications of this are 
clear. There is a need to greatly increase access to education and literacy, 
due to the positive effect of this on labour productivity, population growth 
rates, life expectancy, etc. (see chapters three and six for a greater 
discussion of the subject).
The levels of real interest rates had the expected signs in the investment- 
ratio equations, but were not statistically significant. They also appeared to 
have no influence on ICORs. The main policy conclusion on the role of 
interest rates were discussed in chapter six, and they are mainly related to 
the role that interest rates play in encouraging savings and efficiently 
allocating investment. However, as more investment decisions are left to 
market forces, the importance of financial liberalisation will perhaps 
increase.
Finally, the rate of inflation did not prove to be consistently statistically 
significant in the growth process of SSA. The inflation rates in Africa
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became relatively high in the 1980s, whereas before that, they were 
relatively low (see chapter three). One of the main adverse effects of high 
inflation is that it can lead to financial repression, if nominal interest rates are 
kept fixed. It is noteworthy that the real interest rates were more significant in 
equations without the inflation rate. Similarly, the occasions when inflation 
was significant were when there was no data on interest rates.
Thus a modest rate of inflation (under 10%) is probably an important policy 
objective.
7.4 Trade, Aid and Debt
It may not be far from the truth to say that 'free trade' is little more than 
theoretical and political rhetoric. It is also true that, on balance, trade is 
beneficial. Self-sufficiency is not only virtually impossible to maintain in the 
long-term in the small economies that are typical of Africa, but it can also 
involve inefficiency. On the other hand, excessive specialisation, although 
attractive in the short-term, may not be optimal in the long-term. Indeed, it 
has been argued that one of the SSA's greatest problems is the lack of 
diversification in the trading base of most countries in the continent (Chapter 
three).
Within Africa, it appears that there remains untapped potential for inter­
regional trade and cooperation. Previous attempts have not always 
succeeded (such as the failure of the East African Community in 1977). The 
World Bank (1989) strongly recommends greater regional integration and 
cooperation.
The debt problems of SSA are not unrelated to the trade problems of the 
continent. Before 1970, loans were largely official (inter-governmental) and 
concessionary. By the late 1970s, the problem started to become serious, 
as many LDCs started borrowing commercially to cover their balance of 
payments deficits and to finance government spending. This option was 
made relatively easy by the apparent eagerness of the international 
commercial banking sector to lend money to third-world governments. This 
was brought about by the fact that the oil-price rises of the 1970s led to the 
accumulation of enormous wealth by the oil-exporters, which was re-cycled
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by the international commercial banking sector, many of it as loans to the oil- 
importing developing countries (see section 7.3.7 above). This involvement 
of the commercial banking sector meant that the nature of the loans was 
becoming increasingly non-concessional and more problematic to pay back, 
especially since the early 1980s, when world real interest rates began to rise 
significantly.
After 1980, the situation approached crisis levels; with many LDCs 
experiencing deterioration in both their current and capital account 
balances, due to factors such as the dramatic falls in commodity prices, 
global recessions (particularly in 1981-82), increased developed-country 
protectionism, rising debt-service obligations, significant capital flight 
problems, and the corresponding reluctance and decline in lending by the 
international banks.
Even though most of the debt was concentrated in four Latin American 
countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and Venezuela), SSA's debt problem is 
arguably the most serious, because of the continuing declining incomes and 
stagnating economies of most countries in the continent. Furthermore, the 
problem of capital flight is very serious in most LDCs, with an estimate of 
$200 billion flowing out of the heavily-indebted countries between 1976 and 
1985 - equivalent to approximately to 50% of total LDC borrowing (Todaro, 
1989). One example of this flight capital in SSA is an estimate for Kenya of 
$1.3 billion (equivalent to 40% of aid to Kenya) in the four years to June 
1991; and Kenya is not one of the worst cases in point (Guardian 
Newspaper, November 1991).
This raises the issue of aid. There is no clear evidence of a positive effect of 
aid on economic growth (Chapter 6). It is argued that aid donors give aid 
because it is in their strategic, political and/or economic self-interest to do so. 
LDCs also accept aid for various reasons. Apart from the corrupt and rent- 
seeking factors, virtually all of the advice they get from the developed- 
countries' economists is that aid is a crucial and essential ingredient in the 
development process, helping relieve the foreign exchange and the savings 
constraints. Aid could also be viewed as a powerful political weapon in the 
hands of the recipient government against opposition (Todaro, 1989).
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Academic arguments aside, the best testimonies come from donor aid 
officials and recipients' reactions, good examples of which are:
’The biggest single misconception about the foreign aid program is 
that we send money abroad. We don’t. Foreign aid consists of 
American equipment, raw materials, expert services and food - all 
provided for specific development projects which we ourselves 
review and approve.... Ninety-three percent of aid funds are spent 
directly in the United States to pay for these th ings '1.
As to recipients' thoughts, a statement from the Santiago Resolution:
'What the Third World must ask of the international order is... a 
genuine transfer of real resources, not the present ’aid’ charade'.
(Todaro, 1989).
Thus the controversial debate over the role of aid in the development and 
growth process continues (e.g. Riddell, 1987 , Mosley, 1987 , and Cassen, 
1986 ). Perhaps the only agreement over the essential role of aid is for 
emergency relief (in famine and natural disaster conditions), but not much 
more concord regarding the other roles of aid exists.
7.5 The IMF and the World Bank
The reason why we briefly discuss these two organisations is because of the 
important role they play in channelling funds to developing countries, and 
the conditionality of their lending which has important implications for the 
debtor countries.
IMF lending has traditionally been aimed at the alleviation of balance of 
payments problems. Their perspective was short-term, usually less than 
eighteen months. Policies upon which the loans were conditioned were 
devaluation and reduction in government spending. Since many 
governments were reluctant to devalue, most of the adjustment fell on 
expenditure reduction, with a subsequent contraction of the economy 
(Killick, 1984).
Structural adjustment programmes concentrated on improving economic 
efficiency by relying more on the operation of the markets for resource 
allocation. There may be long-term benefits to the developing countries of 
implementing such structural change programmes, but there are also
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disadvantages and problems. Evidence shows that these measures can 
disproportionately hurt the lower and middle-income groups, thus striking at 
the heart of development efforts (Todaro, 1989). They have also been the 
roots of political instability in many countries, particularly due to the IMF 
demands of abolishing subsidies on, for example, food and fuel.
In an attempt to assess the impact of the IMF's stabilisation programmes, 
Killick et. al (1984), drawing on work by Conors (1979), the ODI, and 'in- 
house' IMF reviews, arrive at the following conclusions:
i. Even though there appears to be some improvement in the current 
account balance of the countries involved in an IMF programme, this 
tendency exhibits low statistical significance when tested. This weak 
statistical significance also appeared when testing the effect on the overall 
balance of payment deficit, even though the deficit appeared to be moving in 
the right direction (falling).
ii. Regarding the IMF objective of the elimination of foreign exchange 
restrictions, little direct evidence was found on progress in achieving this 
objective.
iii. 'Subordinate' IMF-programme goals, such as the reduction of inflation 
and the improvement of the economic growth rate also failed to significantly 
materialise, with no statistically significant results appearing in the tests.
While accepting that the evidence surveyed is mixed, they maintain that it 
also provides little support over the whole period surveyed (1960-1980, 
given the various sources) for the proposition that
'Fund programmes generally gave short-run defla tionary 
consequences, even though there are examples of such results and 
there are indications of a possible worsening in recent years'.
Their study also stresses the fact that it is a
'misconception that reducing inflation is a prime objective of Fund 
programmes’.
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All targets, even if they are included in a programme, remain subordinate to 
the primary objective of the improvement of the balance of payments 
situation,
iv. Finally, even though the Fund has always maintained that income 
distribution is not involved in their programmes as an objective, arguing that 
distributional objectives are beyond their control and should remain subject 
to independent national government design, it is clear that Fund 
programmes will affect the distribution of income. This is primarily through 
the effect on consumption and investment of suggested policies for the 
improvement of the balance of payments (such as the increase of tradable 
goods vis-a-vis non-tradables, favouring some industries against others, and 
the removal or re-direction of subsidies). Killick et. al argue that given the 
results of tests on other variables (discussed above),
'By and large, the results have shown programmes to have limited 
impact.... it does not seem likely that the distributional effects were 
very potent either.’
Flowever, they stress, that there is a shortage of systematic evidence but that
’it is most likely that the majority of programmes have no statistically 
significant effects one way or the other’.
While accepting that better conclusions could be obtained from a more 
detailed case-by-case study, the evidence surveyed above points to limited 
success in many programme-operating countries. Perhaps the best 
testimony to this comes from an evaluation from Fund staff for internal 
purposes, relating to 1980 stand-bys and 1978-80 Extended Fund Facilities :
'The Fund cannot be complacent about a situation in which almost 
half of the cases have not shown any progress towards balance of 
payments viability. This may be no worse a record than in earlier 
years, although previous reviews have not presented the material in 
the same way and so d irect com parisons are not 
possible...nevertheless, there is a clear need to improve the success 
rate..,'
However, more recently, the importance of a case-by-case conditionality 
approach has been realised. This did not mean the abandonment of the 
conditions attached to a loan, but more flexibility was introduced within those
258
conditions, depending on the political as well as the economic feasibility of 
their implementation. This appears to be a more promising approach, given 
the structural weaknesses of many less developed economies (chapter 
three).
7.6 SSA : Past, Present and Future
The 1960s could be described as the first development decade for SSA, as 
it was the period of independence for most countries. Many governments 
embarked upon their development efforts enthusiastically, forming ambitious 
development plans and programmes. The results of those plans were, for 
the most part, disappointing (Wickins, 1986). Although actual GDP growth 
figures were relatively high, the foundations of the growth effort appeared 
not too solid, where most of the growth resulted from the export of primary 
products, with very little diversification.
During the 1970s, those weak structural foundations surfaced in the face of 
severe external shocks. Growth of GDP decelerated significantly - with 
some countries experiencing negative growth (for example Ghana and 
Mozambique). Perhaps the deterioration of the African economies is best 
summed up by the fact that the incomes of its people remain so low and their 
access to basic services so limited. GNP per capita in SSA as a whole grew 
annually by only 0.8% on average over the period 1970-79. For low-income 
SSA, this figure was -0.3% - an actual fall in per capita incomes (World 
Bank, 1981). In no other part of the World was the deterioration in per capita 
income so strong. For example, in South Asia and the low-income 
developing countries (the most suitable regions for comparison with SSA), 
the respective figures were 1.5% and 1.6%. Thus, basically, Africans were, 
for the most part, worse off in 1980 than they had been in 1970, despite 
having higher school enrolment rates and slightly longer life-expectancy (i.e. 
an improvement in other development indicators).
The 1980s have been described by the World Bank (1989) as the lost 
decade of development, when they should have been the third decade of 
Africa's development. As early as 1981, the Bank, in the Berg Report, began 
talking of an economic crisis in SSA. By 1989, their reports still talked in 
terms of a crisis.
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By the end of the 1980s, according to the Bank, twenty out of the twenty-nine 
Least Developed Countries are in SSA2. More to the point in encapsulating 
Africa's predicament, the living standards of the African people today are 
almost as they were thirty years ago (World Bank, 1989). These facts 
summarise the desperate state reached by most of the SSA countries.
Three distinct periods in Africa's history can be identified : 1961-72; when 
per capita incomes grew, 1973-80; a period of stagnation, and 1981-87; a 
period of nearly continuous decline.
The factors behind SSA’s economic decline have been the central feature of 
this study. They were categorised as external and internal factors. The 
results of the regression analysis seem to indicate the greater significance of 
the internal factors than the external factors (without discounting the effects 
of the latter). Also, the examination of political instability as a factor in the 
economic growth process raises the possibility that better economic policies 
will improve stability, thereby further improving the growth prospects.
However, the record of Africa is not all gloom. Several countries, most 
notably Botswana, but also Mauritius, Kenya, Cote D’Ivoire, and Zimbabwe 
have succeeded in improving average living standards significantly since 
1960.
A more disappointing fact is that what is known as the 'Green Revolution1 
appears, for the most part, to have bypassed Africa. Other LDCs, particularly 
the Asian countries, have made use of improved hybrid seeds, soil 
conservation and other technologies aimed at increasing the productivity of 
the agricultural sector. Yet, most of the African countries have only 
marginally applied such technologies (Todaro, 1989). Sustained industrial 
expansion has yet to reach most of Africa.
As maintained throughout this study, it would be hazardous to make too 
many generalisations concerning a solution or a way forward for Sub- 
Saharan Africa. Yet, from the results of our econometric work, we may infer 
that policy reforms need to be directed at improving the performances of 
exports and imports, speeding their growth and improving their 
competitiveness, increasing investment levels and, somehow, reducing or 
eliminating the political fragility of the area. Naturally, this implies a
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framework of more sound and coherent economic management concerning 
all aspects of the African economies.
NO TES
(1) Former U.S. aid official W. S. Gaud "Foreign aid : What is it, how it 
works; why we provide it” , Department of State Bulletin 59, no. 1537,1968.
(2) Benin, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Malawi, Lesotho, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Mali, 
Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso).
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APPENDIX I 
Definitions and Sources of Variables
GDP
Gross Domestic Product at constant (1980 prices) factor cost (or market 
prices if factor cost is not available) in terms of the local currencies. World 
Bank - World Tables (WB - WT). This is defined by the WB as being derived 
as the sum of the value added in all sectors. However, due to some 
discontinuity in the calculation of this series, and the fact that data had to be 
collected from two different editions of the World Tables, with a different base 
year in each edition, the figures were re-calculated in order to obtain values 
for all the series with a common base year. This was achieved by choosing 
a base year, 1980, which was the World Tables' chosen base year in the 
third edition. This method of standardising the base year was also applied 
in the calculation of the GDI, G, and P series.
or
Growth rate of GDP. This was arrived at by calculating the decade average 
of the annual percentage changes of GDP at factor cost from the WB - WT 
data (as standardised above). For those countries for which there were data 
deficiencies in individual years, the decade averages as calculated by the 
WB in the World Development Reports (WDRs), 1978-91, were used instead.
a
Implicit overall GDP deflator. WB - World Tables, base year, 1980. This is 
the index of the annual ratios of GDP at current market prices to GDP at 
constant market prices. It provides a comprehensive measure of the 
aggregate price movements of all goods and services making up GDP.
As mentioned above, the fact that different editions of the WTs used different 
base years in different editions, the pre-1980 data was standardised using 
1980 as the overall base year.
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£General Government Consumption at constant (1980) market prices in local 
currency, WB - World Tables (WT), used as a ratio to GDP. As defined by the 
WB, this is the sum o f :
(i) Purchases less sales of consumer goods and services, reduced by 
the value of the own-account production of fixed assets,
(ii) Compensation of employees,
(iii) Consumption of fixed assets, and
(iv) Any payments of indirect taxes.
Again, the series was re-calculated in terms of one base year, 1980.
IQ I
Terms of Trade index (1980 = 100). World Bank, World Development 
Reports, 1978-91, and World Bank, 1981, "Accelerated Development in 
Sub-Saharan Africa", and 1989, "Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth".
As defined by the WB, the terms of trade index measures the relative level of 
export prices compared with import prices. This is calculated as the ratio of 
the export price index to the import price index, it shows changes over time 
of the level of export prices as a percentage of import prices.
The export price index measures changes in the aggregate price level of a 
country's merchandise exports over time. It is the unit value index of the 
UNCTAD,
The import price index measures changes in the aggregate price level of a 
country's merchandise imports over time. It is also the unit value index of 
UNCTAD.
X-gr
The growth rate of merchandise exports in constant terms, calculated from 
quantum indexes of exports, WB - WT, 1988-89 edition.
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As defined by the WB, these comprise the market value of movable goods, 
including non-monetary gold. It also includes the market value of related 
distributive services up to the customs frontier of the exporting country (that 
is f.o.b. - free on board value).
M :.q r
The growth rate of merchandise imports in constant terms, calculated from 
quantum indexes of imports, WB - WT, 1988-89.
The Bank defines merchandise imports as the market value of movable 
goods whose ownership changes from a foreigner to a resident (includes 
non-monetary gold).
D
Public/Publicly guaranteed long-term debt in millions of US dollars 
outstanding at the year end, WB - WT, various editions, used as a ratio to' 
GDP (as defined by the WB's debt reporting system).
TDS/GNP
Ratio of total debt service on public and publicly guaranteed debt to gross 
national product, % (all in $US millions). World Bank - World Debt Tables, 
1988-89 edition. TDS was defined as the sum of the principal repayment 
and interest payments of public and publicly guaranteed loans.
E
Official exchange rate, period average of market exchange rate, given as 
local currency per one US dollar, IMF - IFS (International Financial 
Statistics) yearbook, 1987.
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Band
The real lending rate of interest, %, IMF - IFS, 1987. Bank lending rates are 
defined as those rates which meet the short-term and medium-term 
financing needs of the private sector. They are defined in nominal terms. In 
order to convert these rates into real terms, the inflation rate is subtracted 
from the nominal interest rate.
i-dep
The real deposit rate of interest, %, IMF -IFS, 1987. Again, the IMF lists 
those in nominal terms, and defines the bank deposit rates as those offered 
to resident customers for demand, time and savings deposits. To obtain the 
real deposit rates of interest for each country, the inflation rates were 
subtracted from the nominal interest rates.
Pol-ln
Political instability index; final figure giving the total number of politically 
unstable years (the higher the index the more unstable the country in 
question). The exact calculation of this index is detailed in chapter five. 
Essentially, this involved according a value of one to every year in which a 
politically destabilising event occurred (coup, attempted coup, coup plot, or 
war), and zero otherwise. The index was weighted so as to give greater 
emphasis to the more serious events (e.g. wars and successful coups 
d'etat). Data on political upheavals was obtained primarily from the Europa 
publication "Africa South of the Sahara", 17th edition,1988.
£
The saving ratio; calculated as the ratio of Gross Domestic Investment to 
GDP (GDI/GDP), WB - WT, 1988-89 edition.
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yThe incremental capital-output ratio; calculated as the ratio s/gr (ICOR - 
Incremental capital-output ratio).
EQP
Average population growth rates, based on mid-year estimates of population 
for countries, WB, WDRs, 1978-9.
UI
Adult literacy rates (%). This is the number of adults with the ability to both 
read and write, expressed as a percentage of the adult population, age 
fifteen years and over. WB - WDRs, 1978-91.
GDI
Gross Domestic Investment, denominated in millions of the local currency, 
being the sum of gross domestic fixed investment and the change in stocks, 
WB-WT.
BM/E
Ratio of the black market exchange rate to the official exchange rate. Data 
for the black market exchange rates was obtained from "Picks currency 
Yearbooks ", 1963-1986, and Cowitt, P. 1986-87, "World Currency 
Yearbook".
The black market rates were quoted in terms of the local currency per one 
U.S. Dollar. The final ratio was calculated by taking decade averages of 
both the official and the black market echange rates, and dividing the latter 
by the former.
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UE
Life expectancy at birth, being the number of years a newborn infant would 
live if prevailing patterns of mortality for all people at the time of his or her 
birth were to stay the same throughout his or her life. WB - WT, various 
editions, and WB - WDRs, 1978-91.
QDA
This the indicator used to capture the effect of aid. It is the ratio of ODA to 
GNP, D.A.C. - OECD, WB - WDR and other WB reports ("Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", 1981, and "Sub-Saharan Africa From 
Crisis to Substantial Growth", 1989).
Official Development Assistance (ODA) consists of net disbursments of loans 
and grants made on concessional financial terms by official agencies of the 
members of DAC (the Development Assistance Committee) of OECD and 
members of OPEC, to promote economic development and welfare. This 
definition is meant to exclude purely military assistance. ODA also includes 
the value of technical cooperation and assistance.
GNP/h
Gross National Income per capita, as defined by the WB - WT, 1988-89 
edition. Data given in terms of 1980 US Dollars.
The 32 countries included in the sample are :
Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo,
Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
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Appendix II
Following are the results of regression equations with V  as the dependent 
variable, but with the countries having a negative value for V  included, 
along with a dummy variable in each equation, having the value of one for 
every country which has a negative V, and zero otherwise.
For the period 1960-69, there were no negative V  countries.
For 1970-79, those were Ghana, Uganda, and Zaire.
For 1980-86, these countries were Cote D'Ivoire, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Niger, Nigeria, Togo, and Zambia.
Following are the equations for those periods.
Equation 1
Const. G LIT Pol-ln BM/E D R2 n
1970-79 -19.18 .34 -.03 .02 .17 53.73
(.53) (.15) (.02) (1.44)(2.30)
1980-86 -60.51 .71 .53 .12 .27 52.21
(.46) (1 ■ 35) (.17) (1.46)(2.94)
Equation 2
Const. G LIT BM/E D R2 n
1970-79 -19.10 .34 -.03 .17 53.98 .45
(.54) (.16) (1.47) (2.67)
1980-86 -60.60 .71 -.54 .28 52.06 .38
(.47) (1.41) (1.57) (5.0)
The results of the above equations are not particularly satisfactory, with 
BM/E and LIT being closest to significance at the 10% level.
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Appendix III
Despite the fact that the Granger-Sims test performed in the previous 
chapter yielded insignificant results, the mere possibility of reverse 
causation between economic growth and political instability, implies the 
existence of simultaneous equation bias. This means that OLS is no longer 
suitable as a method of estimating regression equations (Gujarati, 1988). 
Instead, two-stage least squares (TSLS) is employed in order to improve the 
results. This method was applied to all the equations in section 6.3 which 
contained political instability as one of the independent variables.
Following are the results of these equations , and the associated partial 
regression graphs of the variables involved.
As will be made clear, the results are not too dissimilar to those of the OLS 
equations, implying that no significant difference arises from the reverse 
causality which could exist between growth and instability.
Equation 1
Const. GDI Poi-ln LIT G AP X-gr R2 n
1960-69 10.79 .16 -.63 -.08 -.33 -.27 .06 .59 25
(2.44) (2.41) (2.41) (2.61) (2.09) (1.52)
1970-79 2.64 .44 -1.22 .04 -.41 -.70 .41 .36 25
(1.75) (1.69) (1.29) (1.95) (2.15) (2 .01)
1980-86 -1.47 .05 -.10 .07 -.05 .02 .35 .73 27
(.76) (.74) (2.94) (.56) (.64) (4.53)
1960-86 .56 .18 -.34 .01 -.08 -.06 .20 .61 20
(1.61) (.18) (.33) (.63) (.77) (2.35)
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Egggtipn 2
Const. AToT Pol-ln Pop ODA AP LIT R2 n
1960-69 2.76 .004 -.19 1.42 .05 -.39 -.03 .50 25
(1.03) (.96) (1.66) (.25) (2.44) (.82)
1970-79 5.42 .001 -.52 -.44 .18 .10 .009 .42 25
(2.20) (.71) (.21) (1.20)(.26) (.18)
1980-86 .63 .001 -.50 -.27 .11 .04 .11 .40 27
(1.16) (2.40) (.28) (1.34) (.75) (3.06)
1960-86 -12.6 .001 -.41 2.73 .46 -.18 .14 .36 20
(.38) (.60) (.84) (1.06) (1.39) (.87)
Equation 3
Const.Pop G Pol-ln ODA LIT R2 n
1960-69 1.02 1.76
(-39)
.009
(-02 )
-.20 -.05 -.03 
(.16) (.13) (.22)
.32 25
1970-79 7.75 -.52
(.74)
-.10 -.48 .19 .03 
(1.08) (2.94) (1.15) (1.02)
.34 31
1980-86 .89 -.76
(.82)
.03
(.24)
-.42 .12 .11 
(2.60) (1.44) (2.95)
.35 27
1960-86 4.90 -.49
(.23)
.09
(.74)
-.21 .02 .02 
(.58) (.05) (.22)
.28 20
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Equation 4
Const. ODA Pol-ln AToT R2 n
1960-69 10.49 -.52 -.94 -.004 .24 25
(1.70) (2.40) (.98)
1970-79 4.33 .16 -.27 .001 .22 25
(1.06) (1.1) (2 .11)
1980-86 7.57 .05 -.59 .002 .34 27
(.68 ) (3.11) (1.75)
1960-86 6.42 .09 -.60 .001 .23 20
(.66 ) (1.23) (.92)
Equation 5
Const. D GDI Pol-ln LIT X-gr ODA R2 n
1970-79 2.39 -.09 .14 -.27 .01 .07 .24 .53 30
(1.72) (1.63) (1.37) (.49) (.80) (1.48)
1980-86 -1.67 -.01 .05 -.05 .06 .35 .02 .74 27
(1.69) (.31) (.17) (1.06) (4.05) (.12)
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Equation 6
ConstMend Pol-ln TDS M-gr GDI R2 n
1970-79 2.20 .07 -.23 -.38 .18 .14 .56 22
(.51) (1.03) (.83) (2.14) (1.72)
1980-86 5.01 -.23 -.50 -.35 .36 .16 .50 27
(2.01) (2.09) (1.89) (3.20) (2.01)
Partial regression graphs of selected variables
(1) AToT &gr 1960-69
y = 4.188E-4x + 1.166E-18, R-squared: .065
0 ..
2000 400C-3000 - 2000 1 000 3000-1 000 0
e2 (AToT)
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(2) AToT & gr 1970-79
y = ,001x - 1 .311E-19, R-squared: .224
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 700C-3000 -2000 -1 000 0
e2 (AToT)
(3) AToT &gr 1980-86
y k ,001x - 1.376E-19, R-squared: .063
750 100C-1 250 -1 000 -750 -500 -250 0 250 500
e2 (AToT)
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(4) AToT & gr 1960-86
y & 1.022E-4x + 1.440E-19, R-squared: .004
2-
1 000-2000 -1500 -1 000 500 1 500 200C-500 0
e2 (AToT)
i-lend& gr 1970-79
y = ,065x + 1.931E-19, R-squared: .016
o...
1 08 2 46 4 2 6 80
g2 (i-lend)
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(6) i-lend & gr 1980-86
y = -8.462E-6x - 5.638E-19, R-squared: 5 .498E-10
1 5 20-1 5 -1 0 0 5 1 05
e2 (i-lend)
(7) i-dep & gr 1970-79
y = ,207x + 3.452E-19, R-squared: .024
o...
3 2 1 20 3
e2 (i-dep)
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(8) i-dep & gr 1980-86
y s -.146x - 1.014E-18, R-squared: .066
-12.5 7.5 2.5 2.5 7.5 1 01 0 5 0 5
e2 (i-dep)
TDS & gr 1970-79
y = -,959x + 6.836E-19, R-squared: .136
1 1.5 22 1 .5 5 0 5
e2 (TDS/GNP)
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(10) TDS & g r 1980-86
y = -,138x + .012, R-squared: .018
2 4 6 826 4 0
e2 (TDS/GNP)
(11) Debt & gr 1970-79
y = -.24x - 6.571 E-19, R -squared: .127
4 2 2 4 6 861 4 1 2 1 0 8 0
e2 (D/GDP)
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(12) Debt & g r 1980-86
y s >.008x - 1.371E-19, R-squared: .012
20 30 40 501 0-40 -30 - 20 -1 0 0-50
e2 (D/GDP)
(13) Pol-ln & gr 1960-69
y = -.126x + 7.467E-19, R-squared: .022
2 3 43 2 1 045
e2 (Pol-ln)
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(14) Pol-ln & g r 1970-79
y = -.147x + .064, R-squared: .009
1 2 34 3 2 1 0
e2 (Pol-ln)
(15) Pol-ln & gr 1980-86
y s -,496x + .058, R-squared: .222
1 0,
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
2 3 4 63 2 1 55 4 1 0
e2 (Pol-ln)
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(16) Pol-ln & gr 1960-86
y = -.12x + .033, R-squared: .003
o...
1.5 1.5 21 0 55
e2 (Pol-ln)
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APPENDIX IV
Following are the results of the panel data regressions, performed in order to 
further examine the robustness of the cross-section regressions, performed 
in Chapter Five, over the period 1960-85.
The Main (summary) conclusions of these results are:
A. Equations (1) and (2) support the new or endogenous growth theory 
premise that the level (as well as the growth rate) of human capital, proxied 
in the equation by literacy rates, is significant in determining economic 
growth.
B. Equation (3) supports the premise that the level of per-capita income
significantly affects the rate of population growth, but that this effect is not 
particularly strong.
C. Equation (4) demonstrates that economic growth significantly affects
political stability (negative and significant association between economic 
growth and political instability).
D. Equation (5) demonstrates that the growth of exports in a given year is
not significantly affected (or determined) by the growth of exports in the 
previous year.
E. However, equation (6) shows that lagged investment ratios have a 
positive and significant effect on current investments. Thus, lagged GDI 
would be a good instrumental variable for current GDI.
F. Equations (7) and (8) demonstrate that there is a more significant 
effect of economic growth on political instability than vice-versa. However, 
that is not to say that political instability has no significant effect on economic 
growth (as equation (1) demonstrates), but that the reverse causation is 
stronger from growth to instability rather than the other way round.
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G. Equations (9) and (10) demonstrate interesting results, as they show 
that there is a more significant impact of lagged growth on current 
investment than vice-versa, that is to say, if GDP-gr in year T is high, then 
GDI in year 't+1' will also be high.
PANEL REGRESSIONS
(t-statistics in parenthesis)
(1) Dependent Variable: GDP-gr
R2 = 0.38
n = 3 1
nob = 106 (no. of observations)
£ LH D-LIT Pol-ln X-gr
1.73 0.05 0.09 -0.08 0.26
(2.5) (1.84) (1.81) (5.56)
(2) Dependent Variable: GDP-gr
Ft2 = 0.24
n = 2 8
nob = 97
£ JJI D-LIT* GDI POP Poi-in X-gr
0.86 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.07 -0.07 0.25
(1.86) (1.61) (1.55) (0.13) (1.44) (4.85)
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(3) Dependent Variable: POP, 1960-84
R2 = 0.10
n = 2 7
nob = 72
£  QPP-h
0.0 0.004
(1.67)
(4) Dependent variable: Pol-ln
R2 = 0.15 
n = 2 7  
nob = 72
£  GDP-gr
0.0 -0.73
(2.7)
The following equations have been estimated using instrumental variables:
(5) Dependent Variable: X-gr
R2 = 0.10
n = 7 2
£  X-gr (-1)
0.86 0.05
(0.44)
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(6 ) Dependent Variable: GDI
R2 = 0.55
n = 72
£  .G.QU-.1)
2.02 0.83
(8.60)
(7) Dependent Variable: GDP-gr
R2 = 0.18
n = 7 2
£  Pol-ln H )  GDP-gr (-1)
1.24 -0.1 0.29
(1.0) (2.23)
(8 ) Dependent Variable: Pol-ln
R2 = 0.27
n = 7 2
£
6.47
GDP-gr (-1) 
-0.53
(2 .10)
Pol-ln M )  
0.65 
(3.33)
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(9) Dependent Variable: GDP-gr
R2 = 0.17
n = 72
£  GDP-gr (-1) GDI.fcl)
-0.38 0.29 0.05
(2 .10) (0.80)
(10) Dependent Variable: GDI
R2 = 0.57
n -  72
£
1.89
GDI (-1) 
0.76 
(7.61)
GPP.-ar.fcl)
0.41
(2.04)
(11) Dependent Variable: GDP-gr
R2 = 0.51
n = 7 2
£
2.07
LJI
0.05
(2.40)
Pol-ln
-0.05
(1 .20 )
0.25
(4.77)
* D-LIT is the change in literacy rates.
GDI
0.11
(2 .12)
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